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2ABSTRACT
The thesis deals with Mahmud Shaltut (Shaykh al-Azhar 1958- 
63), an important contemporary Muslim scholar and reformer.
Following a chapter on Shaltut's life and reform work at the 
Azhar, the material is divided into three major chapters, on 
tafsir, law and social issues.
The chapter on tafsir describes the innovations of the 
Muhammad cAbduh school of tafsir and the work of certain key 
scholars prior to Shaltut, with a brief description of 
developments after Shaltut. A detailed analysis of his 
methodology with reference to form and content aims to show the 
extent of his contribution to that development.
The chapter on law is divided into four sections: (1) the 
sources of law, where we see Shaltut's theoretical exposition of 
the workings of the Sharlca; (2) Shaltut's fatwas, which 
illustrate his practical application of those principles; (3) 
penal law, chosen as a case study because Shaltut deals with it 
in considerable depth, and (4) comparative jurisprudence, an area 
in which Shaltut took an especial interest in connection with his 
work for al-taqrib bayna al-madhahib (the coordination of the 
schools of law).
The chapter on social issues initially describes the normative 
values of Islamic society, then proceeds to describe aspects of 
the contemporary reality, with reference to the impact of 
imperialism and the religious response to the needs of the modern
3age in general. The ideal and the real are thus juxtaposed in a 
way which reflects Shaltut's own writings. In this area 
comparative analysis is of particular value in view of the widely 
differing responses to particular issues; we have selected for 
discussion controversial issues such as polygamy, birth control 
and financial transactions, in order to highlight those 
differences.
An attempt has been made throughout to place Shaltut within 
the context of modern Muslim scholarship and to define his own 
contribution in each area.
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INTRODUCTION
The reform work of Muhammad cAbduh and his Syrian disciple 
Rashid Rida has received much attention from specialists in 
Islamic studies; there is no doubt that Muhammad cAbduh was a 
pioneer in many respects, and has become known for his conviction 
that Islam was sufficiently flexible to adapt itself to the 
modern age. In more recent times, however, there is something of 
a lacuna as regards studies on individual Islamic religious 
scholars, as opposed to Western-educated intellectuals or 
political activists. Prominent members of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
for example, have received a certain amount of attention, but 
there is no outstanding figure from the class of culama', at 
least in the Arab world, to compare with Muhammad cAbduh as 
regards the extent of his influence and the radical departure 
which he represents. Perhaps as a result of this, the class of 
culama’ has been somewhat neglected, and dismissed by many, who
feel that they are isolated from the mainstream of Muslim
society, "losing touch with the thought of the age".1 While there
is no doubt some truth in this, we aim to show that it is
possible for even a scholar with a wholly traditional training, 
like Shaltut, to be deeply concerned with communicating his 
knowledge to ordinary Muslims and with its application to 
contemporary problems. Shaltut could not be described as an
1H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1947, p. 122.
9isolated example, since he was widely respected by his colleagues 
at the Azhar, and ultimately attained the most prominent position 
within it.
It is to be hoped that parts of this thesis will provide a 
study of Islam "from within", in particular Chapter Three, which 
deals with Shaltut's work in the area of Islamic law. In this 
area, it will be seen that Shaltut has a special contribution to 
make, being more thoroughly versed in Islamic jurisprudence than 
Muhammad cAbduh or Rashid RidS. Here, some of Shaltut's ideas 
will counteract certain impressions which have been conveyed by 
Orientalists; there is a tendency on the part of many of them to 
narrow the scope of the Sharica. For example, Schacht claims that 
"there are no fines in Islamic law", no concept of negligence, 
and no concept of mitigating circumstances or theory of attempt.2 
However, we will see in Chapter Three that fines are considered 
to be a valid form of punishment, on the basis of the practice of 
the Prophet.3 The concept of negligence is covered in Shaltut's 
section on civil and criminal liability, where he discusses the 
various juristic opinions on the case of the employee who damages 
goods which are in his care, and where the issue at stake is in 
fact whether or not the employee was negligent.4 The case 
described by Shaltut where a man, happening upon his wife in the
2Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984 (repr.), pp. 176, 182 and 187 respectively.
3Infra, p. 207.
4 Infra, p. 241.
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act of adultery, kills either or both of them, takes into account 
the violent emotions of the husband ("al-qhavrat allatT tushbihu 
al-junun") as a mitigating circumstance.5 Finally, Shaltut 
mentions the famous hadith where the Prophet says that when two 
Muslims fight each other to the death, both the one who slays and 
the one who is slain will go to Hell, since the victim was in 
fact trying to kill his slayer. Shaltut elaborates on this, 
explaining that in order to earn this guilt the person must 
actually make a physical attempt to commit the crime as opposed 
to just thinking about it.6 This is therefore an example of the 
theory of attempt. It is to be stressed that neither of these 
examples represent innovations on the part of Shaltut; all are to 
be found in works of classical jurisprudence. Shaltut's main 
achievement here was to illustrate the scope of the Sharica and 
present it in a straightforward and untechnical manner while 
remaining true to the heritage of Islamic scholarship.
It is to be hoped also that Shaltut's work will present a more 
optimistic picture of the potential of the Sharica as a dynamic 
force which can survive in the twentieth century. Malcolm Kerr, 
for example, writing in 1966, felt that there was no longer any 
question of Islamic law forming the comprehensive basis of an 
entire legal structure, and that reformist interpretations of it
5Infra, pp. 215-16.
6A1-Islam, cAqida wa-SharIca , Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 13th
ed., 1985, p. 327.
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could "retain their integrity only as a catechism".7 Jansen 
asserts that ijtihad (the use of independent thought in evolving 
the law as opposed to relying on the judgement of classical 
scholars) "serves to justify in retrospective the changes that 
are brought about by outside forces", notably Western influence.® 
Again, Jansen lays much stress on the influence of Western 
ideas and values on modern Quranic exegesis, almost to the extent 
of portraying that influence as its raison d'etre.9 While Shaltut 
inevitably refers in general terms to the the evils of 
imperialism and the undesirability of Muslims’ turning away from 
their own culture in order to imitate that of the West, he is not 
a scholar who is involved in Orientalist-Muslim polemics, as will 
be seen in Chapter Four; his work is not distorted by an over­
defensive attitude or burdened by frequent references to Western 
standards. We feel therefore that it has a certain integrity 
which gainsays the aforementioned generalisations concerning 
Western influence.
Shaltut stands out among recent Shaykhs of the Azhar by virtue 
of his overriding concern to reach ordinary Muslims, through 
public lectures, broadcasting and publications. In these he 
strove to de-mystify the Islamic sciences, for example quoting
7Malcom H. Kerr, Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal
Theories of Muhammad cAbduh and Rashid Rida, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1966, p. 15.
8J.J.G. Jansen, The Interpretation of the Koran in Modern 
Egypt, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1980, p. 91.
9Ibid., pp. 93-94 and 97.
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sources and underlying reasons in his fatwas rather than giving 
bare answers to the questions asked. As will be seen in Chapter 
One, however, he was not just a scholar but actively involved in 
reform issues which affected not only the Azhar but Muslims 
worldwide, most notably his activities in the cause of al~taqrib 
bavna al-madhahib (the coordination of the schools of law), and 
his efforts to improve Sunni-Shici relations.
As a secondary source on Shaltut we would mention only Wolf- 
Dieter Lemke's "Mahmud Saltut (1893-1963) und die Reform der
Azhar", published in 1980, which concentrates, as the title
suggests, on Shaltut's reform activities within the Azhar. We
have therefore dealt relatively briefly with this aspect of
Shaltut's work in order to avoid duplication. Lemke had the same 
difficulty as this writer in finding detailed sources for 
Shaltut's life,10 and we have both had to rely on relatively 
brief articles in periodicals such as Ma.jallat al-Azhar. While 
there is a brief exposition of the reform ideas of al-Maraghi 
(Shaykh al-Azhar 1928-29, 1935-45) in order to illustrate the
continuity of Shaltut's ideas with al-Maraghi*s, we have referred 
only in passing to Muhammad cAbduh’s reform work, which is amply 
dealt with in other works.
The core of the thesis bases itself on Shaltut's own writings; 
however, it was felt necessary to place Shaltut within the 
perspective of modern Muslim scholarship, and to this end we have
1°Wolf-Dieter Lemke, Mahmud Saltut (1893-1963) und die 
Reform der Azhar, No. 1 of series "Islam und Abendland", 
Frankfurt: Peter D. Lang, 1980, p. 34.
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had recourse to the works of numerous Muslim and Orientalist 
scholars in the various fields covered. There is inevitably a 
degree of subjectivity in the selection of cases for comparison, 
but it is to be hoped that there are no glaring omissions in the 
overall picture presented.
The form of this thesis was dictated to a great extent by the 
nature of Shaltut's work, which could be said to fall 
approximately into the three categories of tafsir, law, and 
social issues. There are always drawbacks to any system of 
categorisation, however, and a degree of overlap between the 
different categories. For example, Shaltut deals with social and 
legal issues in his tafsir, and comments which are made on his 
style of writing in a particular chapter may apply equally to his 
writings which fall into a different category. There is therefore 
an attempt to maintain continuity between the chapters, with 
cross-references where necessary, and to keep repetition to a 
minimum.
We would refer the reader to the abstract for a brief 
description of Chapters Two, Three and Four, adding here only 
that conclusions have been drawn throughout the thesis, so that 
there is no overall conclusion at the end. In view of the wide 
range of areas covered by Shaltut, it seemed more appropriate to 
make comments or draw conclusions as matters arose, rather than 
delay this to the end of the thesis; an overall conclusion would 
therefore have involved little more than repetition. A cohesive 
picture of Shaltut emerges throughout the thesis, and the picture
14
is a human one, with its strengths and weaknesses; we did not 
feel inclined to "sum up" the human being in a few brief lines at 
the end which may have served to detract from the picture rather 
than enhance it.
* * * * * * * * * * *
The Quranic translations contained in this thesis are mostly 
based on the revision of N.J. Dawood's translation carried out by 
Mahmud Zayid and published by Dar al-Choura in Beirut. However I 
have made modifications where I felt it necessary in the 
interests of fluency and/or clarity.
After the first full mention of one of Shaltut's works, the 
title is often given in an abbreviated form, e.g. Tafsir, cAgida 
wa-Sharic a , Mugarana. I have omitted for convenience the 
diacritical marks on Shaltut's name and on the titles of his 
works after their first mention, as well as on words in common 
usage such as Qur'an, Sharica and sura.
Arabic words in footnotes are placed within quotation marks 
rather than being underlined, in order to avoid confusion with 
titles of works cited.
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CHAPTER ONE 
SHALTUT’S LIFE AND REFORM WORK
1) Biographical Details
Shaltut was born on 23rd April 1893 in a farming village of 
Lower Egypt called Minyat Bani Mansut in the district of Itay al- 
Barud in the province of Buhayra.1 It is most probable therefore 
that like the majority of Azhar students, he was from the peasant 
class. After learning the Qur'an by heart, Shaltut was enrolled 
in 1906 at the new Religious Institute of Alexandria, one of the 
four mosque schools affiliated to the Azhar, for the primary and 
secondary stages of education, where he was consistently top of 
his class. In 1918 he graduated from the Azhar with his calxm 
diploma (Shahadat al-cAlimiyyat al-Nizamiyya), obtaining the 
highest mark for his year group.
In 1919 he was appointed to teach at the Alexandrian 
Institute, and during his time there he was active in academic 
circles, publishing articles on the religious sciences in the 
institute's press. Already in the early 'twenties he took an 
interest in the issue of Azhar reform.2 In 1927 he was 
transferred to teach at the Higher Division (al-Qism al-cAli) of 
the Azhar.
1 Unless otherwise stated, details in this brief biographical 
sketch will be taken from cAdad Mumtaz (special edition to mark 
Shaltut's appointment as Shaykh al-Azhar, Majallat al-Azhar, 30 
(1958/59), preceding Part 4 (October 1958), no page numbers.
2Wolf-Dieter Lemke, Mahmud Shaltut (1893-1963) und die 
Reform der Azhar, p. 46.
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When al-Maraghi was first appointed Shaykh al-Azhar in 1928, 
Shaltut openly supported his reform plans, but it seemed the 
Azhar was not yet ready for radical reform and strong opposition 
forced al-Maraghi's resignation the following year.3 Al-Maraghi's 
rival, the more conservative al-Zawahiri, was appointed to the 
rectorship, but faced unrest from the more progressive elements 
in the Azhar. These circumstances led to the dismissal of Shaltut 
and several others on 17th September 1931.4
During his period of dismissal Shaltut worked as a lawyer in 
the Sharica courts5 while continuing to publish his views on
reform. In 1935, however, the year when al-Maraghi began his
second term of office as Shaykh al-Azhar, Shaltut was reinstated
and appointed WakXl (Vice-Dean) of the Kulliyyat al-Sharica
(Faculty of Law),6 and then Inspector of the Religious
Institutes. From then on his career at the Azhar went from
strength to strength.
3Daniel Crecelius, The Ulama and the State in Modern Egypt, 
Phd Dissertation, Princeton University, 1967 (microfilm), 
pp. 308-11.
4Crecelius states that nineteen "insurgents” were included 
in a group of seventy shaykhs who were being forcibly pensioned 
off on the pretext of advancing age - see ibid., p. 314. See 
Lemke, op. cit., pp. 90-91, for the names of some of those who 
were dismissed with Shaltut.
5 See cAlI cAbd al-Raziq, Al-Marhum al-Ustadh al-Akbar al- 
Shaykh Mahmud Shaltut, in Ma.iallat Ma.imac al-Luqhat al-cArabiyya, 
19 (1965), p. 150, where the author tells us that he worked in
partnership with Shaltut during that period.
6This was one of the three Azhar faculties, the other two 
being the Faculty of Arabic Language and the Faculty of Theology.
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In 1937 he represented the Azhar at an international 
conference on comparative law held at The Hague. There he gave a 
lecture on the nature of Islamic law which was well received and 
which won recognition for the Sharica as a viable and independent 
source of law from the delegates.7 In 1941 he was admitted to 
Jamacat Kibar al-cUlama' on the basis of his paper on civil and 
criminal liability, and became its youngest member. In 1946 he 
was chosen as a member of Majmac al-Lughat al-cArabiyya, and in 
1950 he was appointed General Supervisor of Islamic Culture and 
Research at the Azhar, which gave him an opportunity to develop 
relations with the rest of the Arab and Islamic world.
In 1957 Shaltut was appointed Consultant to the Islamic
Conference, and on the 9th November of that year the President 
issued a decree appointing him to the position of WakD. al-Azhar 
(Vice-Rector).8 On October 21st 1958, his elevation to the rank 
of Shaykh al-Azhar was announced.9 Shaltut was then sixty-five 
years old.
Throughout his academic career Shaltut's activities in many 
committees and societies reflected his wide-ranging interests. He 
was a member of al-Lajnat al-cUlva li'l-cAlagat al-Thagafiyyat
7The lecture concerned civil and criminal liability, and is 
likely to have been similar or identical in content to the thesis 
he submitted in 1941 for admission to Jamacat Kibar al“cUlama~'- 
see Lemke, op. cit., p. 128, fn. 1. This dissertation is now to 
be found in Shaltut's cAgida wa-Sharica , pp. 392-429.
8The resolution is published in Malallat al-Azhar, 29
(1957/58), preceding Part 6 (Dec. 1957).
9This resolution is published in cAdad Mumtaz.
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al-Kharijiyya of the Ministry of Education, al-Majlis al-Acla 
li11-Idhac a, and al-Lainat al-cUIya li-Mac<Inat al-Shita", and 
presided over Lajnat al-cAdat wa'1-Tagalid of the Ministry for 
Social Affairs. Within the Azhar Shaltut was a member of many 
academic committees, including those which dealt with law and 
economics, geography and history and the Arabic language.10 In 
1948 he was involved in the founding of Jamacat al-Taqrib bayna 
al-Madhahib (the Society for the Coordination of the Schools of 
Law). He delivered lectures on tafsir in Par al-Hikma and Duwar 
al-Taclim, published many articles in newspapers and periodicals, 
and his morning radio broadcasts on religious topics were highly 
popular.11
During his rectorship Shaltut received visits on an 
unprecedented scale from many international figures including 
politicians, journalists, academics and prominent men of various 
religions.12 His visitors included the heads of state of Iraq, 
Yemen, Cameroon, Burma, Cyprus, Ethiopia, and the Vice-President 
of India.13 He himself made several visits abroad, including 
visits to Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia.14
30Muhammad Mahdi cAllam, Al-Marhum al-Ustadh al-Akbar al- 
Shaykh Mahmud Shaltilt, in Ma.jallat al-Azhar, 35 (1963/64), p. 155.
1JlMd., p. 158.
12Ahmad Hasan al-Zayylt, Al-Imam al-Akbar al-Shavkh Mahmud 
Shaltut, * in Ma.jallat al-Azhar, 35 (1963/64), p. 644.
13cAllam, op. cit., p. 162.
14 Ibid., p. 161.
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His published works have been collected into five main 
volumes: "Tafsir al-Qur'an: al-ajza* al-casharat al-u!5", "Al^
Islam: cAqTda wa-SharTca", "Al-Fatawa", "Min TawjThat al-Islam" 
and "Min Huda al-Qur'an", all of which have run into several 
editions and received a wide distribution throughout the Arab 
world. He also produced a text-book for students at Kulliyyat al- 
SharTc a in collaboration with Muhammad cAli Sayis, entitled 
"Muqaranat al-Madhahib fi'l-Figh" .
By all accounts Shaltut was a very popular choice for the 
position of Shaykh al-Azhar; it was the first time that Ma.jallat 
al-Azhar devoted a special edition to mark such an appointment, 
and in it were printed letters and telegrams of congratulation 
from numerous notables in Egypt and abroad, representing many 
organisations and countries.15
Shaltut has been described by several people as a gifted 
orator, having a powerful voice and a commanding presence.16 
During his period of dismissal from the Azhar, his Friday sermons 
at the Amir Muhammad cAli TawfTq Mosque attracted large numbers 
of people.17 His obituaries all refer admiringly to his tenacity 
in clinging to his reform ideas and his indefatigable activities 
in the service of Islam. Al-Zayyat relates an anecdote in order 
to illustrate Shaltut's integrity: when cAbd al-Majid Salim was
15See cAdad Mumtaz.
16cAbd al-Raziq, op. cit., p. 150, and al-Zayyat, op. cit.,
p. 645, and conversation with Dr. ZakT Badawr on 23rd May 1988.
17cAbd al-Raziq, op. cit., p. 151.
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appointed Shaykh al-Azhar (in 1950)f he asked King Faruq to 
appoint Shaltut as Wakil. FSrUq agreed only on condition that 
Shaltut would cease teaching and delivering sermons at the Amir 
Muhammad cAli Mosque at Qasr al-ManTl. Al-Zayyat was charged to 
convey this message to Shaltut, who replied in anger that he 
would prefer to be dismissed from the Azhar again and suffer 
poverty with his children than compromise his honour, and that he 
would rather work for God at the Amir mosque than for Satan at 
the Palace as Wakil of the Azhar.18
Shaltut was admired for the boldness of certain of his 
fatwas;19 in particular the f atwa concerning "the raising up of 
Jesus" (rafc cTsa), in which he maintained that it was not an 
essential part of the Islamic creed to believe that Jesus had 
been physically raised up to be with God in heaven, where he now 
remains, waiting for the end of the world when he will descend. 
This fatwa was first published in al-Risala, and raised a storm 
of protest so that Shaltut was obliged to write a second article 
in defence of his position.20
He was also admired for his gallantry in scholarly disputes, 
or what may be termed as "adab"; another article published in al- 
Risala , in which Shaltut drew a distinction between the different
1BAl-Zayyat, op. cit., p. 644.
19Muhammad Rajab al-BayyumT, Sadaqat al-Fikra bayna Shaltut 
wa' 1-Risaia, in Ma.jallat al-Azhar, 36 (1964/65), p. 153.
20Both articles are now contained in Shaltut's Al-FatawS, 
12th ed., Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1983, pp. 59-82; they will be 
discussed in some detail in Chapter Three.
21
roles of the Prophet (e.g. ordinary human being, qadT, messenger 
of God, etc.) in order to determine the status of particular 
ahadith (i.e. upon whom and to what extent they are binding), was 
opposed by Muhammad al-Khidr Husayn (Shaykh al-Azhar 1952-54). 
However, in this case the argument took place in a civilised 
atmosphere with due respect on both sides. Shaltut is described 
as welcoming the criticism, and a well-known anecdote recounts 
how, in the face of expectations of a rift between the two men, 
Shaltut announced: "Man asqata al-Khidr gad asgata nafsahu"
("Whoever rejects al-Khidr does so to his own detriment").21
The importance which Shaltut attached to independent thought 
is illustrated by an incident which occurred relatively early in 
his career, around 1938. At that time he visited the Zagazlg
Institute in the province of Sharqiyya in his capacity of
Inspector of Religious Institutes. There the students had been 
taught according to the Shafici school that it was sunna to 
pronounce the niyya (declaration of intent) aloud. Shaltut asked 
a class of students in the presence of their teacher to give the 
definition of sunna; they replied that it was something which is 
rewarded if performed, but not punished if omitted. Shaltut, 
however, told them that it is an action which was performed or 
approved by the Prophet, and was most emphatic in recommending 
that the students should ask for evidence so that they could
21Al-BayyumT, op. cit., pp. 153-54.
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judge matters such as the pronouncement of the niyya for
themselves instead of taking them on trust.22
In the last years of his life Shaltut suffered from ill- 
health. He apparently suffered a stroke even before his
appointment as Shaykh al-Azhar.23 For at least a part of his 
period in office he suffered from paraplegia and was confined to 
a wheelchair.24 In 1962 he moved his office to his own house.
This move is variously attributed to his poor health and to his
disillusionment with the government's interference in Azhar 
affairs.25 Probably there is some truth in both postulates.
On 25th November 1963, at the age of 70, Shaltut was taken 
into Cairo’s Al-Agouza Hospital. There his condition worsened 
until a day after undergoing prostate surgery, he died of a heart 
attack on December 13th. The funeral was held the following day 
after the jumc a prayer at Al-Azhar Mosque, and he was buried in a 
private cemetery nearby.26
2) Shaltut's Reform Work
22Anecdote related by Dr. Zaki Badawi to this writer on 23rd 
May 1988.
23Conversation with Dr. BadawT, 23rd May 1988.
24 Al-Zayycit, op. cit. , p. 645.
25Lemke, op. cit., pp. 238-39.
26These details are taken from a report in the New York 
Times, December 14th 1963, reproduced in Moslem World, 54 (1964), 
p. 148.
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It is not clear precisely why in 1906 Shaltut was sent to the 
Alexandrian Religious Institute in preference to the mosque 
school at Tanta which lay nearer home. What is certain is that 
the Alexandrian school was at that time the most progressive of 
the religious institutes. It had been founded in 1903 under the 
administration of the Azhar, and Muhammad cAbduh had been able to 
implement some of his reform ideas there, including the 
introduction of "al-culum al-haditha" such as the natural and 
mathematical sciences, and the encouragement of independent 
thinking.27 Shaltut must have been influenced in his reform ideas 
and his general intellectual outlook by the progressive 
atmosphere at the Alexandrian Institute, where he experienced the 
cooperation between the religiously motivated visions for reform 
of Muhammad cAbduh and the state interest in reform.28
By the 'twenties, in view of the growing rift between the 
state educational system and the Azhar system, the generally low 
standard of Azhar graduates and the problems they faced in the 
labour market, the need for reform was widely acknowledged; even 
the conservative al-Zawahirx accepted this.29 The conflict 
centred on the extent of the proposed reforms; al-Zawahiri 
proposed superficial reforms which affected the structure of 
courses but not their content,30 while the more progressive-
27Lemke, op. cit., pp. 36 and 42.
28Lemke, op. cit., p. 37.
29Ibid., p. 93 and Crecelius, op. cit., p. 311.
30Lemke, op. cit., p. 242.
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minded culama * including al-MaraghT and Shaltut, like the 
government, looked for more meaningful reform.
When al-Maraghi was first appointed to the rectorship in 1928, 
he presented a "memorandum" to King Fu'ad in which he laid out 
his ideas for reform.31 The ideas presented therein gained wide 
support among the reform-minded culama' including Shaltut, and 
raised great hopes among them.
In the memorandum, al-MaraghT praised the efforts of medieval 
scholars and the past work of the Azhar, but lamented the fact 
that in more recent times religious leaders had become 
intellectually lazy, abandoning original thought (i.itiha’d) , and 
beoming isolated from the world and everyday life. These men were 
inadequate as preachers and defenders of Islam.32 He referred to 
the ineffectiveness of the reform attempts of the past twenty
years, and called for changes of a more fundamental kind,
including a change in teaching methods.33
Al-Maraghi believed that the learning material should be 
pruned of superfluous or false elements such as manifold and 
contradictory interpretations and bidac (blameworthy 
innovations). The curriculum should be purged of sectarianism
31 This memorandum was originally published in al-Ahram, 5th 
and 7th August 1928; it has been translated into English in
Moslem World, 19 (1929), pp. 183-95, under the title: "A Defense
of Reforms in al-Azhar". For a German version and comments see
Lemke, op. cit., pp. 65ff. As we do not have access to the 
original Arabic, we will refer in our discussion to the English 
translation.
32Al-MaraghT, A Defense..., pp. 183-84.
33Ibid., p. 186.
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(madhhabiyya), and legal rulings should be brought in line with 
modern knowledge and circumstances. He recommended the study of 
other religions and their histories in order to better defend 
Islam, and the widening of the syllabus to include the study of 
secular subjects such as the natural sciences, as well as foreign 
languages including their history and philology. He asked that 
modern educational methods be employed;34 this meant 
concentrating on the "development of the powers of the mind" 
rather than traditional methods of rote-learning.35 He referred 
to the inadequacy of the old text books which were abstruse and 
unsystematic in their arrangement, and called on those professors 
who were able to understand them to "set forth the old learning 
in the new ways".36
He felt that the archaic manner of instruction in the Sharica 
had led to its abandonment in many cases, in the belief that it 
was not suited to modern times. He therefore called for the 
exercising of ijtihad, while preserving the essential core of the 
religion.37 The actual legal rulings ought to be studied in 
conjunction with the principles of jurisprudence, in order to 
promote a fuller understanding of the workings of the Sharica.3B 
He criticised the prevailing emphasis on theoretical rather than
34 Ibid., p. 187.
35 Ibid., p. 189.
36 Ibid., p. 193.
37Ibid., p. 188.
38 Ibid., p. 187.
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practical matters, and the lack of general knowledge on the part 
of Azhar professors, gadls etc., resulting in a narrow outlook.39
Al-MarSghI additionally called for a unification of the Azhar 
system with the government's Par al-cUlTTm and Madrasat al-Qada' 
al-$harcI , and made suggestions for more efficient structuring of 
divisions and grades, and for making realistic adaptations to the 
labour market so that graduates could be sure of obtaining 
suitable employment.40
Soon after the commencement of his second period of office, in 
1936, al-Maraghi did in fact implement a reform programme, but it 
mostly concerned organisational or administrative matters and did 
not entail far-reaching changes.41 Subsequent to this, political 
circumstances, not least the Second World War, were not in any 
case favourable for the implementation of reforms. Whether for 
political reasons or through a lack of real resolve, al-Maraghi 
achieved virtually nothing of what he had originally hoped for.42
During al-MaraghT's second term as Shaykh al-Azhar, Shaltut 
and others gradually became disillusioned with his failure to 
take decisive action.43 Shaltut therefore took the initiative and
39 Ibid., p. 190.
40Ibid., pp. 188-95, passim.
4]Crecelius, op. cit., p. 319.
4 2 Ibid., p. 321, and Lemke, op. cit., pp. 148-49.
43A1-Zayyat, op. cit., p. 643, and al-Bayyumi, op. cit., 
p. 150. Al-MaraghT himself is described as rather dispiritedly 
admitting his failure to implement effective reform - see 
Muhammad Muhammad al-Madani, Amthila..., in al-Risala, 11, No. 
512 (26th April 1943), p. 327.
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put forward his own ideas for reform. In fact his ideas did not 
differ substantially from those of al-MaraghT, and Shaltut 
himself stressed the continuity of his reform ideas with those of 
cAbduh and al-MaraghT; Lemke describes the main difference 
between them as being Shaltut's greater determination to 
succeed.4 4
There are two main sources for Shaltut’s views on reform: a 
list of suggestions for the reform of Jamacat Kibar al-cuiama’ 
which he raised before that body at a meeting on 5th November 
1941, only three months after his election thereto, and a lecture 
on educational policy at the Azhar entitled "Al-Siyasat al- 
Taw.iThivvat al-cIlmiyya f i 11-Azhar", which he delivered in 
February 1943 at the Azhar.
Jamarat Kibar al-cUlama' was originally created in 1911 under 
the name of Hay*at Kibar al-cUlama. It was charged among other 
things with the task of exerting religious control over the 
c ulamaT', and of carrying out "al-wacz wa * i-irshad" (preaching and 
providing spiritual guidance to the Muslims). There was however 
no formal training for the culama' to become preachers or 
missionaries; in fact their traditional education made them ill- 
equipped to communicate with the uneducated (at least in the 
religious sense) mass of Muslims.45
44Lemke, op. cit., p. 147.
45Ibid., pp. 129-31; Lemke describes subsequent attempts to 
provide training for al wacz wa'l-irshad, but concludes that 
there was no real commitment to this up until the time when 
Shaltut made his suggestions - see ibid., pp. 132-34. For 
additional information about the inauguration of this body see
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In his famous suggestions46 Shaltut makes it clear that he
feels that the Jama** a has not lived up to original expectations.
In the preamble to his suggestions he quotes from the original
1911 statutes:
...the members of Hay* at Kibar al-cUlamcT' should 
be beacons of knowledge, preservers of the Sharica 
and of the language of the Qur'an, so that 
troubled hearts can turn to their knowledge, and 
agitated souls find rest in their guidance...
He states that the Muslim community still looks to this body to
promote and strengthen the cause of Islam and defend it against
attack, and to elucidate the precepts of the Sharica.
He therefore suggests the setting up of a permanent academic 
board for the Jamac a, which will work to achieve the following 
aims:
(1) To defend religion in general and Islam in particular, in 
accordance with modern methods of study and research;
(2) to investigate disputes or differences between culama', 
and to lay down criteria in order to differentiate between that 
which is bldr a and that which is not (i.e. in order to clarify 
the areas in which differences are permissible and need not lead 
to dispute);
Bayard Dodge, Al-Rzhar: A Millenium of Muslim Learning,
Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1961, pp. 142-43.
46The full text of these suggestions is reproduced under the 
title of Iqtirah marfuc ila Jamacab Kibar al-cUlama', in al- 
Risala, 9, No. 437 (17th Nov. 1941), pp. 1415-16. Slightly
shortened versions can be found in al-Madani, Safha Bayda1 min 
Jihad Shaltut fi sabTl al-Islah wa'l-TagrTb bayna al-Muslimin, in 
Ma.jallat al-Rzhar, 35 (1963/64), pp. 651-52, and al-Bayyumx, op. 
cit., p. 151.
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(3) to compile a list of isra' Tlivva~t‘17 contained in popular 
tafsirs, to protect people from lending them too much credence;
(4) to issue fatwas in response to questions from Muslims 
worldwide;
(5) to investigate modern transactions in order to discern the 
rulings of the Sharica regarding them, so that people may 
appreciate the tolerance and flexibility of the Sharica;
(6) to organise the activities of al-wacz wa*1-irshad, and to 
liaise with other concerned bodies such as the Ministry for 
Social Affairs and Islamic societies abroad;
(7) to search for useful books in the various academic 
disciplines, and to revise them and publish them in an 
academically sound form;
(S) to supervise Majallat al-Azhar and direct it in order to 
best serve the interests of "the Islamic intellectual movement" 
and in such a way as to reflect the activities of the three 
faculties (law, Arabic language, theology).
The majority of these suggestions are concerned with 
strengthening the Jamac a 's pastoral role and spiritual
leadership. There is an emphasis on communication between the 
learned and ordinary Muslims, on breaking down the Azhar's 
international isolation, and on bringing it closer in line with
47These are the reports from Jewish or Christian converts in 
the early period of Islam, who drew on their own religious 
heritage in order to throw light on certain events related in the 
Qur'an, such as the contents of the table which the disciples 
asked to be sent down. As will be seen in Chapter Two, the reform 
movement inaugurated by Muhammad cAbduh strongly objected to the 
inclusion of such unreliable material in tafsir.
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the spirit of the modern age. The suggestion concerning liaison 
with the ministry for Social Affairs shows a willingness to 
cooperate with the government, significant in the light of later 
developments. Certain of the suggestions, such as to defend 
religion in general and to identify points of difference between 
scholars, reveal his Unitarian and ecumenic tendencies, which
were later to find expression in his work for tagrib. He
evidently felt that Majallat al-Azhar was not reflecting the full 
gamut of intellectual activity at the Azhar; in recent times it 
had been somewhat dominated by the editorship of Farid 
Wagdi.4e
It is noteworthy that several of the suggestions put forward 
refer to tasks which had in fact already been delegated to other 
bodies, and would therefore appear to suggest that those bodies
were not successfully performing their functions. In his reform
laws of 1936, al-Maraghi had set up Lainat al-Fatwa for the 
issuing of fatwf's, and Shaltut had himself been involved with 
that committee; similarly al-Maraghi had stipulated that the 
Jamac a should undertake to organise al-dacwa wa'1-irshad. Shaltut 
explicitly mentioned those facts in the course of his 
suggestions; he did however praise the achievements of a 
committee which al-MaraghT had formed in order to investigate 
differences between culama', the second aim on Shaltut's list of
48For a description of Wagdl's editorship and its 
shortcomings, see Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern 
History, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, pp. 132-50.
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suggestions. It was not clear whether he envisaged the
continuation of that committee or its replacement.
These suggestions had repercussions outside the Jama^a; there 
were heated discussions of them in the pages of periodicals and 
an enthusiastic response from those culama1 such as Muhammad al- 
MadanT and Muhammad cAbd al-Muncim al-Khafaji who supported 
radical reform.49 They were seen by many as a criticism of and 
challenge to al-Maraghi; the very fact that he had put forward 
his own reform plan demonstrated his disillusionment with al- 
MaraghT' s reform attempts. It is likely that al-Maraghi was more 
or less offended, for he did little to facilitate the
implementation of the suggestions.50 A commission was set up to 
look into them, under the auspices of cAbd al-Majid SalTm, but 
with no immediate results, although in 1952 a committee was 
appointed to take over the apologetical tasks outlined in
Shaltut’s first suggestion.51
Shaltut followed up these suggestions with his lecture on 
educational and academic policy at the Azhar in 1943.52 This
4 9Al-Risala in particular, under the editorship of the 
progressive al-Zayyat, supported Shaltut's programme and 
published articles in praise of them - see Lemke, op. cit., 
p. 141, fn. 5 for a list of articles.
50AI-Bayyumi, op. cit., p. 151, and al-MadanT, Safha 
Bavda"..., p. 653.
51Lemke, op. cit., p. 142; Lemke comments that the
installation of a commission was to avoid having to make a decision.
52Although cAdad Mumtaz gives the year of this lecture as 
1942, we agree with Lemke (op. cit., p. 147) that it was in 1943.
An article written in April 1943 describes the lecture as having 
taken place "last February" (al-Kadani, Amthila..., p. 327); the
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lecture apparently aroused considerable interest and was relayed 
by loud-speaker to an audience of approximately four thousand 
students and culama', including many in prominent positions; it 
was delivered in Kulliyyat al-Sharica of the Azhar.53
Like al-MaraghT in his memorandum, Shaltut began by praising 
the Azhar’s work in the middle ages in preserving the Islamic 
religion and the Arabic language, he particularly commended the 
fact that at that time the law was taught according to the 
various madhahib rather than just one, and the curriculum 
included several mathematical and rational sciences.54
The situation deteriorated, however, with the spreading of the 
concept of taqlTd (adherence to the opinions of former scholars, 
as opposed to ijtihad); intellectual effort then revolved around 
mere fcrmal or superficial discussions and disputes, hypothetical 
questions unrelated to practical life, and the invention of hiyal 
(legal fictions formulated in order to circumvent the letter of 
the law, although violating the spirit). The spirit of 
sectarianism grew and people were obliged to confine themselves
fact that the articles written in response to this lecture (see 
Lemke, op. cit., p. 147, fn. 2 for list) were all published in 
mid-1943 make it highly unlikely that it was delivered in 
February 1942. The lecture itself is reproduced in Muhammad cAbd 
al-Muncirr. al-Khafaji, Al-Azhar fT Alf cAmm, 3 parts in one 
volume, Cairo: Katbacat al-MunTriyya, 1954-55, 3:9-16; not having 
had access to this work, our comments are based on an article by 
al-Madani entitled Al-Siyasat al-TawjThiyyat al-cIlmiyya fi'l- 
Azhar, in Al-Risala, 11, No. 515 (17th May 1943), pp. 384-86, and 
on Lemke’s description of the lecture in op. cit., pp. 143-46.
53Al-MadanT, Amthila..., pp. 327-28.
54Lemke, op . cit., pp. 143-44.
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to a single madhhab. All this obstructed real intellectual 
progress, and the Azhar became increasingly isolated from the 
Muslim community.55
Shaltut then acknowledged the valuable reform efforts of 
Muhammad cAbduh and al-Maraghi, thus stressing the continuity of 
his own ideas with theirs. He praised the former for "awakening 
the Azhar from its slumber", and commended the latter for his 
famous memorandum, mentioning the great hopes it aroused. He 
mentioned with approval certain points raised therein, including 
the modernisation of text books, the elimination of madhhabiyya, 
and the simplification of the study of the various religious 
sciences. He then expressed disappointment that despite the 
passage of time since the issuing of that memorandum, these 
things had remained unchanged, and much energy was still being 
wasted on hypothetical and unnecessary matters.56
Shaltut regretted that the reforms which had taken place were 
not implemented in the spirit in which they were originally 
intended. He concluded that until bold steps for reform were 
taken, "al-Azhar will remain isolated from the community, neither 
fulfilling its (i.e. the community's) needs nor being properly 
respected by it, even if a thousand (reform) laws were to be 
passed".57
55Ibid., pp. 144-45, and al-MadanT, Al-Siyasat..., p. 385.
56Al-KadanT, op. cit., p. 385.
57 Ibid., p. 385 .
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Shaltut's lecture was warmly received; it was interrupted by 
loud applause and cheering, and at the end he was publicly 
congratulated by the Mufti of al-Diyar al-Misriyya and embraced 
by the WakTl of the Azhar. The students insisted on carrying 
Shaltut out of the lecture hall on their shoulders.38 Like 
Shaltut's suggestions of 1941, the lecture received an 
enthusiastic press in al-Risala,39 and al-Khafaji in his book 
MA1-A~har fi Alf cAmmv) included it in his collection of fourteen 
important documents concerning the history of Azhar reforms, 
despite the fact that Shaltut had not yet been promoted to the 
position of Shaykh or Wakll of the Azhar at the time of writing.
Shaltut adhered to his original views on reform during the 
following years, but in view of the fact that the time was not 
yet ripe for their implementation, there was little point in 
adding to them. Perhaps his most conspicuous activity in this 
regard was his involvement with Jamacat al-TagrTb bayna al- 
Madhahib; this lasted for over twenty-five years, until his death 
in 1963.60 Several prominent Azharls were involved in its 
founding along with Shaltut, including Mustafa cAbd al-Raziq 
(Shaykh al-Azhar 1945-47) and cAbd al-Majid Salim (Shaykh al- 
Azhar 1950-51).6 1 On the Shicf side, the Iranian scholar Muhammad 
Tagi al-Qumrr.T was involved at the outset; Shaltut describes him
38Al-Kadani, Amthila..., p. 328.
39See Lemke, op. cit., p. 147, fn. 2, for a list of articles.
6 0 Safha Bayda'..., p. 654.
6 1 Al-Madar.I, Safha Baydal.., p. 653.
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as one of the first to call for taqrib.62 Shaltut attributes the 
original idea for the movement to al-MaraghT, who called for the 
abolition of the sectarian spirit in his memorandum of 1928.63
The mouthpiece of the organisation was Risalat al-Islam, which 
issued its first number in January 1949 under the editorship of 
Muhammad al-Madani, The president of the organisation was 
Muhammad cAli cUluba Pasha.6'1 The three main aims of Jamacat al- 
TagrTb, as propounded in article two of its constitution, were: 
(1) to bring together the Islamic sects and madhahib; (2) to 
publish the principles of Islam in various languages and convince 
people of the need to adhere to them, and (3) to attempt to 
settle disputes between Muslim peoples or sects by acting as 
mediator between them.65
Shaltut refers to the vehement opposition with which the 
movement met (characteristically naming no names), but sees this 
as a reflection of its importance. He attributes this opposition 
variously to narrow-mindedness, a vested interest in conflict, or 
misunderstanding on the part of those who feared that tagrib 
represented an attempt to merge all the schools into one.66 It is 
stressed by various members of the movement that the aim is not
6ZA1-Madanl, (ed.), Dacwat al-Tagrib, Cairo: Al-Majlis al- 
Arla li'l-Shu’iTn al-Isl^miyya, 1966, p. 10.
63Shaltut, Muqaranat al-Madftahib fi'l-Fiqh, Cairo: Matbacat 
Muhammad cAlT Sabah wa-AwIaduhu bi'l-Azhar, 1953, p. 5.
6<1Risalat al-Islam, 1 (1949), p. 5.
65 Ibid., p. 8.
66Dacwat al-Tagrib, p. 13.
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to abolish the madhahib themselves but to abolish the causes of 
enmity between them. Difference of opinion itself is seen as a 
healthy sign of intellectual activity.67 The important thing is 
to achieve unity on a small core of essential points of creed, 
and to tolerate and even welcome differences of opinion on other 
matters.68 Muhammad A1 Kashif al-Ghita' expresses the belief that 
despite the difference in creed concerning the Imamate, Sunnis 
and Shiris can accept each other as fellow Muslims.69
In connection with his work in this area Shaltut corresponded 
with several eminent Shici scholars, including the aforementioned 
Muhammad al-Husayn A1 Kashif al-Ghita1 from Iraq, Sharaf al-Dih
al-Musawi from Lebanon, and Muhammad Husayn Aqa BurujirdI from
Iran.70 He also exchanged letters with the foremost ShicT
authority in Iraq, al-Imam Muhammad al-Khalisi.71 In a meeting 
between Shaltut and Muhammad Taqi al-QummT, it was agreed to
implement a project whereby a collection of ahadith recognised by
both SunnTs and Shiris would be compiled.72
67 Ibid., pp. 34-35 and 288-89.
68Safha Bayda1..., p. 653, and Risalat al-Islam, 1 (1949), 
p. 93.
69Darwat al-Tagrib, pp. 289-90.
70Safha Bayda'..., p. 654.
71 See Ris§~Ia wa-jawabuha, in Majallat al-Azhar, 30 
(1958/59), pp. 761-63 for a copy of his congratulatory letter to 
Shaltut on his appointment as Shaykh al-Azhar and the reply.
72 Ibid., pp. 654-56.
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The freedom to objectively compare the opinions of the various 
madhahib was a corollary of tagrib, and Shaltut had an active 
academic interest in comparative jurisprudence, as we shall see 
in Chapter Three. He sometimes issued fatwas which gave 
preference to the Shici opinion; as examples of instances in 
which he preferred the ShicT opinion, he mentioned two types of 
divorce - "conditional" divorce and the triple irrevocable 
divorce where the three pronouncements are made on a single 
occasion - both of which are not recognised by the Shica.73
As Shaykh al-Azhar Shaltut remained firm in his desire for 
taqrTb, and issued a controversial fatwa in which he declared 
that worship according to a Shici madhhab was equally legitimate 
as worship according to a Sunni’ madhhab.74 As we shall see 
presently, the establishment of the Islamic Research Academy in 
accordance with the 1961 reform law represented a fulfilment of 
Shaltut's longstanding ambition of bringing the Sunnis and ShicIs 
closer together.
With his appointment to the rectorship, it seemed that Shaltut 
would at last have an opportunity to implement his reform ideas. 
In interviews given to journalists soon after his appointment, he 
stated that he still adhered to the views expressed in his 1943 
lecture and made it clear that he still looked for radical 
reform, expressing optimism that this could be achieved in the
73Arat wa-AhadTth, Majallat al-Azhar, 30 (1958/59), section 
preceding Part 8 (Feb. 1959), 22nd page (no page numbers).
74Two Historical Documents, Cairo: Dar al-Taqreeb, 1383 AH, 
pp. 14-16.
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present circumstances (i.e. the interest taken by the government 
in the reform of the Azhar). He emphasised the need for the 
Azhar to produce not just teachers but competent scholars who 
could exercise ij tihad, as well as the need to modernise text­
books and clarify the aims of fiqh (jurisprudence)f relating it 
to everyday life. He also referred to the need for a centralised 
administration at the Azhar, and the importance of the teaching 
of foreign languages.75
There were various political reasons why reform had not up 
until that time been implemented. In the absence of a unified bid 
for reform from within the Azhar, external pressure was needed; 
up until 1952 the existence of two opposing power blocs vis a vis 
the Azhar, namely the Palace and the government, had often 
blocked reform attempts and resulted in stalemate.76 After the 
Revolution there was at last a unified political leadership. In 
view of the conflict between al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun and the Free 
Officers, which resulted in the outlawing of the former in 1954, 
it was • essential for Nasser to seek religious credibility 
elsewhere. The culama* had in any case always been of political 
importance in view of their influence over public opinion, and 
successive governments had attempted to exercise greater control
75 See ibid., interviews with al-Masa1 and al-Shac b (no page 
numbers). Shaltut did in fact implement the teaching of foreign 
languages at the Azhar immediately after his appointment to the 
rectorship; for the text of this resolution see cAdad Mumtaz, 
last pages.
76See Crecelius, op. cit., passim, for a detailed 
description of these political vicissitudes.
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over the Azhar. By the late 'fifties Nasser's power was 
sufficiently consolidated for him to take on the Azhar, which had 
until then more or less successfully resisted external 
interference in its affairs. Shaltut's appointment by the 
government to the highest position in the Azhar in 1958 was 
doubtless due to his longstanding involvement with the reform 
movement and the wide respect he had gained; his reputation would 
lend credibility to the government-sponsored reform plans for the 
Azhar.
It is not within the scope of this work to describe in detail 
the far-reaching changes in administration, organisation and 
curriculum involved in the reform law (Law No. 103) which was 
passed by the National Assembly in June 1961, nor to evaluate its 
ultimate degree of success which could not in any case become 
clear until after Shaltut's death. Such information can be found 
in specialist works on the Azhar. Here we will deal with the 
underlying principles of the reform and the points which bear 
some relation to Shaltut's own reform ideas.77
One of the main aims of the new reform was to break down the 
barriers that existed between the Azhar and the state educational 
system.78 This was to be achieved by broadening the curriculum so
77The text of Law no. 103 ("Qanun Tatwir al-Azhar") is 
reproduced in several Arabic works on the Azhar, including Al- 
Azhar fi Ithna cAshara cAmm, Cairo: Dar al-Qawmiyya li'l-Tibaca
wa'1-Nashr, n.d., pp. 102-28. There is an English translation 
entitled Law No. 103 for 1961: reorganising al-Azhar, Cairo: Al- 
Azhar University, 1961.
7BAl-Azhar fi Ithna cAshara cAmm, p . 101.
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that Azhar graduates could compete in the labour market with the 
graduates of state universities and institutions, and be 
productive members of society by having qualifications in a 
profession other than religion; in fact the new slogan was that 
religion was not a profession in its own right.79 Accordingly new 
faculties were to be opened at the Azhar in Business and 
Administration, Engineering and Crafts, Agriculture, and 
Medicine.00 The system of formal qualifications was to be unified 
so that there would be greater freedom of movement between the 
Azhar and state institutions.81
The Azhar was to consist of five institutions: the Supreme
Council (al-Majlis al-Acla) , the Islamic Research Academy (Ma.jmac 
al-Buhuth al-lslamiyya), the Islamic Culture and Missions 
Department (Idarat al-Thaqafa wa'l-Bucuth al-Islamiyya), the 
University itself, and the Azhar Institutes (i.e. the institutes 
affiliated to the Azhar where education at the primary and 
secondary levels took place).82 The regulations governing the 
composition of the Supreme Council ensured that the government 
held the balance of power in decision-making.83
Shaltut was involved in the planning of the Research Academy, 
which in some respects represented the culmination of some of his
79Crecelius, op. cit., pp. 352-53.
80Al-Azhar fi Ithna cAshara clUnm, p. 110.
81 Ibid., p. 101.
82 Ibid., p. 104.
83Crecelius, op. cit., p. 355.
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original suggestions regarding Jamacat Kibar al~cUlama'.84 The 
Academy was in fact a continuation of that body, members of whom 
were automatically qualified for membership of the new Academy. 
It was tc be of an international character, transcending
sectarian divisions. It was to consist of fifty members from the 
five madhahib (i.e. the four Sunni schools and the mainstream 
Shi«r school, the Imami), a maximum of twenty of whom would be 
from the United Arab Republic. Its aims were to renew Islamic
culture, purify it from foreign elements and clarify the
essential core of the religion, and work for the removal of 
sectarian fanaticism.85 By its very nature and composition, the 
Academy would promote the international role of the Azhar and end 
its former isolation.
The Culture and Missions Department was to concern itself with 
matters relating to publication, translation, foreign missions 
and preaching, and the reception of foreign students.86 The 
University itself was to actively develop links with foreign 
universities and Arabic and Islamic institutions.87 The 
government backed up its reform programme by appointing culama 
who had received post-graduate education at European universities 
to senior pests in the Azhar.88
84Al-Madani, Safha Bayda'..., p. 656.
85Al-Azhar fi Ithna cAshara cAmm, pp. 106-7.
86 Ibid., p. 108.
R7 Ibid., p . 110.
88Lemke, op. cit., p. 165.
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It emerges that there is a degree of correspondence between 
the reform ideas of al-Maraghi and Shaltut and the aims of the 
1961 law. In particular the aims of broadening and modernising of 
the curriculum and learning materials, the elimination of 
madhhabiyya and the concentration on the core elements of the 
religion, and the development of external relations can all be 
seen to have their origins in the demands of Azhari reformers 
from Muhammad rAbduh's time onwards.
It is difficult to ascertain Shaltut's real attitude towards 
the government reforms. He publicly expressed confidence in it, 
praising the law in general terms for its aims of unifying the 
country and integrating men of religion into the community,
improving standards and tackling the unemployment problem of 
culama',89 There is no doubt that any Azhari would have preferred 
reforms to have come from inside the Azhar rather than by 
governmental decree;90 and it seems that there was some
difficulty in establishing a good working relationship between
the Azhar Shavkhs, including Shaltut, and the officials appointed 
by the government to the new ministry for Azhar affairs.91
"Shaltut, Risalat al-Azhar fT daw' Qanunihi al-Jadid, in 
Kajallat al-Azhar, 33 (1961/62), pp.' 779-82 passim; here he
supports the government line that religion is not a profession in 
its own right.
q°Crecelius depicts the Azhar Shaykhs as being unhappy with 
the reforms but almost bullied into accepting them - see op.
cit., pp. 347-48.
91 See Crecelius, op. cit., p. 346, and Muhammad al-Bahl 
(government minister for Azhar affairs 1962-64), Hayati fT Rihab 
al-Azhar, Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1982, pp. 64-65, where some 
personal conflict between BahT and Shaltut is indicated.
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However, in view of past failures Shaltut probably accepted that 
only the government had the ability to effect meaningful reform. 
Being a man of positive thought, Shaltut had the choice of 
cooperating with the government and having some say in the 
reforms, or of resigning. The former course must have seemed the 
most constructive; once having chosen it, it would be 
characteristic of Shaltut to publicly endorse it wholeheartedly, 
thereby increasing its chances of success.
In his opening addresses to the newly formed Azhar Planning 
Committee (Hav'at al-Takhtit), Shaltut applauds Nasser for 
implementing a programme that will end the harmful cultural 
dichotomy which has arisen between those educated in the Azhar 
system and those who receive a state education. Under the new
system, Shaltut optimistically asserts that all will be able to 
benefit from the best of both worlds and that the learning of the 
Qur'an by heart will form the basis of both systems. With the 
introduction of the new secular disciplines such as medicine,
"the Azhari doctor will be able to treat the heart and soul as 
well as the body".92
Writers on Shaltut vary in their opinions as to the extent to 
which his own ideas reached fruition in the 1961 law.93 Although 
the 19C1 reform exceeded the demands of the Azhari reformers, it
92Shaltut, Ara1 wa-Ahadith: Kalimat al-Ustadh al-Akbar fi
Kay'at al-TakhtTt, in Kajallat al-Azhar, 33 (1961/62), pp. 506-8.
93Cf. al-Zayyat, op. cit., p. 644, and cAllam, op. cit.,
p. 162, who are both optimistic, and cAbd al-Raziq, op. cit.,
p. 153, who is rather less so.
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was not on the whole incompatible with them. Our own feeling is 
that the fact that reform had to be implemented by the government 
does not detract from Shaltut’s own personal achievement, or 
negate his significant contribution to the reform movement over 
more than half a century at the Azhar.
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CHAPTER ONE 
SHALTUT AS MUFASSIR
In order to place Shaltut's work within the context of tafsir 
as a whole, it is necessary to trace briefly the historical 
evolution of tafsir, concentrating on those aspects which have 
some bearing on the development of tafsir in the modern age.
1) Tafsir: Definition and Outline History
Tafsir is the verbal noun of the verb fassara, meaning: "He 
discovered, detected, revealed, developed, or disclosed, a thing 
that was concealed or obscured...he rendered a thing apparent, 
plain or clear; explained, expounded, or interpreted it."1 The 
word "tafsir" occurs in Qur'an 25:33 meaning "explanation".
The word was used in connection with verses of the Qur’an by 
the Companions,2 and thereafter gradually acquired its technical 
character as Muslim scholarship developed, applying both to the 
science of Quranic exegesis and as a noun to denote complete 
commentaries.
Classical definitions of tafsir generally put forward the
*See Lane's Arabic-English Lexicon under fasara.
2See A. J. Wensinck, Concordance de la Tradition Musulmane, 
s.v. fassara, for several ahadith.
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opinions regarding its relation to "ta'wil",3 but this debate has 
lost much of its importance in the modern period.4
a) The Early Development of Tafsir
While the Prophet was alive, he naturally explained the 
meanings of Quranic verses to the Companions as the need arose; 
the Qur'an itself refers to his role of clarifying the Qur'an: 
"And We revealed to you the Reminder (Qur'an) so that you may 
make clear to men what has been revealed to them..." (16:44). 
After his death, Muslims wishing to know the meanings of verses 
which were not clear to them, or which were not clarified by 
other parts of the Qur'an, would seek out someone who had heard 
an explanation from the Prophet.
Thus in its early stages tafsir could be described as a branch 
of hadith, relying almost solely on transmitted knowledge 
(riwaya). The great reluctance of the Companions to interpret 
verses on the basis of their own opinions is reflected in ahadiTth 
such as: "Whoever gives a personal opinion with regard to the 
Qur'an, even if he be right, is in error".5 This attitude towards
tafsir may be explained by various factors: the Companions' piety
3See, e.g., al-TahanawT, Kashshaf Istilahat al-Funun, s.v. 
tafsir.
4 It is noteworthy that the modern commentators talk only 
about tafsir al-Qur'an and not ta'wil.
5Related in TirmidhT, Sunan, Kitab al-Tafsir, Ch. 1, and Abu 
Dawud, Sunan, Kitalb al-cIlm, Ch. 5.
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and fear of telling a lie against God,6 their relatively simple 
way of life, which meant that comparatively few new questions 
arose needing answers from the Qur'an, and their emphasis on 
practical rather than theoretical matters. This latter point is 
illustrated by an anecdote about cUmar ibn al-Khattab, who, it is 
related, read the phrase "wa-fakihatan wa-abban" (Qur'an 80:31) 
from the pulpit, asked about the meaning of the word "abb", then 
pulled himself up saying: "This is affectation (takalluf), oh
cUmar".7
In spite of the scruples about Quranic commentary, some of the 
Companions did use their special knowledge as an aid to 
understanding the Qur'an, and many scholars have recognised the 
superiority of tafsir from the Companions over that of later 
generations for various reasons: they are likely to have heard it 
from the Prophet, and even if they didn't, their close contact 
with him and knowledge of the circumstances of revelation, as 
well as their familiarity with the Arabic language as used at the 
time of the revelation, in addition to the fact that they put the 
Quranic precepts into practice immediately, all ensured their 
superiority in the sphere of tafsTr.B Ibn cAbbas (d. 68 A.H.) 
used his wide knowledge of pre-Islamic poetry in order to clarify
6AmTn al-Khuli, Manahi.i TajdTd fi al-Nahw wa'l-Balagha wa'l- 
Tafsir wa'l-Adab, Cairo: Dar al-Macrifa, 1961, p. 273.
7 Story quoted by Muhammad Husayn al-Dhahabl, Al-Tafslr wa'l- 
Mufassirun, 3rd ed., 2 vols., Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1985, 1:37.
8Cf., e.g., al-DhahabT, op. cit., 1:95-6, and cAbd Allah
Mahmud Shihata, Tarikh al-Qur'an wa'1-TafsTr, Cairo: Al-Hay'at 
al-Misriyyat al-cAmma li'l-kitab, 1972, pp. 90-91.
48
meanings of certain Quranic words; this was undoubtedly a kind of 
ijtihad.9
Generally speaking, tafsir in the age of the Companions was
not tafsir of the whole Qur'an, but only of those words and
phrases which were difficult to understand; it was usually 
confined to general meanings and brief lexical explanations, and 
it was not written down.10
b) The Classical TafsTrs
Caution as regards the use of ra'y (personal opinion) remained 
a prominent factor at least until the time of Ibn Jarir al-Tabari 
(d. 310 A.H.), whose "Jamic al-Bayan fi TafsTr al-Qur'an"
represents the culmination of tafsir bi'l-ma'thur (tafsir relying 
on transmitted material), comprising as it does most of the
reports contained in previous tafsirs of the Companions and
Followers, the majority of which have been lost to us. The fact 
that this work, which is the most important source of tafsir 
bi'1-ma1thur, is also considered an important source of tafsir 
bi'1-ra'y, containing critical evaluation of ahadith, grammatical 
comment, the derivation of legal principles, etc.,11 demonstrates 
that it is not a question of clearly demarcated categories but
9Al-DhahabT, op. cit., 1:69.
1°Ibid., 1:97-98.
11 Ibid., 1:144; Shihata, op. cit., p.98; it also contains 
some lengthy polemics, putting forward the orthodox Sunni view 
vis-a-vis that of such theological sects as the Qadariyya - cf., 
e.g., Surat al-Fatiha, under "iyyaka nastacin".
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rather a matter of emphasis. The fact is, however, that although 
there were one or two important tafasTr bi'l-ma'thur written in 
later centuries, such as that of Ibn Kathir (d.774 A.H.), and 
although even tafsir bi'l-ra'y contained transmitted material, 
this material was by its very nature finite, and moreover did not 
cover the whole of the Quranic text; the ahadith contained in the 
tafsir sections of the hadith collections cover only about one 
eighth of the Qur'an.12 It was inevitable, thererfore, that 
tafsir should branch out in other directions.
We should also mention some of the external factors which 
profoundly influenced Muslim scholarship. With the beginnings of 
sectarian strife, from 40 A.H. onwards, the various factions 
naturally sought authority for their own beliefs in the Qur'an; 
the large numbers of new, non Arab-speaking converts in the 
conquered lands meant that the Qur'an was less easily understood 
and therefore needed more thorough interpretation; the rapid 
expansion of the area under Islamic rule brought practical 
problems of a more complex nature for which solutions were sought 
in the Qur'an; and eventually, in the Abbasid period, a new 
generation of Muslim scholars, who had a more settled way of life 
and more leisure to study, brought the intellectual tools of 
older civilisations, such as the Persian and Greek, to bear in 
their tafsirs.13
12AmTn al-KhulT, op. cit., pp. 273-4.
13Cf. Shihata, op. cit., p. 115: "thumma tahawwala'1-Qur'an
ila kitab dirasa, bacda can kana dustur al-hayat".
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With these developments, tafsir became a science in its own 
right which dealt with all or most of the verses in the Qur’an 
(tafsTr musalsal). At the same time, the place of ra1y steadily 
gained ground, resulting in greater diversification and more 
controversy.14 On the one hand, then, the science of tafsir was 
enriched in some respects by these developments, while on the 
other, there were some undesirable side-effects which later 
scholars, particularly in the modern age, have not been slow to 
point out.
Not least was the growth of sectarianism in tafsir, "each man 
seeking in the Qur'an that which would strengthen his view and 
support his madhhab (sect or school of thought, usually legal or 
theological), and each finding what he sought even it it meant 
subjugating the Quranic verses to his madhhab".15
Another undesirable development, not unrelated to the growth 
of sectarianism, was the proliferation of ahadith of dubious 
authenticity which found their way into tafsirs. Ahadith in 
tafsir were not vetted to the same extent as those in the hadTth 
collections; it is said even of al-Tabari, who was recognised as 
a scholar of hadith, that "even though he cited the isnads , he 
reported such a great quantity of material that he included some
14 There was continuing disagreement, too, as to the 
limitations on the use of ra'y, and as to where the dividing line 
between al-ra'y al-ja'iz (permissible ra1v? and al-ra'y al- 
madhmum (reprehensible ra*y) lies. See al-Dhahabl, op. cit.,
1:263, for a brief list of things a mufassir should avoid in this 
respect.
15Al-Dhahabl, op. cit., 1:343.
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which was not reliable".16 After al-Tabari, the situation 
deteriorated and isnads were shortened or omitted altogether.17
Tafsir bi11-ma'thur has also been criticised for its inclusion 
of isra1llivvat - reports from converted Jews and Christians who 
brought their own religious heritage to bear on the stories and 
other material related in the Qur'an. Stories which were dealt
with briefly in the Qur'an, which concentrates on the moral
aspect of stories rather than historical detail, were told at 
length in the Jewish and Christian sources, therefore the 
temptation was great; but while the Companions asked only about 
generalities, subsequent generations grew more curious and were 
interested in such details as the exact details of the food which
was on the table requested by the disciples (and which may or may
not have been sent down). Al-Tabari lists the various conflicting 
versions at great length, and even al-Zamakhshari gives these 
details in his "Al-Kashshaf can Haga'iq Ghawlmid al-TanzTl".18
Another important change in tafsTr came about due to the
development of Muslim scholarship19 - both in the Islamic
sciences such as hadith, fiqh and kalam, and the more Greek-
16 Ibid., 1:156. See also Amin al-KhulT, op. cit., pp. 279 —
80 .
17 Ibid., 1:198f f .
18See their commentaries on Quran 5:112.
19Which in its turn was of course influenced by the 
aforementioned external factors. For example, the need for non- 
Arab Muslims to understand the Qur'an gave rise to a greater 
philological content in tafsir, while the fiqh content, and the
specialised works on ahkam al-Qur'an, were a response to the
practical needs of the community.
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influenced branches of learning such as philosophy and the
natural sciences, all of which had their influence on tafsir
which became increasingly specialised, written by; religious
scholars for religious scholars. The tendency to pack tafsir with
many different sciences culminated in the encyclopaedic work of 
ctl-VTn
Fakhr^al-Razi (d. 606 A.H.), of whose tafsir it has been said: 
"it contains everything but tafsTr".20
For obvious reasons the linguistic element in tafsir always 
remained prominent; with the elaboration of nahw and the rise of 
the science of balagha, a new dimension was added, and there was 
more curiosity about stylistic usage rather than just lexical 
explanations. The doctrine of icjaz (the miraculous nature of the 
Qur'an), gave a new impetus to these studies; the technical term 
icjaz dates back to the late ninth century A.D.21 Al-Baqillani 
(d. 404 A.H.) wrote an important general work entitled "Iciaz al- 
Qur'an", but it was cAbd al-Qahir al-JurjariT (d. 470 A.H.) who
first wrote extensively on the iciaz bayanT (stylistic or 
rhetorical ic j az) of the Qur'an, bringing out its unique 
stylistic qualities, in his "Dala'il al-Iciaz" and "Asrar al- 
Balagha". It was al-ZamakhsharT (d. 538 A.H.) who most
effectively brought the science of balagha to bear on the Qur'an, 
building on the work of al-JurjanT in his tafsir- In this work 
and others, the concept that there is a correct or best way of 
saying a thing in a given situation ("li-kulli maqlm maqal")
20Al-Dhahabl, op. cit., 1:281, quoting from Kashf al-Zunun.
2iE.I.2, s.v. Icjaz, by G.E. von Grunebaum.
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meant that the Quranic text was analysed in minute detail to 
discover the exact effect of or reason for a particular 
grammatical construction, word order, etc., especially where the 
text deviated in some way from normal usage.
However, language and style were not the only criteria by 
which the Qur'an was considered miraculous. Al-RazT's tafsTr, 
"Mafatih al-Ghayb", while it has a substantial balagha content, 
concentrates more on the miraculous nature of the Qur'an as 
regards natural phenomena and sciences (ic_iaz cilmT) .
It may be fruitful here to mention Sufi tafsTr; just as Sufism 
has made an acknowledged contribution to mainstream Sunni Islam, 
and indeed has become virtually identified with it in some cases, 
so Sufi tafsir contains some material which is relevant for and 
useful to the Sunni community. Of the two trends in Sufi tafsTr, 
tafsTr ishari (intuitive tafsir) is more acceptable in orthodox 
circles than tafsTr nazarT (speculative tafsTr), which subjects 
the Qur'an to philosophical theories and interprets the text in a 
somewhat dogmatical fashion, claiming that it does not allow 
other meanings. Those who apply the method of tafsir ishTrT, on 
the other hand, rely more on spiritual intuition and believe that 
the Quranic verses can have more than one possible meaning; thus 
they do not deny the obvious or apparent (zahir) meaning of the 
verse.22 This intuitive type of tafsir has existed since the 
beginning of Islam, and some Quranic verses exhort men to reflect 
on (tadabbara) the Qur'an, implying that it contains depths of
22Al-Dhahabl, op. cit., 2:338.
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meaning not immediately apparent; this may be the "inner" 
(batinT) meaning of the Qur'an to which Sufi's often refer.23
Accordingly, this type of tafsir may be accepted by orthodox 
Muslims provided that (a) it is linguistically sound, and (b) 
there is some kind of evidence to support it, and it does not 
contradict the accepted sources. (Most works of tafsir isharT, 
however, contain material which does not fulfil these criteria 
alongside material which does.}24 Nevertheless many orthodox 
culama1 have a favourable opinion of tafsTr isharT,20 for it is 
undoubtedly desirable to reflect deeply on the meaning of the 
Qur'an,26
Before moving on to the modern period, we will briefly mention 
two other tafsTrs which are still very popular today. Al-Baydawi 
(d. 685 A.H.) in his "Anwar al-TanzTl wa-Asrar al-Ta'wil", drew 
extensively on al-Zamakhshari, particularly with regard to 
balagha, and also on al-RazT. His popularity can be partly 
attributed to the fact that he is more concise than these two, 
and he represents the orthodox Sunni viewpoint, purging al- 
Zamakhsharl's material of Muctazili deviations, with a few
J -3Ibid., 2: 339. See also p. 341 for examples of this type of 
tafsTr among the Companions.
24 Ibid., 2:344.
25 Ibid., 2:353-55 .
26A description of some of the main works of tafsir isharT 
can be found in al-Dhahabl, op. cit., 2:364-98. ShTcT tafsTr is 
not discussed here because, generally speaking, it bears little 
relation to Sunni tafsTr.
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inadvertant exceptions.27 "Tafsir al-Jalalayn" , begun by Jalal 
al-Din al-Mahalll (d. 864 A.H.) and completed by Jalal al-Din al- 
SuyutT (d. 911 A.H.), is still highly popular because of its 
extreme brevity and relative simplicity; it often simply gives 
easily understandable synonyms of Quranic words by way of
comment. However, it also contains some technical grammatical
material, and it is noteworthy that even this tafsir was written
for a specialist audience, i.e. students of grammar.
Generally speaking, one may say that from al-Baydawi's time up 
until fairly recent times, tafsir activity was largely confined 
to unoriginal works based on previous authorities or commenting 
and elaborating on earlier tafsirs .28 This corresponds with the 
"age of stagnation" widely cited by historians of Islamic
civilisation. It was in the late nineteenth century, within the 
context of the Arab-Islamic revival (nahda), that new 
developments in tafsir began to emerge.
c) Tafsir in the Modern Period
Western supremacy represented a threat to the Muslims on many 
levels, the most traumatic being the threat to Islam itself. 
Although in the past Muslim lands had often been conquered or 
controlled by foreign powers, those powers had nearly always been 
Muslim - or else subsequently converted to Islam. In the colonial
27Al-Dhahabi, op. cit, 1:283-84.
28See ibid., 1:151 under the heading:"Tawassuc mutaqaddiml
al-mufassirln qacada bi-muta'akhkhirihim can al-bahth al- 
mustaqill".
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age, for the first time large numbers of Muslims were having to 
live under non-Muslim rule. This new state of affairs shocked 
them out of the complacent presumption that Islam and Muslims 
would always prevail; it seemed to cast doubt on the very words 
of the Qur'an which guaranteed God's help to the Muslims (e.g. 
30:47). It may not be an exaggeration to say that Muslims 
developed an inferiority complex, incompatible with a feeling of 
pride in one's religion.
In times of conflict or crisis, Muslims have always sought 
guidance or support for their views in the Qur'an; it was 
natural, therefore, that tafsTr should be an important vehicle 
for the response to the Western challenge,29 and that there 
should be a renewed interest in tafsTr at this stage. Nor was it 
surprising that, for the Arabs at least, this response should 
come initially from an Azharl scholar at a time when Egypt had 
been facing urgent socio-political problems since its occupation 
in 1882 by a foreign power - the British.30 We are talking, of 
course, of Muhammad cAbduh (1849-1905), who was a pioneer not
29 See cIffa Muhammad al-SharqawT, Al-Fikr al-Dini fi- 
Muwa.jahat al-cAsr (dirasa tahlTliyya li-ittijahat al-tafsTr fT'l- 
casr al-hadTth) ‘ 2nd ed., Beirut: Dar al-cAwda, 1979,
where he illustrates the way in which Muslims have used tafsir as 
a response to the threat posed by foreign cultures in the past.
30This type of response was somewhat earlier in India (see, 
e.g., J.M.S. Baljon, Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation (1880— 
1960, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968, Introduction, passim; apart from 
the language difference, however, writers like Ahmad Khan do not 
have the same academic background as Muhammad cAbduh and his 
followers with whom we are concerned here.
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only in the reform of the Azhar but in modern Islamic thought 
generally and tafsir in particular.
i) Muhammad cAbduh's tafsTr
His main exegetical work, "TafsTr al-Manar",31 was actually 
written down by his Syrian pupil, Muhammad RashTd Rida (1865- 
1935), Up until Qur'an 4:125 this tafsTr was directly based on 
Muhammad cAbduh's lectures and the manuscript was approved by 
him. After his death, Rashid Rida continued the tafsir up to 
Qur'an 12:107;32 it fills twelve volumes of about five hundred
pages each. The importance of this tafsir can scarcely be
overrated as it influenced to a greater or lesser extent nearly 
all those which came after it. In view of this fact, we will deal 
with it in some detail.
In the preface and introduction to Tafsir al-Manar,33 the 
authors express their views on tafsir, and of what it should or 
should not consist. Their practical approach to the Qur'an is 
much in evidence:
The tafsir which we aim at is to understand the 
Book as a path (din) which guides people to that
which will give them happiness in this life and
31 Muhammad cAbduh has also written three other_short works 
on tafsir: TafsTr Juz' cAmma, (Cairo 1322 AH), Tafsir Surat al- 
cAsr, (Cairo 1903}, and Fatihat al-Kitab (Cairo 1382 AH).
32C .C, Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1933, p. 199.
33The Preface (Fatihat al-Tafsir) is by Rashid Rida and the 
Introduction (Mugaddimat al-Tafsir) is based on Muhammad cAbduh's 
lectures; the aims set out in them are essentially the same.
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the next, for this is its highest aim, and all 
other endeavours are subordinate to this or a 
means of attaining it.34
The emphasis on bringing out the guidance contained in the
Qur'an entails a disapproval of anything that diverts attention 
to less vital concerns; the traditional type of tafsTr which 
concentrates on grammar, lexicography, theology, etc., is 
described as "dry, alienating (the reader) from God and His
Book", and such studies "should not be called tafsir, but are 
simply an exercise in various sciences such as grammar, macani, 
etc."35 While acknowledging that a knowledge of grammar, 
rhetorics, jurisprudence and other things help in understanding 
the Qur'an, Rashid Rida deplores the fact that often discussions 
on the finer points of grammatical and rhetorical usage, as well 
as theological controversies, the reasonings of the scholars of 
usul and the jurists who practice taqlid, the interpretations 
(ta1wTlat) of the Sufis, sectarian polemics and scientific data 
of various kinds "distract the reader from these lofty aims and 
this sublime guidance".36 Similarly, while there is a small
proportion of ahadith which are genuine and essential for tafsTr,
the greater part of tafsTr bi'l-ma'thur consists of unreliable
34Tafsir al-Manar, 12 vols, Cairo: Matbacat al-Manar, 1324- 
26 AH, 1:17.
35Ibid., p. 24; there is no suitable translation for macani
- for a description of this science see E.I.2, s.v. "Al-Macani 
wa'1-Bayan" .
36 Ibid., p. 7.
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reports and isra1lliyyat;37 moreover, "much of what has been 
related in tafsTr bi'l-ma'thur draws a veil over the Qur'an and 
diverts the reader's attention from its higher aims".38
On the positive side, tafsTr should be written "in a manner 
which attracts people and draws them towards (right) action and 
guidance".39 Muhammad cAbduh aimed to "observe the requirements 
of the age as regards simplicity of expression, bearing in mind 
the varied levels of understanding of the readers".40
These stated aims and beliefs are generally borne out in the 
actual text of TafsTr al-Manar. The belief that tafsTr is first 
and foremost an instrument of guidance entails an emphasis on the 
practical and social aspects of moral teachings. For example, 
"sabr" is taken to be an active quality of steadfastness and 
perseverance, not the passive quality of mere patience, which 
suggests resignation;41 On the subject of sabr, Muhammad cAbduh 
quickly progresses to talk about its importance for society as a 
whole: "A nation whose members are lacking in sabr will be weak 
in every way...", attributing among other things ignorance or 
educational backwardness (nags al-cilm) to a lack of sabr, since 
without sabr the individual "sleeps on a nice soft bed of
37Ibid., pp. 7-8.
38Ibid., p. 10.
39 Ibid., p. 25.
40Ibid., p. 10.
41 Ibid., 2: 35-36 .
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ta^lid".42 The Quranic precept of "al-amr bi'l-macruf wa'l-nahy 
can al-munkar" and its implications for corporate responsibility 
for the maintenance of moral standards is given much weight.43 
The concern with social issues is evident in all his exegetical 
work, and in many places specific topics are discussed at 
length.4 4
The authors' cautious attitude with regard to ahadith is 
particularly evident when they are dealing with mubhamat (those 
things in the Qur'an which are obscure, ambiguous, etc.). Where 
there is no reliable authority, unlike most earlier mufassirun 
they prefer to leave the question open, resisting the temptation 
to supply even a weak hadith rather than nothing - particularly 
where the question is of no practical import.45
There is no doubt that they largely succeed in their aim to 
produce a more simple, direct form of tafsir, uncluttered by 
unnecessary technical terms; the language is eloquent and
appealing, and relatively easy for the layman to understand - a 
suitable vehicle for the exhortation of the Muslims in general. 
However, there are long passages where scholarly issues are 
discussed, as where fifty-four pages are devoted almost entirely
42Al-Dhahabl, op. cit., 2: 537-38, quoting from Majmuc at 
TafsTr al-Fatiha wa Sitta Suwar mln Khawatim al-Qur'Tn.
43See, e.g., TafsTr al-Manar, 4:25-29.
44E.g. Ibid., 4:364-70 (polygamy), 4:122-31 (usury), and 
8:508-22 (homosexuality).
^45See cAbd AllaTi Mahmud Shihata, Manhaj Muhammad cAbduh fi 
Tafsir al-Qur'an al-KarTm, Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1963, pp.
137ff. and al-Dhahabl, op. cit., 2:534-37 for examples.
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to a discussion of the sources of law.46 Rashid RidT in 
particular is prone to lengthy digressions,47 which in some cases 
at least may be said to "consume the reader's energy and turn his 
mind away from the Quranic verses".48
One major concern which comes out in the text is the defence 
of Islam, and the desire to show that it is compatible with 
modern civilisation.49 To this end, Muhammad cAbduh and Rashid 
Rida stress the rational character of Islam, and this is done in 
various ways: firstly, by showing that there is no essential
incompatibility between reason and revelation and by attempting 
to define their complementary roles;50 secondly, by emphasising 
Islam's enlightened attitude with regard to knowledge, i.e. the 
fact that it encourages people to think and reflect and acquire 
knowledge, and by bringing out the implications of this with 
regard to iitihad and taglid;51 and thirdly, by attempting to
46Tafsir al-Manar, 5:168-222.
47By his own admission - see ibid., 1:16, where he justifies 
this by the Muslims’ great need for knowledge of certain matters.
48Shihata, op. cit., p. 237.
49See, e.g., sub-headings beginning on TafsTr al-Manar, 
2:244, such as "al-Islam dTn al-fitra", "al-Islam din al caql 
wa'1-fikr", etc.
50 See, e.g., J. Jomier, Le Commentaire Coranigue du Manar, 
Paris: Editions G.P. Maisonneuve & Cie., 1954, pp. 7 9 f f.
51Shihata, op. cit., pp. 71ff.; for the attitude to taglid, 
see TafsTr al-Manar, 11:252-53, under heading: "TaglTd and the 
rigid adherence to the practice of one's forefathers is 
prohibited".
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purge the religion of all irrational or superstitious elements, 
such as magic, miracles, the cult of saint-worship, etc.32
Another way of demonstrating Islam's compatibility with the 
modern world is to show how some widely accepted scientific 
theories, such as the theory of causality, are in keeping with 
the teachings of Islam;53 these are often described as "God's 
laws" (sunan Allah). Thus Islam is seen as the religion of nature 
(fitra), i.e. it is both fully in accordance with natural laws, 
and perfectly suited to man's nature.54
Scientific tafsir proper was considered to be an unnecessary 
diversion from the main aims of the Qur'an;55 however, it was 
considered important that the Quranic text did not in any way 
contradict the findings of modern science. Muhammad cAbduh and 
Rashid Rida went a stage further than this, claiming that 
reference in the Qur'an to some scientific knowledge which was 
not available at the time of revelation was a proof of its 
icjaz.56 It seems, moreover, that they could not resist some 
allusions to specific modern scientific theories, such as
5zShihata, op. cit., pp. 105ff.
53Tafsir al-Manar, 5:269.
54See e.g. ibid., 11:244-46.
55Ibid., 1:7; the phrase "bac d al-mucasirTn" no doubt
refers predominantly to Tantawi Jawharl (d. 1934), another pupil
of Muhammad cAbduh.
56Ibid., l:210ff. under the heading: "Icjaz al-Qur’Sh bi-
tahqTq masa'il kanat majhulatan li11-bashar".
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Darwin's theory of evolution, in relation to certain Quranic 
verses.37
Not unrelated to the defence of Islam is the desire to 
highlight the unique literary qualities of the Qur’an, and thus 
confirm its miraculous nature. Apart from the comments on points
balagha throughout the text,38 there is a discourse on the
miraculous qualities of the Quranic stories, with regard to both 
their language and content.39 This is one of the characteristics 
of Muhammad cAbduh's school of tafsir, which has been called the 
"socio-literary" school of tafsTr.60
Before moving on to Muhammad cAbduh's followers, however, we 
should pause in order to put his contribution to tafsTr into 
clearer perspective, and to identify those elements of his work 
which were original and new, and those which were old but to 
which he brought new emphasis, and those things in which he was
simply a product of his age.
To say that the Qur'an is a source of guidance is of course 
nothing new, and the Qur’an itself states this repeatedly; but 
Muhammad cAbduh was the first mufassir specifically to state this 
as his main aim in tafsir, to which all else was subordinate. 
This may be seen as a turning point in tafsTr.
37See, e.g., Ignaz Goldziher, Madhahib al-TafsTr al-Islami, 
tr. cAbd al-HalTm al-Najjar, 2nd ed., Beirut: Dar Iqra', 1983, 
pp. 382-83, and al-Dhahabi, op. cit., 2:541-43.
38See Jomier, op. cit., pp. 56-7 for some examples.
39Tafsir al-Manar, 12:40ff.
60Al-Dhahabi, op. cit., 2:523.
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His tafsTr also represents the first conscious attempt to 
popularise tafsir and appeal to a wider audience. It roust be said 
that the time was ripe for such a development; literacy was now 
no longer the prerogative of the religiously trained scholars - a 
new audience was emerging with a more Western-style education, 
and the age of journalism was dawning. (Much modern tafsir, 
including Tafsir al-Manar and Shaltut's, was first published in 
instalments in periodicals.)
Muhammad cAbduh and Rashid Rida were of course not alone in 
calling for "the re-opening of the gate of ijtihad"; as one
modern writer points out, it was more to do with the "spirit of 
the age" than any single mufassir, and was not confined to any 
particular geographical area.61 Moreover, throughout Islamic 
history there had always been individual scholars who rejected
taglid and claimed the right of ijtihad, and Muhammad cAbduh and
Rashid Rida were influenced by classical authorities like Ibn
Taymiyya (d. 728 A.H.) and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751 A.H.) 
in this regard as in others.62
Similarly, the attitude towards mubhamat and ghaybiyyat (the 
unseen) reflects the more pious and reserved attitude of the 
Companions, and is reminiscent of Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241 A.H.),
6 1 Al-SharqawT, op. cit., p. 123.
62Shihata, op. cit., p. 57. Rashid Rida in particular quoted
Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim at length, and indeed had much in 
common with the Wahhabis (who base their tenets on the work of 
Ibn Taymiyya), particularly as regards the vehement opposition 
to bidac (heretical innovations) in Islam such as saint-worship,
and the desire for a return to the true sunna - see ibid., pp.
226-28 and Goldziher, op. cit., pp. 363ff.
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who simply believed in the Quranic tenets "bila kayf" (without 
asking how).
Since early times certain Muslim scholars have expressed their 
doubts about the general validity of the ahidith contained in 
tafsTr;63 it was only in the modern era, however, that this 
attitude became widespread, representing a further stage in the 
trend away from tafsTr bi'1-rna'thur. Similarly, the objections to 
sectarianism within tafsir, which had always existed, became more 
conscious and articulate from Muhammad cAbduh's time on, and he 
was instrumental in this.
Thus we find conservatism alongside the concern with the 
modern world, a combination of elements characteristic of 
mufassirun cf Muhammad cAbduh's school which distinguishes them 
from those who go to one extreme or the other, whether it be the 
muqallidun or the more extreme modernists.
When talking about Muhammad cAbduh's "school" of tafsir we 
should bear in mind that this does not denote a specific and 
clearly defined group of people so much as a set of 
characteristics largely common to those people who, like Shaltut,
have been strongly influenced by Muhammad cAbduh in their
exegetical work. These characteristics, which have already been 
described with regard to Muhammad cAbduh, include a common 
attitude towards such things as sectarianism, isra'Tlivvat, weak 
ahadith and mubhamat, as well as the desire to rid tafsir of
unnecessary technical terms and to achieve a flowing, eloquent
63Amin al-Khuli, op. cit., p. 276.
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style. Most important of all is the concern to provide guidance 
to Muslims in the context of the modern age, which dictates a 
practical rather than a theoretical bias.
ii) Between Muhammad cAbduh and Shaltut
Rather than discussing those mufassirun who could be described 
as belonging to this school, of whom there are many,64 we will 
concentrate on a few individuals whose work or whose ideas form a 
significant contribution to the general developments which took 
place within this school of tafsir up until Shaltut's time. The 
obvious person to begin with is Muhammad Mustafa al-Maraghi 
(1881-1945); despite the fact that his association with Muhammad 
cAbduh was not long, he carried on the work that the latter began 
perhaps even more faithfully than did Rashid Rida. This was due 
to his closer involvement in social and religious reform and his 
holding of senior religious posts including that of Shaykh al- 
Azhar. In addition to this, his personal charisma and eloquence 
made him more of a popular leader and preacher than was RashTd 
Rida.6 5
Like Shaltut, he did not embark on a verse by verse tafsir of 
the Qur'an, in fact the number of verses he commented on is
64cAbd al-Ghaffar cAbd al-Rahim, in his work, Al-Imam 
Muhammad cAbduh wa Manhajuhu fT al-Tafsir, Cairo: Matbacat al- 
Halabi, n.d.f describes the work of several mufassirun belonging 
to Muhammad cAbduh's school, such as cAbd al-Qadir al-MaghribT, 
Jamal al-Diii al-Qasimi, cAbd al-Hamld ibn Badis and Muhammad al- 
Tahir ibn cAsh’ur.
65Al-Dhahabi, op. cit., 2:563-64, and Jansen, The 
Interpretation of the Koran in Modern Egypt, p. 77.
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relatively small.66 They were chosen as the subjects of lectures 
to be delivered in mosques during Ramadan, between 1937 and 1943, 
so their predominantly sermon-like quality is not surprising. Ve 
will find this quality equally characteristic of Shaltut, and the 
similarities in the styles of the two men will become apparent in 
our discussion of Shaltut*s tafsir. Al-MaraghT's lectures were 
very popular and were broadcast by radio.
The aim of guidance may be said to be even more paramount in 
al-Maragtii's work than in TafsTr al-Manar; there are no scholarly 
digressions to bewilder the layman. The style is fluent, 
persuasive, emotive:
...if it wasn't for religion, man could not endure 
this life, for despite its brevity it is full of 
trials and tribulations; there is crushing 
poverty, chronic illness, the loss of one's family 
and kinsfolk, as well as of rank and prestige, for 
one may go from eminence and distinction to 
humiliation and degradation...it is not possible 
for a man to bear all this unless he can look 
forward to an eternal life and eternal happiness; 
for belief in the afterlife mitigates life's 
harshness and gives the believer peace of mind and 
the strength to bear hardships and to live 
peaceably with his fellow men...67
One modern writer makes the point that, being of such a 
general nature, much of these sermons could have come from a
66See Al-Dhahabi, op. cit., 2:565-67 for a bibliography of 
his exegetical lectures.
67Al-Dhahabi, op. cit., pp. 572-73, taken from Al-Durus al- 
Diniyya, 1365, pp. 34-36; needless to say, in order to appreciate 
the style one should consult the original Arabic.
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Christian preacher.68 This comment highlights the way in which 
the definition of tafsir has expanded in recent times so that 
there is an overlap between tafsir and general religious 
writings. The above passage is part of a commentary on Qur'an 
42:13: "He has ordained for you the religion which He commended 
to Noah..."; it is easy to see how this verse may lead one to 
talk about religion in general, but one writer raises the 
question as to whether this kind of expose of the author's views, 
brought about by an "association of ideas", can really be called 
"tafsTr".6 9 It is significant in this regard that, 
notwithstanding the fact that he occasionally comments on entire 
short suras, al-Maraghi has selected the verses presumably to 
some extent on the basis of the subjects he wished to talk about 
in his lectures. Thus the main aim was clearly not to analyse and 
dissect the Quranic text but to draw lessons from it. However, 
noone has suggested that such works should be considered beyond 
the pale of tafsTr, indeed they would conform to the most basic 
definition of tafsir given by al-DhahabT: "the science of tafsTr 
seeks to understand the meaning which God Almighty intended, to 
the limits of human capabilities".70 Moreover the ordinary
68Jansen, op. cit., p. 79.
69Jomier, op. cit., p. 69; he is talking about Tafsir al-
Manar , but this tendency is even more apparent in al-Maraghi's work.
70Al-DhahabT, op. cit., 1:17.
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meaning of the word "tafsTr" is sufficiently broad to accommodate 
a great variety of possibilities.71
It is observed that al-Maraghi had a more respectful attitude 
towards his forebears than did Muhammad cAbduh and Rashid Rida; 
of his tafsTr he wrote: "It is nothing more than the fruits of 
that which was planted by our ancient forebears, and flowers from 
their gardens."72 He was thus less liable to reject ahadith which 
are generally accepted as sahrh (genuine), whereas Muhammad 
cAbduh did sometimes reject such ahadith, particularly with 
regard to sensitive subjects like magic.73 With regard to these 
things, orthodox Sunni Muslims invariably feel more comfortable 
with a man like al-Maraghi; al-Dhahabl commends him for not 
attacking other mufassirun, as other scholars have done, saying: 
"this conduct is most fitting for scholars" C’hadha adab ma 
ajmalahu bi'l-culama'"),74 Perhaps we should not just dismiss 
this by saying that al-Maraghi is more orthodox or conservative; 
already by this time the West was less awe-inspiring, its image 
somewhat tarnished by the events following World War One, while 
Egypt had gained more confidence in its own identity. There was 
less need to answer to the West on all points and to rationalise 
away all the supernatural elements of Islam, and, conversely,
71 See the first page of this chapter for the meanings of the 
word "tafsir".
72Al-Dhahabi, op. cit., 2:568, taken from the introduction 
to his tafsir of Surat al-Hadld.
73Ibid., 2:547-49.
74 Ibid., 2:569.
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renewed confidence in the Islamic heritage. Perhaps in these 
respects al-Maraghi represents a more relaxed attitude and a more 
natural continuation of Muslim scholarship than does Muhammad
r Abduh.
One of the major factors which prompted a greater freedom of 
form in tafsir in the modern period was the new emphasis on 
topics dealt with in the Qur'an. Amin al-Khuli (d. 1967), who did 
not write a commentary himself,75 hut whose views on tafsTr have 
gained wide popularity, lays great stress on the importance of 
topical tafsir (tafsir mauduci). He points out that because the 
Qur'an often deals with the same subject in many different
places, it is essential for the mufassir to have in front of him 
all the verses on that subject; moreover he should know in which 
order they were revealed, as well as their circumstances of 
revelation, so that his understanding of the subject may be as 
thorough as possible.76
This idea is not wholly new, of course; the concept of
interpreting the Qur'an by the Qur'an dates back to the
Companions,77 and was after all only common sense. Moreover the 
Quranic science of al-nasikh wa'1-mansukh as well as the branch 
of fiqh called tacarud al-adilla required a comparison of
different Quranic texts relating to the same subject. However,
75He did, however, write a short series of works entitled
"Min Huda al-Qur'an.. , dealing with Quranic themes such as
financial legislation and Ramadan.
76Amin al-Khuli, op. cit., pp. 305-6.
77Cf. al-DhahabT, op. cit., 1:40-47.
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there was no systematic treatment of topics in tafsTr until the 
modern period; the nearest thing to tafsTr mauducT would be the 
specialist works which dealt with a single aspect or subject 
matter of the Qur'an, such as the works on ahkarn al-Qur'an7n or 
the work cn oaths in the Qur'an by Ibn Qayyim ("Al-Tibyan fT 
Agsam al-Qur'an"). However, Amin al-Khuli maintains that even 
such a work as this was not sufficiently thorough in following up 
the parallel occurrences (nazT1 ir) in the Qur'an and comparing 
them with each other.79
TafsTr al-Manar deals at some length with individual topics, 
often referring to other parts of the Qur'an which deal with the 
same topic. There is also a detailed index preceding each volume 
which lists all the subject matters in alphabetical order for 
easy reference. Moreover the text is divided into pericopes 
which, as far as possible, are chosen to form a natural unit 
dealing with a particular subject matter or aim. However this 
would not satisfy AmTn al-Khuli, who maintains that dealing with 
the Qur'an in its tartlb mashafT (the order which was 
definitively established in the rUthmanic recension and in which 
we find it today), means either repeating oneself where the same 
topic occurs in different places, or else digressing at various
78 See al-Dhahabi, op. cit., 2:420-53 for a description of
several such works.
79Amin al-Khuli, op. cit., p. 301.
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points of the text to deal at length with a topic, thus 
interrupting the flow of one's tafsir of the sura.80
ArrXn al-KhulT's views on tafsTr mauduc i form part of his
overall approach to the Qur'an, which is primarily literary and 
philological. He believes that the Qur'an should be treated like 
any great work of literature, and be studied as such regardless 
of whether or not the student believes in it or seeks guidance 
from it.81 He rather unnecessarily takes issue with Muhammad
cAbduh's view that guidance is the first aim of tafsir, saying
that the first aim is to look at the Qur'an "insofar as it is the
greatest book of the Arabic language" ("min haythu huwa kitab al-
carabiyyat al-akbar"), and to fully understand the Arabic text.82 
Presumably Muhammad Abduh did not intend that this guidance 
should rest on an imperfect or faulty understanding of the text.
It is apparent here and elsewhere that AmTn al-Khuli is an 
intellectual whose main interests are literary rather than a 
religious reformer after the pattern of Muhammad cAbduh; but
perhaps it was natural that, the importance of social questions 
having been established with regard to tafsir, some scholars 
should find leisure to dwell on more literary questions. The 
literary approach can serve the cause of Islam in its own way, by
demonstrating the unique character of the Qur'an and thus
increasing its influence.
80Ibid., pp. 306-7.
81 Ibid., pp. 303-4.
82 Ibid., pp. 302-3.
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Under the heading: "The Literary Approach to TafsTr",83 Amin 
al-Khuli describes two types of studies which are essential to 
tafsir of the Qur'an, just as with any literary text. Firstly, 
background studies,84 which would include the Quranic sciences 
such as the circumstances of revelation, the collection of the 
Qur'an, readings (qira'at), etc., as well as studies on the 
environment in which the Qur'an first appeared, including 
history, sociology, religion, and even down to such details as 
the geography, meteorology, geology, vegetation, etc. of seventh 
century Arabia, all of which go to make up the "Arabdom" (curuba) 
of the Qur'an. Secondly, the study of the Qur'an itself on 
various levels,05 beginning with individual words, whose 
evolution (tadarruj) must be carefully traced in order to 
establish their meaning at the time of the revelation (he points 
out the inadequacy of the available lexicons in this respect); in 
addition to this their Quranic usage should be observed. After 
this one may deal with murakkabat (phrases and sentences), and 
this involves the use of grammar and balagha, but these must be 
used only as tools to bring out the beauty of the Quranic text. 
(This is the nearest Amin al-Khuli comes to referring to icjaz.) 
Apart from an extensive knowledge of Arabic and of the Quranic 
style, this requires outstanding aesthetic judgement (dhawq 
baric) . He goes on to describe the psychological approach to
03 Ibid., pp. 307ff .
84 Ibid., pp. 308-12 .
85Ibid., pp. 312-17.
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tafsir (al~tafsTr al-nafsT) , which is closely linked with 
rhetorical studies, which analyse how language achieves its 
effect. Such psychological studies would show how the Qur'an 
caused men to abandon the way of their forefathers and how it 
eventually brought about the triumph of the Islamic religion. He 
is evidently not claiming this as a totally new form of tafsTr, 
since he gives an example of this psychological approach from al- 
ZamakhsharT. Finally, at the broadest level, sociology (cilro al- 
ijtima0 ) helps us to understand the Quran, which often deals with 
communities rather than individuals.
There are marked similarities between AmXn al-Khuli's 
proposals and Muhammad cAbduh's comments in the introduction to 
Tafsir al-Manar, where he describes the prerequisites for a 
tafsTr which rises above the simplest level.86 These include "an 
understanding of the true meanings of the words”, for "the 
thorough scholar must interpret the Qur'an according to the 
linguistic usage at the time of the revelation", as well as 
observing the usage of a given word in the Qur'an itself. Second 
on the list is "asalib", which involves a knowledge of grammar 
and balagha, and third comes "cilm ahwal al-bashar", which 
corresponds to Amin al-KhulT's "cilm al-ijtimac", and fourthly, 
the way in which men have been guided by the Qur'an ("al-cilm bi- 
wa.ih hidayat al-bashar kullihim bi ' 1-Qur1 an") , which involves a 
knowledge of life at the time of the Prophet. Elsewhere he 
mentions the importance for tafsir of a true appreciation and
66TafsTr al-Manar,
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feel for the Arabic language ("malakat al-dhawq al-carabi"), and 
laments the fact that this is much rarer now than it was in the 
first ages of Islam.87 Thus Muhammad cAbduh mentioned, albeit 
less systematically, many of the points which Amin al-Khuli talks 
about.
However, we do not find in Tafsxr al-Manar evidence of the 
degree of philological analysis or background studies which Amin 
al-Khuli would like, and it is unlikely that Muhammad cAbduh 
would agree that it is essential to have a background knowledge 
of places like Madyan and the dwellings of cAd and Thamud in 
order to fully understand the lessons contained in the Quranic 
stories about these places;88 on the contrary, he may well have 
considered such information to be a diversion from the true aims 
of the story.
It would be true to say that, while there has been no 
systematic undertaking of AmTn al-Khuli's proposals, some areas 
of study which he recommended have received more attention than 
others. His wife, cA ’ishah cAbd al-Rahman, known as Bint al- 
Shatic , undertook a tafsir of fourteen short suras, entitled: 
"Al-Tafsir al-Bayani li'l-Qur'an al-Karlm", concentrating on the 
literary and philological aspects of tafsir. She chose suras "in 
which the topical unity is conspicuous",89 perhaps in order to
87 Ibid., 1:28-29.
88AmTn al-Khuli, op. cit., p. 311.
89cA ’isha cAbd al-Rahman, Al-TafsTr al-Bayani li'l-Qur'an 
al-Karim, 2 vols., Cairo: Car al-Mac5rif, 1966, 1969, 1:14.
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avoid the problems Arran al-Khuli mentioned with regard to tafsTr 
musalsal, This strictly literary approach is not characteristic 
of Kuhammad cAbdul.'s school of tafsir, however.
The importance of topical tafsir has been widely recognised, 
and apart from the effect on tafsir proper, this has resulted in 
a wealth of monographs on Quranic subjects,00 which, although 
they dc not call themselves "tafsTr"s, would appear to be the 
logical response to Amin al-Khuli's call for tafsTr maudurT as 
opposed to tafsir musalsal. Works which call themselves "tafsir" 
have perhaps inevitably remained more tied to the tartTb mashafT 
of the Qur'an, but in Shaltut we will see an example of a tafsTr 
which deals with the Qur'an sura by sura but which is 
sufficiently free in form to accommodate the requirements of 
tafsTr maudorT.
There has been much interest in the literary nature of th, 
Qur’an as an entity, i.e. in the form of the mushaf. Amin al-
Khuli briefly referred tc this area of interest, with his usual 
tendency tc place things in a strict order of priority: "if the
mufassir wishes to reflect on the unity of the sura and the
relationship between its verses, and its smooth progression, that 
would probably be only after a thorough tafsir of the various 
topics contained in it".91
90For example cAbbas Mahmud al-cAqqad, Al-Mar'a fi al-
Qur1 an, Kuhammad al-Madanl, A1 Qur'an yakhluq al-mu.itamar al-
mutafa'il, Muhammad al-Bahi, Manhaj al-Qur'an fi-Tatwir al-Muitamar .
91AmTn al-KhulT, op. cit., p. 307.
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This approach, which also deals with the relationship between 
the suras, presupposes that the order of the suras within the 
mushaf is divinely inspired - a belief that is now almost
universal among Muslims but which has been disputed in the
past.92 Such studies are often closely associated with the theme 
of icjaz, as in Muhammad cAbd Allah Diraz's (1894-1958) "Al-Naba1 
al-cAzim", which deals at length with establishing the divine 
origin of the Qur’an before going on to analyse its outstanding 
literary qualities, the structure of its suras, etc.93
Diraz lists four levels (maratib) on which the Quranic text 
may be studied: (1) section (qitra) by section (a section would
usually be a few verses which form a natural unit; it could
equally be one long verse or a short sura); (2) sura by sura 
(3) the links between suras and (4) the Qur'an as a whole.94 Of 
these four levels, Diraz pays most attention to the sura, and in 
fact the book ends with a forty-eight page structural analysis of 
Surat al-Baqara. He compares the sura to a well-constructed
building containing rooms and courtyards; since there are no
incongruities or irregularities, there must have been an overall 
plan, despite the fact that the Qur'an was revealed apparently
92 See Jalal al-Dih al-Suyutf, Al-Itqan fi cUlum al-Qur'an, 
3rd ed., 2 vols, Cairo: MatbacatHijazi', 1941, l:107ff.
" Th e  author spent twelve years studying in France (see Al- 
Naba' al-cAzTm (nazara iadrda fI11-Qur'an), 4th ed., Kuwait: Dar 
al-Qalam, 1977, p.' 7), which may explain his preoccupation with
establishing the divine origin of the Qur'an; it also enabled him
to become acquainted with the techniques of modern literary
criticism.
94 Ibid., p. 107.
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haphazardly, in irregular instalments which were not even placed 
chronologically in the Qur'an. Furthermore, the sura as a whole 
has a particular aim? just as the parts of the body all cooperate 
to perform a single function, so do the parts of the sura.95
The idea of viewing the sura as an organic unity is not new; 
Diraz quotes Abu Ishaq al-ShltibT {d. 790 A.H.): "No matter how
many subjects the sura deals with, it is a single discourse; the 
end is linked to the beginning, and the beginning is linked to 
the end, and the whole is devoted to a single aim. Moreover the 
sentences appertaining to a particular subject are related to 
each other. If one wishes to understand the arrangement (nazm) of 
the sura, it is essential to look at the whole in some depth, and 
the same goes for the sections which deal with a particular 
subject."96 TafsTr al-Manar also pays some attention to the sura 
as an organic unity; from Surat al-Nisa' onwards, Rashid Rida 
follows each sura with a summary of its subject matter which is 
often quite detailed, and there is often a brief section 
preceding the sura entitled: "The way in which this sura is
related to the previous one".97 The way in which the verses are
95 Ibid., p. 155.
96Ibid., p. 159; in the footnote to this page Diraz gives_ 
the names of other scholars who have held to this concept: Abu 
Bakr al-NTsaburiT, Fakhr al-DTn al-RazT, Abu Bakr ibn cArab7, 
Burhan al-DTn al BaqacT, "and others".
97E.g. Tafsir al-Manar, 7:287ff., (Surat al-Ancam).
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linked to each other (tanasuq al-ayat) is also referred to.98 
However, the idea of tanasuq al-ayat wa'l-suwar is not so 
consistently applied as with later writers like Diraz and 
Shaltut.
Diraz points out various unique characteristics of the Quranic 
style, such as its conciseness: there are no superfluous words in 
the Qur'an, and there is a unique balance between economy of 
expression (al qasd fi'l-lafz) and conveying the required sense 
as fully as possible (al-wafa* bi-haqq al-macna) A n o t h e r  of 
its unique qualities which he cites is that of being suited to 
all mentalities; its simplicity is such that it is meaningful tc 
all, while it has depths of meaning to satisfy the more 
intellectually or meditatively inclined. Likewise it satisfies 
both the intellect and the emotions, sustaining a perfect balance 
between them.100
Thus we see a broader approach to the Quranic style, as well 
as a new emphasis on the aesthetic aspect of tafsTr; Diraz states 
that the Quranic harmony has an effect like that of music or 
poetry, but unlike them is always varied, and never repetitive in 
its rhythms, so that one never tires of listening to it.101 This
"E.g. Ibid., 3:293-95, which discusses Qur'an 3:37 and 
shows how this passage represents a natural progression of what 
has gone before, with regard to its essential aim.
"Diraz, op. cit. , pp. 109-112; here and elsewhere Diraz 
illustrates his points with examples from the Qur'an.
100 Ibid., pp. 113-16.
101 Ibid., p. 102.
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beauty of form, however, is only the wrapping on the parcel; the 
meanings conveyed by these words are even more wonderful and 
harmonious.102 Thus the area of aesthetics encompasses not just 
the forms of expression in the Qur'an but also the substance of 
its message.
Diraz points out the difficulty of describing the techniques 
of the Qur'an, which are often so subtle as to defy analysis, and 
which cannot always be classified according to the rules of 
balagha; discussing the links between sections of a sura he 
writes:
However, if one forgets about those technical 
terms and superfluous questions, and gives free 
rein to one's mind and one's emotions, then 
recites or listens to those places, one would not 
be aware of any incongruity or any transition 
which offends the taste or jars upon the ears,..103
This aesthetic approach inevitably involves a greater degree 
of subjectivity, but "taste" or "aesthetic judgement" has never 
been denied as an aid to understanding the Qur'an simply because 
it cannot be objectively measured, and Diraz is not guilty of 
unwarranted or unrestrained subjectivity, since his arguments are 
backed up by concrete examples from the Qur'an. His structural 
analysis of Surat al-Baqara, for example, adheres closely to the 
text, and identifies the connecting links between the different
102Ibid., p. 106.
10 3 Ibid., p. 162, f.n.
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sections.104 Before embarking on this analysis he refers to 
various undisputed facts, e.g. that Surat al-Baqara is not only 
the longest sura but the most diverse as regards subject matter, 
as well as the sura which was revealed over the longest period of 
time (nine years) in the greatest number of instalments (over 
eighty). He points out that this makes it all the more amazing 
that there should be a consistent progression of ideas within the 
sura, which go to make up a harmonious whole.105
While we may describe Diraz' s approach as a literary one, 
unlike Amin al-Khuli and cA'isha cAbd al-Rahman he has constant 
reference to the moral lessons of the Qur'an. For example, he 
divides Surat al-Baqara into structural parts on the basis of its 
four main aims, which include the promotion of Islam and the 
promulgation of its laws, as well as "the promise and the threat" 
(al wacd wa'l-wacid). This is perhaps inevitable when one 
considers that the Qur'an, unlike most literary works, is 
deliberately and consistently intended to act as a catalyst on 
peoples' souls; thus there can be no separation between its aims 
and its literary form. With Diraz, we begin to see an effective 
synthesis between the literary approach and the practical 
approach which aims at guidance.
The "psychological" approach is an integral part of this type 
of tafsir, which has reference to the effect of certain
104See e.g. ibid., p. 180, the heading: "Halqat al-ittisal 
bayna al-qismayn al-awwal wa'1-thani", which is given as verse
74.
105Ibid., pp. 157-58.
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rhetorical features of the Qur'an, for only then does the full 
extent of its literary ic ,j az become apparent.106 The 
aesthetic/psychological approach, which seeks to uncover new 
subtleties in the Qur'an, leaves room for a more instinctive, 
intuitive approach, and in this respect resembles some Sufi 
tafsTr, except that here the intuition operates in less 
controversial and more clearly-defined areas, and is firmly based 
on an understanding of the Quranic text in the light of the 
accepted principles of Arabic grammar, rhetorics, etc.
2} Shaltut1s Tafsir
As can be seen from the full title, "Tafsir al-Qur'an al- 
Karim: al-Ajza' al-cAsharat al-Ula" deals with the first third of 
the Qur'an. It was first published from 1949 onwards in the 
periodical "Risalat al-Islam" issued by "Jamgcat al-Tagrib bayna 
al-Madhahib".107 In 1959 it was first published in book form; its 
popularity can be judged by the fact that it was republished 
within a few weeks,108 and by 1982 had reached its ninth edition. 
It is about 650 pages long, devoting between sixty and a hundred
106E.g. ibid., p. 186: "...wa kana hadha al-tardid wahdahu
kafiyan li-ifhamihim..."
107Muhammad al-Bahi, Tafsir al-Qur'an li'l-Ustadh al-Akbar 
al-Shaykh Mahmud Shaltut, in Majallat al-Azhar, 31 (1959-60), p. 
1017.
1O0Muhammad cAbd Allah al-Samman, TafsTr al-Qur'an al-Karim 
li'l-Ustadh al-Akbar al-Shaykh MahmUd Shaltut, in ibid., 32 
(1960-61), p. 115.
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pages to each of the first nine suras excepting the first two, 
which receive less attention.
Apart from his tafsir he has written a fairly short booh 
entitled "Ila al-Qur'an al-Karim" which gives a resume of the 
general topics of selected suras, or parts of them, section 
(rubr) by section, as well as three monographs on Quranic topics: 
"The formation of society according to the Qur'an", "The Qur'an 
and women", and "Islam and international relations in war and 
peace". All of these works are included in "Min Huda al-Qur'an". 
The fact that extracts of these works are also included in his 
other works - "Min Tawjihat al-Islam" and "cAgTda wa-SharTca"109 
- demonstrates the essential homogeneity of much of his work, and 
illustrates the point that nowadays there is a thin dividing line 
between "tafsTr" and religious writings in general.
a) Shaltut*s Views on TafsTr
Shaltut greatly appreciated the services which Muhammad cAbduh 
had rendered to the science of tafsir, and made particular 
mention of the emphasis on practical matters, the way in which 
the Qur'an was taken as the primary source in all matters and not
109E.g. passages on the Islamic view of wealth and begging 
contained in Min Huda al-Qur'an, 2nd ed., Cairo: Dar al-Katib al~ 
cArabT li'l-tibaca wa'1-nashr, 1968, pp. 212ff and 226ff, are to 
be found in cAqida wa~Sharica, pp. 250ff, and Min Tawjihat al-
Islam, 8th ed., Cairo and Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1982, pp. 165ff 
respectively.
84
subordinated to anything else, the rejection of isra*lliyyat and 
unreliable reports, and the eradication of sectarianism.110
Shaltut expounds his ideas on tafsir only briefly, in the 
Introduction to his tafsir and in a short article entitled "The 
ideal method of tafsir".111 Like Muhammad cAbduh and al-MaraghT, 
he was more of a practical man than a theoretician, being like 
them involved in social and religious reform in the Azhar and 
elsewhere.
In the Introduction to his tafsir, he mentions the many 
different types of tafsTr - those that concentrate on grammar, 
balagha, figh, etc. - not in order to criticise them, but, 
characteristically, in order to praise the great efforts which 
have been devoted to the Qur'an over the centuries.112 He does, 
however, single out two things which should be totally avoided- 
sectarianism in tafsir and "scientific" tafsTr (tafsTr cilmi). It 
is significant that his tafsir was first published in Risalat al­
ls lam, which devoted itself to the eradication of sectarianism. 
Shaltut felt that these two types of tafsir were unfitting to the 
dignity of the Qur'an. In the first case, the mufassir 
subordinates the Qur'an to his own beliefs instead of vice versa, 
and in order to do so has recourse to undesirable elements such 
as isra’iliyyat and weak or forged ahadTth; sectarianism has also
310Shaltut, Al-Shaykh cAbduh wa-Tarigatuhu fi'l-Tafsir, in 
Al-Risala, 12, No. 576 (17th July 1944)*, p. 582.
11^ i n  Huda al-Qur'an, pp. 322-25.
1125haltut, TafsTr al-Qur'an al-KarTm: Al-Ajza1 al-cAsharat
al-Ula, 9th ed., Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1982, pp. 7-8.
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led to the prevalence of taqlTd in tafsTr.113 Secondly, he 
criticises those who interpret the Qur'an according to scientific 
theories and who, "if they pass by a verse which mentions the 
rain, or describes the clouds, or talks about thunder or 
lightening, rejoice and say: SeeJ The Qur'an is addressing the
scientists”.114 Shaltut observes that such people may think they 
are serving the Qur'an, but on the contrary, they expose the 
Qur'an to the charge of instability (dawran), since scientific 
theories change with the times. Moreover the Qur’an was not
revealed as a handbook on scientific theory - its references to 
natural phenomena are only in order to provoke thought and
reflection and research, and to increase people's faith. One
should be content that it does not contain anything which 
contradicts established scientific truths.115 Thus he is more 
cautious with regard to tafsir cilmT than Muhammad cAbduh and
RashTd Rida, who, as we have observed, occasionally referred to 
scientific theories in their tafsTr, although they did not 
approve of tafsir cilml as such.
In his article "The ideal method of tafsir", Shaltut puts the
case for tafsTr mauducT . He believes that the traditional form of 
tafsTr, (musalsal), has contributed to the areas of conflict 
within tafsTr and has made it easy for those with a particular 
bias to interpret the verses in their own way; consequently the
113 Ibid, pp. 9-10.
114Ibid., p. 11.
115Ibid., pp. 13-14.
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guidance contained in the Qur'an has been somewhat difficult to 
obtain. In fact this has resulted in an "intellectual chaos" 
which has turned people away from the Qur'an and tafsir.116 By 
gathering together all the verses on a particular subject and 
comparing them, on the other hand, the mufassir will be able to 
see their true aim and significance, without forcing any meanings 
onto the verses. Shaltut feels that this type of tafsir shows 
people how the Qur'an is connected to all spheres of their daily 
lives, and gives them the practical guidance that they need, and 
this will combat the attitude of some Muslims who see the Qur'an 
as "just a spiritual book", to be used only for recitation and 
medititation, or as a kind of charm to ward off the devil or to 
cure ills .117
b) The Form of Shaltut's Tafsir
Accordingly, Shaltut's tafsir deals with the Qur'an sura by 
sura but not verse by verse. The sura is generally introduced by 
a passage giving the reason for its name and other general 
details such as its muqattacat (the letter-symbols which preface 
some suras of the Qur'an), whether it is Meccan or Medinan, its 
order in the mushaf, etc. Usually there is a passage describing 
the general circumstances of the Muslim community at the time of
116Min Huda al-Qur'an, pp. 322-23.
7Ibid., p. 324.
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its revelation.118 The most consistent feature of all, however,
is the sections which are common to all the chapters (except that
on al-Fatiha, due to its brevity), outlining their main aims or
subject matters. One may paraphrase Shaltut's outline of Surat
al-Baqara thus:119 Surat al-Baqara is one of the most
comprehensive suras, containing in its early part the essential
articles of faith and many proofs of tawhid, and mentioning the
creation of man; the sura can then be divided into two parts
which reflect its two main aims. The first aim arose as a result
of the fact that the Muslims now lived alongside the Jews in
Medina; this aim comprised the appeal to and discussion with the
Jews (vv.40-177), reminding them of their past misdeeds and God's
favours to them, and refuting their doubts about Muhammad's
prophethood. The second aim arose as a result of the fact that
the Muslims had now come to form an independent community with
their own identity, and were thus in need of new legislation to
regulate their affairs, and here Shaltut mentions the many and
varied subjects which are dealt with in the second half of the
sura (vv. 178ff.), and goes on to say:
...and all that is interspersed - as is usual in 
the Qur'an - with stories, promises and threats 
which encourage the believers to adhere to these 
precepts and not to violate them, drawing 
attention to God's laws in creation and in 
communities; it (the sura) then ends with an 
affirmation of the creed of the believers, just as
118E.g. Tafsir, pp. 275-77 and 516. There is also frequent 
reference to such background information in the text, e.g. pp.
373 and 589ff.
119 Ibid., pp. 50ff.
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it began with an affirmation of the 
characteristics of the believers...
Thus the end endorses the beginning, and the 
beginning anticipates the end, and the sura forms 
a single entity.120
c) The Sura as an Organic Unity
Here and elsewhere it is evident that Shaltut regards the sura 
as a perfectly balanced whole, and, like Diraz, he feels it is 
important to get an overall view of the sura before embarking on 
its individual topics. While he does not give a systematic 
structural analysis of each sura, he does take it for granted 
that the sura has a coherent and well-ordered structure, and he 
sometimes refers to this. For example, after describing at length 
the various individual topics contained in each of the two
aforementioned parts of Surat al-Baqara, he says:
These are the beads of the two sides of the
necklace, upon which are threaded the topics of 
Surat al-Baqara, and of which ayat al-birr (v.177) 
is the centre-piece...
We have used this method, which is unusual in 
tafsir, in order to place the topics with which 
the sura deals before this verse, as well as those 
which come after it, in front of the reader on a 
single thread which links the beads of each side, 
and gives the onlooker an overall view of all that 
that noble sura contains, and helps him to 
identify the aims and the nature of each topic, 
and the way in which it is connected to the other 
topics.121
Shaltut is aware of the importance of the nida1 at (those
places where God directly addresses people in the Qur'an,
12 0 Ibid., p. 52.
121 Ibid., pp. 78-79.
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beginning with "va ayyuha...") to the structure of many of the 
suras, and often pays special attention to them. In his chapter 
on Surat al-Ma'ida, with the exception of a discussion of the 
disciples and the table which they asked to be sent down, the 
whole chapter is structured on the basis of the nida1 at, 
reflecting the fact that these define the sequence of subject 
matters within the sura.122
He also refers to the way in which verses relate to one 
another within a sura. For instance, he points out that the long 
section in Surat al-Acraf which relates the stories of past 
nations who disbelieved in their prophets (vv.59-177), begins and 
ends with a verse which compares the disbelievers to natural 
phenomena (vv. 58 and 176 respectively) - in the first instance 
to bad soil which yields only poor and scanty vegetation, and in 
the second to a dog who does nothing but pant whether you chase 
it or leave it alone. Thus the end and the beginning of the 
passage are related to each other.123
Elsewhere he refers to the natural progression within the 
sura, when discussing the two styles which predominate in Surat 
al-Anc am: the style of taqrir (affirmation or statement), and
that of talgin (instruction - i.e. those passages which begin 
with "Say:..."). He believes that the way in which the ten 
commandments are introduced towards the end of the sura in the
122Ibid., pp. 278-348.
123Ibid., p. 501, under the heading: "Khitam hadha al-siyaq 
mutt asiq maca al-bad'".
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talqini style, following the forceful arguments and polemics of 
the sura, make them a natural conclusion to those arguments.124
d) The Relationship between the Suras
Shaltut not only likes to give the reader an overall view of 
the sura, but he also wishes the reader to bear in mind the 
general contents of each of the suras in succession, and to this 
end he periodically reminds us of the subject matters of previous 
suras. Before commenting on Surat al~Ancam, for example, he 
reviews the main aims and characteristics of all the previous 
suras.125 He points out that the four long Medinan suras 
preceding this sura, although they differ in their details, all 
have the same common aim, i.e. to regulate the legal affairs of 
the Muslims as an independent community, and to provide guidance 
on how they should deal with their new neighbours - mainly the 
Jews - both on the level of verbal polemics and practicalities, 
in peace and in war.126 Having stated what they have in common, 
he then highlights the differences between them by giving a 
fairly detailed resume of each sura. He points out the uniqueness 
of Surat al-Fatiha in its relationship to all the other suras of 
the Qur'an, inasmuch as it alludes, despite its brevity, to all 
the main aims of the Qur'an, referring as it does to faith and
124 Ibid., pp. 395-96, under the heading: "Maji'atuhu bi- 
uslub al-surat al-talqTnT ka-nata’ij bacda al-mutaqaddimat".
125 Ibid., pp. 350-60. He does this again more briefly on 
pp. 584-85 and 514-15.
126 Ibid., p. 352 .
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works, to this world and the next, to "the promise and the 
threat".127
Having thus given us a picture of the way in which these four 
suras agree in their aims and complement each other in their
details, Shaltut goes on to show how Surat al-Ancam, being
Meccan, differs from them in several respects; for example, it 
does not contain legislative material, or reference to ahl al- 
kitab (the People of the Book), hypocrites or war, nor are there 
any nida'at addressed to the believers as a group.128 He then 
summarises the contents of this sura, showing in greater detail 
how it differs from the previous suras:
We find that this sura concentrates on the 
first elements of the dacwa (Islamic mission), and 
its weapons in this are repeated arguments, 
clearly expounded verses, and an amazing variety 
of methods of persuasion and compelling proofs; it 
mentions God's unity in creation, in worship and 
in legislation, as well as the attitude of the 
disbelievers, and it tells them what befell their 
forefathers of like mind, and relates their 
objections to the prophethood; it mentions the Day 
of Resurrection and Retribution, and with regard
to all these things refers us to the evidence in
our souls and in the world ("fT al-anfus wa-fl al 
-afaq")...129
Following this summary, Shaltut goes on to compare this sura 
with the four other "suwar al-hamd" (those suras which begin with 
"al-hamd u 1i '11ah"): al-Fatiha, al-Kahf, Saba', and Fatir (al-
Mala'ika), showing how they all concentrate on aspects of God's
127 Ibid., pp. 350-52. 
1 28 Ibid.. , p. 361.
129 Ibid., pp. 361-62.
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Lordship (rububiyya), whether it be in relation to creation or 
with regard to His guidance.130 Shaltut feels that, far from 
being an isolated phrase at the beginning of the sura, the 
opening of a sura with "Praise be to God..." influences its 
nature and content in a particular way, and that the five suras 
which begin in this fashion have a special relationship with each
other by virtue of it. He shows convincingly that the opening
phrases of these suras give a clear indication of which aspect or 
aspects of the rububiyya will be prominent in the sura. For 
example, Surat al-Ancam, which concentrates on the wonders of 
creation and natural phenomena begins: "Praise be to God Who
created the heavens and the earth and made the darkness and the
light...", while Surat ai-Kahf, which concentrates on the risala 
and wahy (prophethood and revelation), begins:"Praise be to God 
Who revealed to His servant the Book, and did not make any 
crookedness in it...". Surat Fatir, which deals with both of 
these aspects, begins: "Praise be to God, Creator of the heavens
and the earth, Who made the angels messengers...", and Surat al-
Fatiha, which begins with: "Praise be to God, Lord of all
worlds...", contains in essence all the aspects of the rububiyya 
which are contained in the other four suras.131
Following this he embarks on a comparison between Suras al- 
Ancam and al-Acr£f, which stand together as two long Meccan suras
130 Ibid., pp. 363-68.
131See also ibid., pp. 23-25. Cf. pp. 167-68, where he 
compares Surat al-Misa' and Surat al-Ha_i.i. which both begin with 
the phrase: "Ya ayyuha al-nas ittaqu rabbakum".
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in a succession of Medinan suras, but which differ in several
respects.132 He lists nine ways in which they differ, indicating
for example those aspects which are dealt with in detail in one 
sura but only briefly or generally in the other, such as the 
stories of past prophets, and the customs of men with regard to 
tah111 and tahrim (declaring things to be lawful or unlawful). He 
also brings out the difference in the overall emphasis of each 
sura: while Surat al-Anram concentrates on the objections tc the 
dacwa, and relates the proofs which establish its validity, Surat 
al-Acraf concentrates on the threat of the punishment in the 
Hereafter, as well as the punishment in this world of former 
nations who disbelieved in their prophets.133 He also shows how 
each was more suited to the time when it was revealed, al-Ac raf 
being revealed in the first stages of the dac wa before the 
opposition had had time to formulate arguments against it, while 
al-Ancam, revealed later, responds to the growing opposition and 
replies to their objections.
Again, when dealing with Surat al-Tawba, Shaltut shows its
relationship to Surat al-Anfal and the reason why they are linked
together with no basmallah in between:
...together with Surat al-Anfal, it gives us a
general historical picture of Muhammad’s 
(p.b.u.h.) mission and jihad up until the time
when God blessed him with the fruits of that jihad 
and the completion of that mission...
Perhaps it is because these two suras describe 
those stages that they come together in the
13 2 Ibid., pp. 369-74.
133 Ibid., p. 373.
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mushaf.13 4
An overview of the suras is in any case a corollary of the 
topical approach to tafsir; for example, when dealing with Surat 
al-Nlsa', he lists all the other suras which deal with women's 
issues, mentioning the aspects upon which they concentrate.135
e) Shaltut's Method of Tafsir
Having given an overall picture of the sura, Shaltut feels 
free to dwell on particular topics dealt with in the sura, while 
perhaps neglecting others. For instance, his chapter on Surat al- 
Bagara deals with the following subjects: the story of the cow
and Quranic stories in general, the mugattac at and the mutashabih 
(that which is open to conjecture or admits of more than one 
meaning) in the Qur'an in general, the three types of people vis- 
a-vis the Quranic guidance (muttagun, kafirun, munafiqun), and 
the position of "ayat al-birr" within the sura and the theme of 
birr (piety, righteousness) in general. While he does not discuss 
the many legal matters contained in this sura, elsewhere he 
dwells at length on the legislation, both internal and external, 
which helped to consolidate the Medinan community.136 We should 
add that his selectiveness is more apparent here than in any 
other chapter, since despite the fact that Surat al-Baqara is the
longest sura of the Qur'an, Shaltut's chapter on it is only
/
134 Ibid., pp. 588-89.
135Ibid,, pp. 162-65.
136See, e.g., ibid, index to Surat al-Nisa'.
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forty-eight pages long, while most of the other longer suras 
receive nearly a hundred pages.
Apart from this selectiveness, the list of topics he deals 
with in his chapter on Surat al-Baqara show clearly his tendency 
to go from the particular to the general; just as he likes to 
have an overall view of the sura, so he likes to deal 
comprehensively with particular themes which occur in the sura. 
This gives us an interesting combination of tafsir proper, tying 
itself to the text of a particular sura, and writings on general 
aspects or topics of the Qur'an, these being, in Surat al-Baqara, 
the Quranic stories, the mugattacat and the mutashabih in the 
Qur'an, and the theme of birr.
As we have said, the chapter on Surat al-Baqara is not typical
in that it is unusually short; in other chapters we find a much
greater variety of social and legal subject matters. In Surat al- 
Nisa', for example, he talks about the various aspects of
internal and external stability with which the sura deals, such 
as the family, marriage, man's authority over woman, polygamy, 
orphans, financial legislation, inheritance, adoption, the 
sources of law, judges and their responsibilities, war and 
various matters appertaining to it as well as many other things 
which are dealt with more briefly such as al-qada' wa'l-qadar 
{destiny and free will), kindness towards parents, the nida'at 
contained in the sura and so on.
Notwithstanding the great variety of topics, which cover most 
of the contents of Surat al-Nisa1, Shaltut has still been
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selective in deciding which aspects to concentrate on. We also 
see the same tendency here and in other suras to go from
particular subjects to general ones. In this sura, for example, 
in view of the title and main subject matter of the sura he
discusses the Qur'an’s concern with women in general.137 In Surat 
Al 0 Imran, when dealing with the nida1 at contained in the sura, 
he talks about the general significance of the call from God.138
Again, in Surat al-Ma'ida, on the subject of tayammum, he
discusses the phenomenon of tashric al-badal (legislation which 
allows certain acts of worship to be replaced with a substitute 
in certain circumstances) in general;139 and when discussing 
Qur'an 5:7, "And remember God's favour to you and the Covenant He 
made with you when you said: "We hear and obey"...", he goes on 
to talk about the different types of covenant (mithaq) which are 
referred to in the Qur'an, such as the covenants God made with
the prophets, with mankind in general, and with Banu Isra'Tl.140
Equally in evidence is the desire to derive general principles 
from particular Quranic verses, and this is where Shaltut's 
training as a faqlh becomes apparent. For example, having 
discussed the verses on inheritance in Surat al-Nisa', he goes on 
to deduce the general principles of inheritance which can be
inferred from them, such as the fact that inheritance can be
137IbicL, pp. 165-67.
138 Ibid., p. 113.
139Ibid., p. 320.
140 Ibid., pp. 332f f.
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through blood relationship or marriage relationship, and that age 
or sex have no influence on whether or not a person qualifies as 
an heir, etc.,141 This characteristic also applies to the Sharica 
as a whole, as where he discusses the different opinions as to 
the correct procedure in the various parts of wudu', and goes on 
to maintain that this difference of opinion demonstrates the 
tolerance and flexibility of the Sharica-142
i) The Qur'an as first source of tafsir
The major characteristic of tafsTr mauducI , as has already 
been mentioned, is that of bringing together different parts of 
the Qur'an in order to see every aspect of a topic and fully 
understand the significance of each phrase. Accordingly, when 
Shaltut is dealing with a particular topic in a particular sura, 
he does not confine himself to that sura but refers to other 
parts of the Qur'an; for example, when he is discussing the 
financial legislation contained in Surat al-Nisa', we find the 
heading: "The Qur'an's concern with the subject of wealth in this 
sura and others".143 When in the chapter on Surat al-Anfal he 
wishes to define the legitimate causes or reasons for war, he 
refers to Quranic verses in other suras which throw light on the 
subject,544 and when discussing the concept of justice in the
141 Ibid., pp. 195-97.
142Ibid., pp. 311-12.
143 Ibid., pp. 197-99.
144Ibid., pp. 529-30.
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chapter on Surat al-Ancam, he refers to the many different 
instances in which the Qur'an enjoins justice.145 Apart from such 
examples, he naturally feels free to quote from any part of the 
Qur'an whenever it is relevant to his discussion.
This method is also used for particular features of the 
Qur'an, as where he deals with the questions people address to 
Muhammad, in the Quranic phrases beginning: "yas'alunaka" or 
"yastaftunaka", taking examples from the whole Qur'an. This 
enables him to make some general observations on these questions, 
such as the fact that they usually concern practical matters, the 
difference between "su'al" and "istifta' ", and the reasons for 
particular nuances of expression contained in some of them.146 
Often it is simply a case of bringing out particular features 
which occur frequently in the Qur'an in order to show their 
importance, as for example the fact that zakah and salah are 
often mentioned together, or the way in which the Qur'an 
generally mentions the attributes of the believers following a 
word like mu'mlnun or muttaqun.147
This is also important on the linguistic level. Although the 
actual grammatical content in Shaltut's tafsTr is small, he is
14 0 Ibid., pp. 438-41.
146Ibid., pp. 537ff,
147Ibid., pp. 573-74 and 567ff. respectively.
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often influenced by the general Quranic usage of words when 
defining their meaning.148
Apart from fulfilling the aforementioned aims of clarifying 
meanings and making the Quranic lessons more relevant to people's 
lives, this constant cross-reference within the Qur'an reflects a 
reluctance to measure the Qur'an by any criterion except itself, 
When Shaltut is discussing Qur'an 4:115, "He that opposes the 
Prophet after guidance has been made clear to him, and follows a 
path other than that of the believers, shall be given what he has 
chosen. We will cast him into Hell, a miserable abode", he 
maintains that this verse shows that those who either have not 
heard about Islam or have not had it presented to them in a 
favourable light, cannot be called kafirun, nor can anyone be 
sure that they will go to Hell. He goes on to describe the 
objections which some scholars would have to his interpretation, 
namely that it relies on the connotations (dalalat al-mafhum) of 
the verse rather than on an explicit statement, and he refutes 
their view, saying: "in our opinion this amounts to understanding 
God's word in the light of technical rules (gawacid istilahiyya), 
whereas God's word is independent of any rules".149
For Shaltut the Qur'anic text is in fact often the first 
source of tafsTr. Having remarked on the fact that there is a 
difference of opinion as to whether the "rImran" in the title of
14 8 See ibid., pp. 26, 79ff., 420, 465ff., 549, and 643 for
examples of this.
149Ibid., p. 229.
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the third sura is the father of Moses and Aaron or the father of 
Mary, he goes on to give his own opinion, basing it not on any 
previous authorities or reports, but on the evidence contained in 
the Qur'an itself; he points out that in the Qur'an, the names of 
the suras generally refer either to the most important subject 
matter of the sura, as with Surat al-Nisa', or to the strangest 
event contained in the sura, as with Surat al-Ma'ida or Surat al- 
Bagara. In Surat A1 cImran, there are no strange or wonderful 
stories appertaining to Moses or Aaron, but there is one about 
Jesus and Mary, therefore Shaltut believes the cImran in question 
to be Mary's father.150
Another important way in which the Qur'an itself is a main 
source of tafsTr is where there is reference to the context 
(siyaq) of a verse or phrase. Whereas traditional tafsirs will 
often look at a verse, or even the words within a verse, in 
isolation,151 in modern times there has been a reaction against 
this fragmentary approach to the Qur'an, and mufassirun now tend 
to take a broader view, characterised as we have said by a new 
emphasis on the sura as an entity and tafsir mauducT . The use of 
siyaq is another aspect of this broader view, and Shaltut has 
frequent reference to it.
For example, after quoting the opinion of Muhammad cAbduh and
150 Ibid., pp. 90-91.
^Thd^s would not apply to all traditional muf assirun; al- 
ZamakhsharT, for example, was interested in the relationship 
between the words and phrases of the Qur'an.
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Rashid Rida regarding the story of the cow (Qur'an 2:72-73),152 
he refutes their interpretation on the grounds that it is not
appropriate either linguistically or with regard to its
context.153 They interpret the story as one that illustrates a 
piece of Jewish legislation, which Rashid Rida quotes from the 
Torah - i.e. the procedure to be followed in the event of a 
murder being committed where the perpetrator is unknown. Because 
this procedure avoids bloody disputes as to the identity of the 
murderer, and thus has the effect of saving lives, they interpret 
the word "yuhyi" in the phrase: "kadhalika Allah yuhyT al-mayta" 
("Thus does God bring the dead to life" - 2:73), in the sense of
preserving life, as in the phrase: "In qisas (talion) there is
life for you" (2:179). Likewise the phrase which follows: "and He 
shows you His signs so that you may understand", would refer to 
the wisdom of this legislation rather than to any actual visible 
phenomenon. Thus they are trying to avoid the interpretation that 
the corpse actually came to life and uttered the name of his 
killer; Shaltut attributes this reluctance partly to the fact 
that the story is not contained in any of the Jewish sources; 
however the tendency of Muhammad cAbduh and RashTd Rida to 
minimise the importance of supernatural phenomena within Islam is 
well known.154
1 5 2 Ibid.-, pp. 41-44.
153 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
154See, e.g., al-Dhahabi, op. cit., 2:543-47, and cAbd al- 
Ghaffar cAbd al-Rahim, op. cit., pp. 255ff.
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Shaltut objects to their interpretation on the grounds that it 
involves "turning words away from their lexical meanings to 
another meaning, without any good reason for such an 
interpretation", and this may be simply because the mufassir 
finds the more obvious or literal meaning somewhat unlikely,155 
and also because of the context, as the phrase that follows: "Yet 
after that your hearts became as hard as rocks or even harder", 
suggests that there was a definite physical event to which they 
reacted.
When discussing the opening phrase of Surat al-Anfal:156 "They 
ask you about the spoils of war", Shaltut remarks that the 
question could concern either whether or not the spoils are 
lawful, or how the spoils should be divided up. He remarks that 
of the two types of question in the Qur'an ~ those whose exact 
significance is clear from their wording, (e.g. 2:217), and those 
whose exact significance becomes clear from what follows, (e.g. 
2:219,220) - this is of the second type. The reply: "The spoils 
of war belong to Allah and the Apostle" does not indicate that 
the question concerns the lawfulness or otherwise of the spoils, 
but neither does it specify the exact significance of the 
question. The phrase which follows, however ("so have fear of 
(ittagu) God and end your disputes, and obey God and His 
messenger, if you are true believers"), suggests that the 
Companions had been arguing in a way which does not conform with
155Ibid., p. 45.
156 Ibid., pp. 555f f.
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taqwa, and this would not apply to the question of whether or not 
spoils are licit, which would in fact be a valid question. The 
view that the question refers to the division of the spoils, as
well as being supported by ahadith which relate disputes as to
who should be given priority in the division of booty, is backed 
up by what comes later in the sura, i.e. that one fifth of the 
spoils is for Allah and His messenger and for various categories 
of people in need (v. 41).157
ii) Balagha
Balagha is of course an essential part of the literary 
approach to the Qur'an, and in Shaltut's tafsir we see it on
various levels. Firstly, there is the rhetorical analysis of
particles or words, or the reasons behind particular forms of 
expression in the Qur'an, such as can be found in the work of al- 
Zamakhshari and al-Razi. For example, Shaltut comments on the use 
of the preposition "bi" rather than "ila" with the verb "ahsana" 
in the phrase: "wa bi'1-walidayni ihsanan",158 and gives reasons 
why the answer to the question about the mountains (Qur'an 
20:105), unlike any of the other answers given to questions 
addressed to Muhammad, is introduced by the particle "fa", 
although it is not a conditional.159 He gives the reason for the
157For other examples of the use of context see, eg., ibid., 
pp. 265 and 507.
158 Ibid., pp. 405-6.
159Ibid., p. 545.
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phrase in Surat al-Ancam: "nahnu narzuqukum wa-iYY5hum" (6:151)
being reversed in Surat al-Isra' ("nahnu narzuquhum wa-iyyakum"- 
17:31),160 and the reason for the omission of the word "qul" in 
reply to the question about God ("wa-idha sa'alaka cibadi canni~ 
fa-inni qarib" - 2:186), quoting in this last instance from al- 
RazT,161
However, this type of linguistic comment is relatively rare 
with Shaltut, since he does not aim to give a detailed analysis 
of the Quranic text. Having become acquainted with Shaltut's 
approach to the Qur'an, it should not surprise us that in the 
field of balagha the emphasis is on general features or 
characteristics of the Qur’an. There are many examples of this in 
his work, both within and outside his tafsir, as can be seen from 
headings like: "Styles of the Qur'an in enjoining piety", "The
ways in which the Qur'an demonstrates the case for the 
Resurrection", or "Styles of the Qur'an in calling people to
profitable thought".162
The close relationship between balagha and psychological
tafsir was observed by Amin al-KhulT, as we noted earlier, and is 
illustrated in Shaltut's tafsir when he talks about the effect of
certain rhetorical features in the Qur'an, such as the way in
160Ibid., pp. 412-13.
161 Ibid., pp. 543-44.
162 See ibid., pp.562-63 and 382-84, and Min Tawjihat al-
Islam, pp. 135ff. respectively. For other examples see Tafsir,
pp. 344ff., 455ff., Ila al-Qur'an al-Karim, Cairo and Beirut: Dar
al-Shuruq, n.d.rpp. 129-30, and Al-Islam, cAqida wa-Sharica , pp.
261ff.
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which the Qur'an sometimes has an abrupt change of subject and 
"takes one by surprise when it is talking about particular 
subjects, in such a way as to revivify the heart so that it is in 
continual contact with God, from whom it draws strength and 
help".163 Elsewhere he gives reasons for the wording of the
phrase: "Faddala Allah bacdahum cala bacd" (4:34) rather then a
phrase such as "bi-ma faddalahum calayhinna", where the Qur'an is 
describing men's authority over women,164 and the reason for the 
use of the verb "garaba" in the phrase: "wa-la taqribu al-
fawahish" (6:151).165
In addition to this he deals with such things as the effect of 
the two styles (taqrirT and talqinT) which dominate Surat al-
Ancam,166 the effect of the comparison of the fates of the
believers and the unbelievers in Surat al-Acraf,167 the effect of 
the mugatta0at at the beginnings of suras,168 and the effect of 
opening a sura with mention of good things ("baracat matlar"), 
such as the Prophet or the believers.169
163Ila al-Qur'an al-Karim, pp. 91-92, where he gives 
examples of this in the Qur'an.
164Min Huda al-Qur'an, p. 313.
16^Tafsir, pp. 430-33.
166Ibid., p. 391.
167 Ibid., pp. 481-82.
168 Ibid., pp. 61ff.
169 Ibid., pp. 536 and 166. For other examples of 
"psychological" tafsTr see, e.g., headings: "Sirr tawjTh al-inkar 
ill al jamaca wa fiha al-mukhlisun al-musaricun", and "Tawjih al- 
darwa bi'sm al-rububiyya min bawacith qubuliha", in ibid., pp.
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Shaltut*s rhetorical analysis is generally clearly thought 
out, and backed up by examples from the Qur’an where appropriate, 
but occasionally he seems to get carried away by his train of 
thought and is a little less careful than usual in the examples 
he cites. In the aforementioned instance where he is explaining 
the reason for the use of the verb "qaraba" in the phrase "la 
taqribu al-fawahish", i.e. that it is used with things which can 
be hard to resist, so that one should not even go near them for 
fear of being tempted, one or two of the parellel occurences of 
the verb in the Qur'an which he gives are not appropriate. For 
example, the phrases: "fa-la yagribu al-mas.iid al-haram bacda
camihim hadha" (9:28), and "la taqribu al-salat wa-antum sakara" 
(4:43), would appear to be using the verb rather in the emphatic 
sense or to convey indignation, and in the phrase: "wa-la 
taqribuhunna hatta yathurna" (2:222) the verb is used in a 
technical sense to denote sexual relations.170
We have seen that in the sphere of balagha the Qur'an is still 
the main source of tafsir; the aim is not to categorise the 
Quranic phrases under various rhetorical headings or to evaluate 
the Qur'an in the light of the principles of balagha, but rather 
to highlight the mastery of the Quranic expression, and hence its 
icjaz.
iii) Social issues
637-38 and 397-99 respectively.
170 Ibid., p. 431.
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The single most striking characteristic of Shaltut's tafsTr is 
the emphasis on practical matters. As with Muhammad cAbduh, the 
paramount aim is to guide people; accordingly, social and legal 
issues form a significant part of his tafsir.
Since most of Shaltut*s writings about society are contained 
in his other works, we will deal with this at greater length in a 
separate chapter on Islamic society. Here we will show the 
importance he attaches to social issues within his tafsir.
One of Shaltut's major preoccupations is the desire for unity
among Muslims; he frequently refers to the lamentable state of
the Muslims today, and warns against the evils of schism and
disunity.171 He conveys a sense of urgency when he addresses the
Muslims directly:
How important it is for us - Oh Muslims-
especially in this age when the bonds of Islamic 
unity have been loosened, and the Muslims are 
being undermined both internally and in their 
external relations - how important it is that we 
should listen to these calls from God, and reflect 
upon them and understand them properly... and make 
them our guiding light in life, so that we will 
again be a strong community (umma) with upright 
morals, and occupy the place which God intended 
for us...172
In some places he abruptly reminds the reader that he expects an 
active response, by direct reference to either present-day Egypt 
or those in authority.173
171 E.g. ibid., pp. 155-56, 302-3 , 133, 122-23, 242-43 and
446.
172Ibid., pp. 122-23 .
173E.g. ibid., pp. 149, 167-8 and 189.
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Under the heading: "God's laws with regard to the rise and
fall of nations", he writes:
There are various ways in which societies or 
groups are exposed to imperfection and weakness: 
by way of their spiritual weakness, so that they 
become vulnerable to any provocation or
disturbance, or to any false rumours which are 
broadcast, or by way of the decadence of their 
individuals, and the absence of a single goal to 
which all are devoted, or by way of acquiescence 
in the misdeeds, indecencies and sins which are 
perpetrated within them, which spread like a 
disease and pervade the whole community... or by 
way of their being deceived by the outward 
appearance of their opponents, believing them to 
be honest and sincere...or by way of the harshness 
which fills the hearts of its rich members, so 
that they are no longer aware of the plight of the 
poor...so that the poor man.,.resents the rich 
man...and in addition to all this, they are 
exposed to weakness by way of the ,iaz;ar and 
halac174 with which they encounter difficulties, 
so that they lose the strength to resist and
protect themselves, and are prostrated by events, 
misfortunes and enemies.175
This passage illustrates the author's view of the organic nature
of the Muslim community, and the reciprocal responsibility
between all of its members, which is epitomised in the Quranic
phrases: "al-amr bi'l-macruf wa'l-nahy can al-munkar" and "al-
tawIsT bi'l-haqg wa'l-tawasT bi'l-sabr". Shaltut maintains that
the first Muslims were most conscientious in this respect, but
i74These are Quranic words signifying the opposite of sabr, 
i.e. restlessness, apprehension, anxiety, fickleness, etc.
175Tafsir, p. 123.
109
after this the seeds of desire and selfishness grew and men 
competed with each other instead of helping each other.176
Sometimes when Shaltut is painting a picture of the ideal 
society he gets carried away and displays more eloquence than 
factual information, and such passages may be introduced by such 
vague phrases as: "Experience has shown us..." ("wa-qad dallat 
al-ta.iarib"):
Experience has show us that the society in 
which there is mutual help and compassion between 
people, and in which each individual feels the 
pains of others, and where the worship of money, 
putting it before all noble human values, is dead 
- experience has shown us that such a society is a 
happy and contented society, where the rich and 
the poor regard each other with mutual affection 
and live in close cooperation...177
No doubt Shaltut would cite the early Muslim community as an
example of such a society, but looking at recent history and at
the world today it is difficult to see a society which would fit
this description. We may take it that the more these
characteristics apply to a society, the happier it will be - but
in any case he is stating the obvious. However, we should
remember that Shaltut is not a sociologist but a religious
scholar and a preacher, and such a speech is intended to awaken
in people the desire to improve their society; he would be the
first to encourage sociologists to use their specialised
175Ibid., pp. 135-36; see also headings: "Takaful al-umma 
wa-mas'uliyya bacdiha can bacd" and "Isharat al-Sura ila fikrat
al-damah al-ijtima0-!", in ibid., pp. 182-83 and 202 respectively;
the theme of social solidarity is explored in greater depth in 
Chapter Four.
177Ibid., p. 144.
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knowledge to serve Islam, believing as he does that each should 
have authority in his own sphere.178
Shaltut sometimes gives a utilitarian reason for certain types
of moral behaviour, and this is when he is considering the
implications of such behaviour for society as whole. For example,
when discussing the Quranic injunction to treat parents well:
...we may realise that this great concern with
parents is not just for their own sake and for the 
upbringing they gave their children, but because 
they are the pillars of the family, and in order 
for society to be strong and healthy, the family 
must be strong and healthy, its members enjoying 
an atmosphere of happiness and dignity, so that 
this spreads to other relatives and friends and
neighbours and to other areas of society, and
virtue extends to the whole nation (umma), for the 
nation is nothing but a collection of families,
and is affected by that which befalls the 
families, whether it be evil or good.179
Similarly his main objection to "al-tanali bi'l-ithm wa’l-cadwan"
(talking in secret with evil intent), is its detrimental effect
upon society as a whole, and he cites the example of the way in
which political parties slander and malign each other in
underhand ways, and spread false rumours about each other,
etc.;180 again, orphans should be carefully brought up so that
they should not grow up to be a menace to society.181
While these passages illustrate Shaltut's concern with society 
as a whole, he is not suggesting that these are the only reasons
178See Xin Tawriihat al-lslam, p. 563.
179Tafsir, p. 205.
180Ibid., pp. 219-20.
181 Ibid., p. 184.
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for such conduct; he simply considers the advantages to society 
to be an important factor. He often refers to compassion, mercy, 
etc., and would certainly not deny, for example, that gratitude 
to one's parents is a reason for treating their, well in their old 
age, especially as the Qur'an itself refers to this (17:24).
Shaltut often discusses individual social questions which 
occur in a particular sura. He deals with Surat al-Nisa', which 
contains more such material than the other suras, on the basis of 
its two main aims: the establishment of internal stability, by
the regulation of the Muslims' social and legal affairs, and of 
external stability, by the regulation of the Muslim community's 
relations with other communities, whether they be ahl al-kitab or 
mushrikun (polytheists). We will deal more fully with the way in 
which he treats these social questions in the chapter on social 
issues; it is enough here to state that he considers the aims of 
social reform to be very much a part of tafsir, since, as we have 
said, one of his main aims is to make tafsir relevant to people's
lives and to contemporary society.
iv) Figh
Up to now we have not made much mention of the figh content in 
tafsir, although no tafsTr which purports to be closely related 
to practical matters can totally avoid figh, which is after all
intended to regulate Muslims' practical affairs and relations
with each other. Accordingly, Tafsir al-Manar pays some attention
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to legal matters and to the sources of law,182 but it is 
evidently felt that a tafsir is not the place for an elaborate 
discussion of legal questions, since this would then become one 
of the factors which divert attention from the Quranic guidance.
Shaltut himself, who trained as a fagih and worked as a lawyer 
during his period of expulsion (1931-35), often refers the reader 
to the legal manuals ("kutub al-fiqh" or "kutub al-furuc") when 
discussing legal questions.183 He does, however, occasionally 
indulge in a fairly detailed legal discussion, particularly where 
he wishes to differ from the majority view-point and so needs to 
show his reasons.184
In these passages he often gives the majority view or views 
other than his own first, before proceeding to give his own. In 
his chapter on Surat al-Ma'ida, he discusses the questions of 
whether the permission firstly to eat the food of ahl al-kitab 
and secondly to marry their women (Qur'an 5:5), is mutlaq 
(unconditional). In the first instance he cites two opposing 
views and two conflicting fatwas issued by the Lajnat al-Fatwa of 
the Azhar, not failing to point out that the existence of two 
opposing fatwas illustrates that the "spirit of ijtiha'd" is very 
much alive. Shaltut agrees with the majority view that this
182 See Jomier, op. cit., Chapter 6: "Le Commentaire du Manar 
et le Droit Musulman".
183E.g. Tafsir, p. 313.
]84We will discuss his treatment of individual legal topics 
more fully in Chapter Three; here, as with social issues, the aim 
is to show the extent to which he includes figh in tafsTr.
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permission does not overrule the prohibition in Qur'an 5:3 of 
certain catergories of meat, i.e. carrion, blood, pork, and that 
which has been dedicated to other than God. His reason for this 
is based more on common sense than on any technical or legal 
principles; as usual he first looks at the reasons behind the 
prohibition - i.e. because it conflicts with tawhid, or because 
of an intrinsic quality of the meat itself such as being carrion,
and then goes on to state that there is no reason to suppose that
such a prohibition, which must have been for a valid reason, 
should be lifted simply because the meat belongs to someone 
else.18 5
As is to be expected, the Qur'an itself is a primary source of 
law; in his discussion of the circumstances which justify 
tayammum,186 like Muhammad cAbduh and Rashid Rida before him, 
whom he quotes at length, Shaltut bases his opinion on the 
Quranic text itself and disregards the opinions of the four 
madhahib:
We would like here to pause and consider this
phrase "if you are ill or on a journey..." of ayat
al-tahara (5:6), and observe its relation to the 
two" preceding phrases, in order to discover- 
solely on the basis of the Quranic style - the 
circumstances for which the verse is legislating 
with regard to tahara, which would permit
183 Ibid., pp. 291-94; marriage to the women of ahl al-kitab 
is discussed below, in Chapter Four.
186Ibid., pp. 323-28, under the heading: "A free discussion 
of the circumstances in which tayammum is permissible, drawn 
from the verse (5:6), and a description of the confusion of the 
majority of the jurists concerning it".
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performance of the salah. ..187 
Shaltut feels that the Quranic style and phraseology imply that 
sickness, travelling and lack of water are three separate 
circumstances which each make tayammum permissible, there being 
no evidence to suggest that the licence for tayammum in 
travelling is conditional upon there being no water available.
Shaltut's legal discussions are generally relatively easy to 
follow and free from complicated technical terms. On occasion, 
however, he becomes more scholarly; when he is dealing with the 
aforementioned ayat al-tahara,188 he discusses the different 
interpretations of the parts of wudu', such as "al-mash bi'l- 
ra 's", and here he necessarily becomes more technical in his 
language,189 and goes into some detail when discussing the 
various views of the culama'. It is probable that he is tempted 
to include this amount of detail in what is after all a tafsir 
and not a figh book (and moreover a tafsir which purports to be 
straightforward and easily understood by ordinary Muslims), 
firstly by his training as a fagih, and secondly perhaps by the 
fact that he has made comparative Islamic law a special area of 
study.190
187 Ibid., p. 323 .
188 Ibid., pp. 304-30.
1 "E.g. "makanat al-ba' fi qawlihi "bi-ru'usikum", hal hiya 
za'ida aw hiya li'l-ilsaq" - ibid., p. 306.
190Cf. Shaltut and Muhammad cAlI al-Sayis, Mugaranat al- 
Madhahib fi'l-ficrh, Cairo: Matbacat Muhammad cAli Subayh wa
awladuhu bi'l-Azhar, in which the authors select the procedure 
for wudu' as an area of study (pp. 7-24).
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He then goes on to discuss ghusl, and in particular whether 
major ritual impurity (janaba) is occasioned by genital contact 
alone (al-iltiqa') or by the emission of semen inside the vagina 
in particular.191 He cites the various opinions, going into such 
minute details as to seem almost pedantic, and uses much 
technical language which may not be easily understood by the 
ordinary reader. We feel that Shaltut could more appropriately 
have referred the reader to the books of figh for a detailed 
discussion of the various views,192 while confining himself to a 
brief statement of his opinion in his tafsir.
Following this, he goes to some lengths to show that neither 
this verse (5:6) nor any other verse indicates that women should 
perform ghusl after their menstruation, in order to purify 
themselves before praying or having sexual relations with their 
husbands - only to demonstrate that the requirement of ghusl in 
this case is in fact based on the Sunna.193 It is clear in this 
passage that he is in fact addressing other fuqaha' rather than 
Muslims in general.
He then discusses tayammum at some length.194 Apart from the 
passage on the circumstances which justify it, which we have 
already discussed, and a short piece entitled: "The things which
191Ibid., pp. 313-15.
,92This is in fact what he did for the first cause of 
disagreement that he mentioned in this regard: "Ahduhuma:..." - 
ibid., p . 313.
1 " Ibid., pp. 316-18.
194 Ibid., pp. 318-30.
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remove purity ("nawaqid al-tahara") as indicated by this verse", 
he concentrates on bringing out the general significance of 
tayammum, namely that it represents the symbolic, rather than, 
for example, the purely hygienic, nature of tahara. He also gives 
the reasons for tashrTc al-badal in general, such as feeding the 
poor instead of fasting, praying by gestures when one cannot 
perform the full movements, etc. - namely that these things give 
the Muslim a sense of continuity and enable him to maintain the 
observance of his religion in an active sense, rather than 
completely omitting these duties, which might lead to being 
neglectful of them even when the original reason (cudhr) for not 
doing them was no longer present. Furthermore, this license 
(rukhsa) and others demonstrate the mercy of God, Who desires to 
make it easy for men to observe their religious duties. When 
Shaltut is making these points, he is more in keeping with the 
spirit of the rest of his tafsir, for he is always keen to show 
the reasons behind things, or to demonstrate the ways in which 
Islam and the Sharira are designed to be easy and natural for 
man, and not to lay burdens on him.195
When Shaltut is discussing the questions which people address 
to Muhammad in the Qur'an, the heading: "Legal principles which 
may be deduced from the questions and their answers"395 may at 
first sight appear to indicate some specialised legal material,
195Cf. also ibid., p. 329, under the heading: "Qacidat al-
yusr wa-nafy al-harj fi hadha al-tashrTc wa-ghayrihi wa-wujub 
muracatuha cala al-nazirin fT ahkam al-din".
195 Ibid., pp. 550-55.
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but in fact his observations are of a general nature. For 
example, he observes the fact that the questions concern 
practical rather than theoretical matters, as well as the fact 
that there is no intermediary between God and man, that one 
should commit the lesser of two evils when one cannot avoid both, 
and that the legality or otherwise of an action is directly 
dependent on whether it is beneficial or harmful in its effects, 
and not on any outward appearances. Here he is again bringing out 
the general nature of the Sharica, and the fact that it is for 
man's good and is based on sound principles.
Commenting on the verse: "Obey God and His Prophet and those
in authority..." (4:59), Shaltut talks about the sources of law, 
but only in a very general way;197 he evidently felt that a 
tafsir was not the place for a full discussion of this important 
subject, which he dealt with at length in another work.198 Here, 
he merely enumerates three sources: the Qur'an, the Sunna and
"ra'y ahl al-hill wa'l-cagd", and briefly comments on their 
relationship with each other and with concepts like shura, ijmac 
and giyas, following this with the heading: "Ijtihad is one of 
the sources of law and its gate will be open forever". It is not 
surprising that he should take the opportunity to stress this 
fact, in view of its vital importance for the modern Muslim 
reformers. He follows this with the headings: "Reliance on other 
sources of legislation is incompatible with faith", and
197 Ibid., pp. 207-11.
198cAqida wa~Sharica , pp. 468-550.
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"Opposition to Islam and its legislation among some of those who 
have acquired a foreign (i.e. European) culture", bringing to the 
reader's attention the precarious position of the Sharica today.
Apart from his discussion of legal matters, the influence of 
Shaltut's training as a faqih is apparent throughout his tafsir, 
as in those places where he is not prepared to accept an argument 
with no evidence (dalTl or mustanad),199 or where he takes his 
opponents' arguments to their logical conclusions,200 or in his 
detailed discussions where he weighs up all the evidence and 
mentions the alternative opinions before giving his own.203 
* * *
In addition to the emphasis on social and legal matters, the 
practical approach manifests itself in other ways, both in a 
negative way, i.e. by avoiding certain things such as forcing 
meanings onto the Qur'an or bringing in material which is of 
dubious authenticity, or trying to understand or explain that 
which only God knows, and in a positive way, by making the 
Quranic precepts as clear as possible, by explaining the reasons 
behind them, and by relating the Qur'an to people's everyday 
lives by stressing the general nature (cumum) of its contents.
v) hubhamat, Isra'Tliyyat, etc.
199See, e.g. rjafrstr , pp. 26 and 55.
200E.g. ibid., pp. 229-30.
20,E.g. ibid., pp. 555-58 and 53-64.
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We have already discussed the attitude of Muhammad cAbduh and 
Rashid Rida with regard to mubhamat and dubious ahadith, and most 
of what we have said there applies equally to Shaltut. With 
Shaltut, however, there is no attempt to explain away irrational 
elements like miracles; provided the sources are valid he is 
prepared to accept such reports at their face value.202
When discussing the muqattacat, 2 0 3 he is prepared to comment 
on the effect that these letters might have on listeners, namely 
that of attracting their attention and making them listen to what 
follows, but does not agree with those whc believe that there is 
nothing which cannot be understood in the Qur’an, and who bring 
various unsubstantiated theories as to the meanings of these 
letters, such as the idea that they represent particular names of 
God. Shaltut believes that it is God’s privilege to have some 
secrets of His own, both in His creation and in His commands to 
men, "this being an indication of His omnipotence as opposed to 
man's weakness".204 He points out that the knowledge which 
scientists achieve from day to day is but a drop in the ocean of 
God’s knowledge, and there are some things Muslims must accept 
without fully understanding, just as they accept the religious 
duties like prayer, without understanding the reason for such 
details as the precise numbers of rakr as, etc.
202Cf., e.g., his f atwa on miracles in Fatawa, pp. 48-53.
203Ibid., pp. 53-64.
2 0 4 Ibid., p. 56.
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When commenting on these letters, then, Shaltut confines 
himself to concrete observations, such as the effect on the 
listener, the fact that they are almost all followed by reference 
to the revelation and to the Qur'an and its attributes, drawing 
attention to its marvellous nature, and the fact that almost all 
are Meccan suras, i.e. revealed at a time when there was much 
controversy and polemics surrounding the Qur'an.
Under the heading: "The correct way to believe in the
unseen",20P Shaltut mentions some of the Quranic phenomena about 
which people ask, such as: how can the people of Heaven and Hell 
hear each other when they are so far apart, or how can they see 
each other when there is a curtain (hi.iab) between them, and the 
answers which are sometimes given, and goes on to say:
Thus have some mufassirun distracted people 
from the lessons of the Qur'an, and from the 
warning and the threat, and have described for 
them the unseen things about which only God knows, 
in accordance with that which they can see and 
with which they are familiar; if radio and
television had been invented a long time ago, we 
would have seen people using these in their
replies to these questions!
The correct way, however, is to believe in the 
unseen just as it is mentioned, and within the 
confines of the Quranic text, without any
additions and without trying to use the "seen" as 
an analogy for the unseen, and in these matters 
one is only obliged to believe in that which is 
supported by an appropriate and genuine text from 
the Qur’an or the Sunna.206
Shaltut does not force meanings onto the Qur'an if there is no 
valid authority to support a particular point of view, preferring
205 Ibid., pp. 494-95.
206Ibid., p. 495.
121
to leave the question open. When discussing the table which the 
disciples asked to be sent down,207 he deplores the wealth of 
isra'lliyyat which are contained in most of the classical 
tafsirs relating the contents of the table. Similarly the 
question of whether or not it was actually sent down has consumed 
much time and energy among scholars in the past; he 
characteristically takes the sting out of this dispute by saying 
that whether or not we believe it was sent down, "God has not 
commanded us to believe in either of these two things, and there 
is nothing in the Qur'an which makes any one of them certain".200
Thus while it is essential to believe in whatever is contained
in the Qur'an, no matter how unusual it appears, without trying 
to interpret it in such a way as to agree with what is more 
rational or easily understood, it is equally important not to add 
anything to these essential beliefs without a valid authority, 
thus causing unnecessary dissension among Muslims.
One aspect of the unseen is the stories of events that
happened long before the time of the revelation - the qisas 
contained in the Qur'an. Shaltut disapproves of any obscure 
interpretations being placed on these stories which do not take 
the words at their face value, whether it be metaphorical 
interpretations to avoid the seemingly miraculous, as we have 
seen in Muhammad cAbduh and Rashid Rida's interpretation of the 
story of the cow, or whether it be the even more obscure
207Ibid., pp. 269-72.
2 0 8 Ibid., p. 272 .
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symbolism of the Sufis.209 Even worse than these are those who 
adhere to the theory of takhyil, believing that the stories are 
fictional, perhaps at most general historical truths, related
purely for their effect.210 Shaltut certainly believes that the 
lessons to be drawn from the stories are the most important 
consideration,211 but this does not alter their historical truth; 
indeed to doubt this is incompatible with the sanctity of the 
Qur'an, detracting from its whole aura of truth, for if people 
doubt the veracity of these stories then they are likely to doubt 
the veracity of other aspects of the Qur'an.212
vi) Theological issues
Shaltut's treatment of theological questions is similarly 
straightforward; unlike Muhammad cAbduh he was not trained in 
philosophy and had no taste for the tortuous arguments of 
theology. In any case he strongly disapproves of all the 
theoretical controversies on such matters as al-qada' wa'l-qadar, 
which he believes to have resulted in unnecessary dissension
between Muslims and confusion in their beliefs. In such cases he
relies on common sense, and emphasises the essential difference
20 9 Ibid., pp. 45-46.
210See ibid., pp. 46-47 and p. 273 under the heading; "The 
opinion of some contemporary pseudo-philosophers concerning the 
Quranic stories"; no doubt Shaltut is thinking here of Muhammad 
Khalafallah among others.
211 Ibid., p. 537.
212Ibid., p. 273.
123
between God and man. He tells us, for example, that it is obvious 
that man is responsible for his own actions, and has a choice 
between good and evil, otherwise the whole idea of exhorting men 
to do good and then requiting them for their actions on the Day 
of Judgement would be a nonsense.213 Those verses which some take 
as an indication that God causes people to be misled, etc.,
should be taken as meaning that he allows them to be misled, and
does not stand in the way of it if that is what they choose;21,1 
and even if God has complete knowledge of future events, this
knowledge has no coercive element to it and does not negate man's 
freedom of choice.21B
Similarly in the question of God's bounty versus good works 
(al-fadl wa'l-acmal), Shaltut refuses to see a contradiction 
between the two; while not denying that there is a causative link 
between man's good works and the reward he receives, he stresses 
the fact that God's bounty is unlimited, so that we cannot
discuss this as though it was a straightforward business
transaction, the reward being exactly equivalent to the
believer’s good works.216 Thus he clearly brings out the
difference between man, who is limited, and God, Who is Infinite.
Again, when explaining that mutual assistance between men is 
not in conflict with the words of Surat al-Fatiha: "From Thes
213Ibid., p. 232.
214 Ibid., p. 231.
21BIbid., p. 234.
21 6 Ibicl., pp. 485-86 .
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(alone) do we ask help", he quite simply draws a distinction 
between the sphere of humanity and that of divinity: "for this 
mutual assistance is within the sphere of human limitations and 
does not exceed it" ~ while God's help is clearly on a different 
plane.217 Thus Shaltut in some cases obviates the need for 
theological dispute by stressing the essential difference between 
God and man.
vii} "Aiifcikair."
In order to stress the significance of certain matters, and, 
in the case of good deeds or acts of worship, encourage people to 
observe them, Shaltut frequently refers to the underlying reasons 
for them, often under a heading beginning: "Al-hikma fi..." or 
"Sirr...". Among other things, he relates the reason why God told 
us the story of the table, why certain times and places are 
sanctified, why God addresses us as "Banu Adam", why God ordered 
the Muslims to refute their agreements with the polytheists and 
wage war on them, and the reasons for sujud al-til5wa.218
In the latter case, the Qur'an itself provides Shaltut with 
all the reasons. He sees sujud al-tilawa as an important symbolic 
act of worship which is neglected by Muslims, for in the Qur'an 
the verb sajada is used to describe the unalterable state of the 
whole of creation in its relationship to God: "Unto God prostrate
217Ibid., p. 30.
218 See ibid., pp. 274-75, 300-2, 469-70, 624ff., and 509-11
respectively.
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all who dwell in the heavens and the earth, willingly or 
unwillingly, and their very shadows, in the morning and the 
evening." (13:15). It is furthermore an attribute of those who 
possess faith and knowledge (17:107), and the kafirun's refusal 
to prostrate before God (25:60) makes it a symbol of opposition 
to and dissociation from them. We are reminded that God alone is 
worthy of our prostration (41:37), thus it becomes a symbol of 
tawhid. Moreover, by the act of prostrating we are following in 
the footsteps of Muhammad and the other Prophets, as well as 
"those who are with God" (96:19, 19:58, 7:206).219
viii) The universality of the Qur’an
Many of the Quranic verses are associated with particular 
occasions of revelation (asbab nuzul), and some scholars have 
taken those verses, or some of them, to be applicable only to the 
exact circumstances in which they were revealed, or to apply only 
to those persons whom they concerned, who lived at the time of 
the revelation. Like Muhammad cAbduh and many other modern-day 
reformers, Shaltut believes that the Quranic text in general is 
of universal significance, applying to all Muslims of all ages, 
even where a verse was prompted by a specific event. This 
principle is expressed by the phrase: "al-cibra bi-cumum al-lafz 
la bi-khusus al-sabab".
Discussing the verse: "Oh believers, remember the favour which 
God bestowed on you when certain people were about to stretch out
219Ibid., pp. 509-11.
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their hands towards you, but He restrained them...” (5:11),220 
Shaltut says: "As usual the mufassirun try to make this verse
refer to a particular event...", and he goes on to give two of 
the well-known versions of the events which prompted this verse, 
concluding:
In our understanding, the verse is a general 
reminder of the acts of aggression against Muslims 
and their enemies' attempts to plot against them 
and to kill them, ever since the beginning of the 
dacwa up to its end; there is no doubt that it is 
also a reminder of their good fortune in escaping 
from danger, and of the fact that they had 
sufficient strength to ward off their enemies. It 
also draws attention to the fact that the reason 
for it (i.e. the escape) was their truthfulness, 
the sincerity of their intentions and their spirit 
of solidarity in repelling the ruses of those who 
sought to deceive them...221
Under the heading: "In its universality, this verse applies to
all Muslims up until the Day of Judgement", Shaltut goes on to
state that Muslims will always find themselves in situations like
these, and God's nicma (blessing, comfort etc.) will always be
there to help those Muslims who are sincere believers; it is one
of the characteristics of the Qur'an to remind the Muslims of
God's help to them in times of adversity, and this provides an
inspiration to all future generations.222
Commenting on the verse: "When the Qur'an is recited, listen 
to it in silence so that God may show you mercy" (7:204), Shaltut 
relates the opinions of some scholars that this verse applies
2 2 0 Ibid., pp. 339ff.
221 Ibid., p. 340.
2 2 2 Ibid., p. 341.
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only to a specific situation, for example talking during salah or 
during the khutba, or reading Surat al-Fatiha behind the Imam 
silently or out loud.223 Apart from the fact that these 
interpretations are not in keeping with the context of the verse, 
or with the time of revelation, Shaltut refutes them on the 
simple grounds that if the Qur’an does not even give precise 
directions as to such basic things as the number of rakc as in 
each prayer or the number of prayers in a day, then how should it 
refer to such minor details as these? He prefers to dwell on the 
significance of the verse as regards the general spirit in which 
one should listen to the Qur'an.224
f) Structure ar.d Style
Style as such is not a paramount consideration in a tafsir 
which aims first and foremost to guide. However, Shaltut was a 
preacher, and no doubt aware that eloquence can help the cause of 
guidance.
There are some elements in his tafsir which may be considered 
"unsystematic"; we have already mentioned the fact that the 
length of the chapters is not necessarily proportionate to the 
length of the suras with which they deal, and that there is a 
certain selectiveness as regards the topics to be discussed. In 
addition to this one finds some digressions, although these are
2 2 3 Ibid., pp. 506-7.
2 2 4 Ibid., pp. 507-9; other places where he refers to the 
universality of certain verses or Quranic precepts include pp. 
107ff., 151 and 637.
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usually intentional, often under a heading: "1st itrad...". These 
sections do not contain anything unusual, or anything which would 
not normally be a part of his tafsir, but simply imply that he 
intends to return to what he was talking about before the 
istitrad, as where he devotes thirteen pages to talking about the 
disciples and the story about the table near the beginning of the 
chapter on Surat al-Ma'ida, then returns to talking about the 
more general aspects of the sura.22” In the chapter on Surat al- 
Anf al, he "returns" to the beginning of the sura not once but 
twice.226
There is also a certain amount of repetition, as where he 
discusses the "suwar al-hamd" in two different places,227 or 
where he reviews each of the first four long Medinan suras in his 
chapter on Surat al-Ancam, reiterating some of what he has 
already said in the chapters concerned.229
When discussing the structure of Shaltut's tafsir, we should 
remember that it was first published not as a unified work but in 
instalments in a periodical. Notwithstanding this, these 
features, which may at first make Shaltut's work appear less 
orderly and systematic than one might wish, will be seen to 
fulfil important functions when we bear in mind the main aim of
2 2 5 Ibid., pp. 262-75; cf. also pp. 382-84.
226Ibld., pp. 533 and 560 under the headings: "cAwda ila
matlac al-sura" and "cAwad cala bad'".
2 2 7 Ibid., pp. 23-25 and 363-68.
228 Ibid., pp. 352-60.
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his tafsir. The varying lengths of the chapters and the 
selectiveness are a natural consequence of the "topical" 
approach; as we have said, some of the legal topics which occur 
in Surat al-Baqara are dealt with under other suras where they 
occur. Thus Shaltut does not arbitrarily omit important topics 
but simply deals with them where he feels it is most appropriate. 
The digressions are likewise a result of the "topical" approach, 
enabling him to deal with topics as they occur, then return to 
the Quranic text with which he was dealing, in order to select 
another aspect of it for study. The very fact that he refers to 
these passages as "istitrad"s shows that he does in fact have a 
particular arrangement in mind. As for the repetitions, these 
arise partly from the didactic nature of the work; the Qur'an 
itself is a prime example of the use of repetition in order to 
reinforce lessons.
We could perhaps more appropriately call "digressions" those 
places where Shaltut gives free rein to his train of thought or 
to his emotions, where his tafsir comes nearer to what has been 
referred to as "the association of ideas"228. Often this is where 
his character as a preacher and orator is most in evidence, and 
where he wishes to make full use of a point and bring it home to 
his audience as vividly as possible.
Commenting on the general significance of the verse: "Help one 
another in what is good and pious, not in what is wicked or
229 Supra, p. 68.
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sinful. Have fear of God, for He is stern in retribution" (5:2), 
Shaltut says:
When will the Muslims, then, submit to the 
teachings and guidance of their Lord, when He 
orders them to be a single nation, with no strife 
or dissension, no fighting or disunity, and no 
fanaticism, whether it be racial or ideological?
Why these long-standing disputes which have turned 
them from their goal and led them astray, and 
divided them into sects and parties? Why this 
division, when they all agree on the unity of God, 
and all believe in His revelation and His 
messengers and in the Day of Resurrection and 
Requital, and in the principles of the Sharica 
which the eternal Book of God has laid down, 
making them a protection for all...230
He continues in this vein for two more paragraphs.
It is in more general passages like this that his eloquence is 
often most in evidence. Like al-Maraghi, he tends to make use of 
strong, emotive words in order to persuade the reader, often 
juxtaposing words which denote that which is definitely good and 
beneficial with those that denote the opposite, thus emphasising 
the desirability of the former:
Thus God wishes the family to be built on a 
foundation of mutual love and beneficence and on 
reciprocal rights and duties, so that the family 
will be a source of men who will be an asset to
their nation, and society will consist of noble
families which know neither humiliation nor 
injustice, nor oppression nor subjugation.231
This homiletic style of writing, where Shaltut is at his most
idealistic, can be found in virtually all his works.232
2 3 0 Ibid., p. 302.
231 Ibid., p. 408.
232See Chapter Three, section 2 for an analysis of the 
sermonising content of his fatwas.
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When appraising Shaltut’s style we should remember the deep 
influence the Qur'an exercised on him, just as it did with many 
scholars before him. In view of the fact that Shaltut was brought 
up in close contact with the Qur'an from a very early age, it is 
not surprising that his work has some of the characteristics 
which he attributes to the Qur'an itself. We have just mentioned 
the element of repetition, which is to be found both in Shaltut*s 
work and in the Qur'an; similarly the way in which he juxtaposes 
the good and the bad for emphatic reasons corresponds with the 
Quranic style, as where descriptions of those who do good and 
their reward are juxtaposed with descriptions of those who do 
evil and their punishment.233 Just as Shaltut points out the way 
in which the Qur'an gives reasons for its legislation,234 so does 
he himself like to give the underlying reasons for things; and 
just as the Qur'an, after relating a story or an event, "seizes 
the opportunity" to relate the general principles which can be 
drawn from it,23? do does Shaltut like to derive general 
principles, as we discussed earlier. Like the Qur'an, he makes 
use of persuasive and emotive language to influence his audience, 
and like the Qur'an, the material is not arranged according to
233See also cAgida wa-Sharica, p. 274, where Shaltut 
comments on the Quranic style of placing warnings against 
economic injustice, exploitation, etc., alongside exhortations to 
generosity and compassion.
234Tafsir, pp. 625f f .
23sIbid., p. 218.
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any strict system or order, but so as to best suit the aim of 
guidance.
Just as Shaltut's tafsir is not a literary work properly 
speaking, neither is it a scholarly dissertation; thus Shaltut 
can allow himself when giving the opinions of others, tc use 
phrases like "bacd al-culama'" - although this is sometimes 
because the opinion in question is considered to be common 
knowledge - or when giving his own opinion to introduce it with a 
phrase like: "Experience has shown...". Nevertheless, we would 
not describe his work as "unscholarly" either, for he rarely 
gives unfounded opinions, and is able to rely on his solid 
background of Islamic scholarship. Where he deems it appropriate 
he quotes scholars such as al-Razi, al-Qurtubi and Muhammad 
cAbduh, usually where he feels they have expressed a point 
particularly well.236
The major part of his tafsir is of a simple and 
straightforward nature, even more so than Tafsir al-Manar, for 
there are none of the long scholarly digressions to which Rashid 
Rida is prone. As we have mentioned, he does occasionally 
transform himself from a popular preacher to a jurist addressing 
his fellow jurists, but these passages taken together would not 
amount to more than twenty or thirty pages of his whole "Tafsir11.
One factor very much in evidence in Shaltut's writings is the 
desire to avoid any provocation which might lead to disunity 
among Muslims; we have already mentioned many facets of this,
236Ibid., pp. 268, 310, 544, 301 and 325ff.
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such as his disapproval of theological disputes and of 
sectarianism in any shape or form. It is also apparent in his 
"adab" as a scholar; when he is disapproving of a particular 
school of thought or tendency, he will not name names - something 
that an ordinary Western or secular scholar, for example, would 
have no scruples about. This reluctance to criticise people by 
name is apparent in his introduction, where, unlike Rashid Rida, 
he abstains from criticising the many different types of taf sir 
(legal, grammatical, etc.), and where he criticises tafsir cilmi, 
without naming even al-Razi. This adab also accounts for some of 
the occasions where he cites "bacd al-culamat" or "kathir min al- 
culama'" as authorities for opinions which he finds invalid or 
unconvincing. We will see the same spirit of conciliation in some 
of his legal rulings in Chapter Three.
By the same token, Shaltut is careful to distinguish between 
the khilaf (disagreement) which causes disunity and the areas 
where khilaf is permissible and even desirable, being evidence of 
the breadth and flexibility of the Sharica.237 In those areas 
which are subject to ijtihad, such as whether or not Muslims can 
eat the meat of animals slaughtered by ahl al-kitab, or the exact 
procedure for wudu’, Shaltut does not present his opinion as the 
conclusive or only correct one, but ends with a phrase such as: 
"li-kulli mujtahid nasib" ("each mujtahid will have his 
reward").238
23 7 Ibid., pp. 311-12.
238E.g. ibid., pp. 294 and 312.
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3) Tafsir After Shaltut
Since Shaltut wrote his tafsir in the 1940’s and 50's f the 
ideas of tafsir mauduci and of the sura as an organic unity have 
become increasingly popular. There are countless publications now 
dealing with one particular sura of the Qur'an; but most of their., 
notwithstanding their description as "tafsir mauduci", adhere 
more closely to the Quranic text in its tartih mashafT, printing 
pericopes each followed by a section of commentary-23q Some of 
the apparent "innovations" are merely formal; for instance a full 
tafsir may be split up into smaller books each dealing with a 
sura or two in order to make the material more accessible.
There are increasing numbers of works which deal with the 
literary aspects of the Qur'an,240 and some which deal 
specifically with the organic unity of the sura or with topical 
unity in the Qur'an in general.241
We have mentioned the wide popularity of Shaltut's tafsir, 
which has been distributed throughout the Arab world. That it is
23t)E.g. The series of tafsir of selected Suras of the Qur'an 
by Muhammad al-Bahi.
240E.g. Sayyid Qutb, Al-Taswir al-Fannl fi al-Qur’an al~ 
KarTr., and Muhammad Khalafallah, Al-Fann al-Qasasi fT al Qur'an 
al-Karim.
241 E.g. Muhammad Mahmud Hijazi, Al-Wahdat al-MaudtT iyya fi 
al-Qur'an al-Karim, and H.M. Bajuri\ Al-Wahdat al-MaudETr iyya fi 
Surat Yusuf. Cf. also cAbd al-Ghana Ahmad *NajT, Min Adab al- 
Qur’an al-Karim, a work in which each section deals with a 
particular aspect of a particular sura, e.g. "The juxtaposition 
of opposites in Surat 'Si cImran" and "Defense of and opposition 
to the truth in Surat al-Hajj".
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regarded as common property is illustrated by the fact that a 
Professor in the Faculty of the Sharira and Islamic Studies in 
the King cAbd al-cAziz Univerity in Mecca, Muhammad cAbd Allah 
al-Sabuni, who wrote a sort of patchwork tafsir "drawn from the 
most reliable works of tafsir", entitled "Safwat ai-Tafsir", 
draws extensively on Shaltut, often quoting him verbatim in his 
introductory passages to the long Medinan suras.242 This should 
not be regarded as plagiarism, since among Muslims knowledge, and 
particularly religious knowledge, is regarded as something to be 
shared; ideally, the author does not seek credit from men for his 
originality, but reward from God for spreading knowledge and 
guiding people. The fact that Shaltut's tafsTr is well known, and 
that al-Sabuni often quotes him verbatim, also goes against the 
idea of plagiarism.
As regards Shaltut's influence in the sphere of tafsir, it is 
of course difficult to evaluate; perhaps it would be more 
apposite to observe to what extent his style and methods have 
increased in popularity in the latter half of this century, 
leaving the reader to draw his own conclusions as to the extent 
of his direct influence in this regard.
24ZSee, e.g., pp. 376-77 of vol. 1 of his Safwat al-Tafsir, 
3 vols., 4th ed., Beirut: D5r al-Qur'an al-Karim^ 1981, where he 
divides the subject matter of Surat al-An°am into the same three 
categories as does Shaltut ("qadiyyat al-uluhiyya", "qadiyyat al- 
wahy wa11-risala", and "qadiyyat al-bacth wa'1-jaza'"), and uses 
Shaltut's idea of the two prevailing styles of the Sura- 
"taqrTrT" and "talqinT", often using Shaltut's phraseology as 
well (see Tafsir, pp. 376-77).
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Muhammad cIzza Darwaza (d. 196?), a Syrian, did much of his
writing in the 1930's and '40's, but did not have it published 
until the ’60' s; therefore it would be difficult to establish any 
direct influence between him and Shaltut either way. Some of his 
earlier works, such as "Sirat al-Rasul min al-Qur'an" and "c Asr 
al-NabT wa-bT'atuhu min al-Qur'an" may be considered tafsTr 
maudurl. His tafsir proper, "Al-TafsTr al-Hadxth", deals with the 
suras in the order of their revelation, so that the reader may 
appreciate the "atmosphere" in which the revelation took place 
("jawv al-nuzul"), and the progressive stages of the prophetic 
mission.243 Although he divides the text into pericopes as he 
considers appropriate, he aims among other things to make use of 
context and to observe the relationship between the verses and 
sections in order to make the Quranic arrangement (nazm) 
clear.244 The stated aims of clarity and simplicity and of using 
the Qur'an as a source of tafsir are now so commonplace as to be 
taken for granted in modern tafsirs. Notwithstanding these 
things, his tafsir is more traditional than Shaltut's, having a 
more formal arrangement and including such details as asfcab nurul 
and lexical and grammatical comment, albeit brief.
The tafsir of Sayyid Qutb (d. 1965), "Fi Zilal al-Qur'an", is 
considerably longer than Shaltut's, filling thirty volumes, and 
deals with the Quranic text in full. However, there is some
2 4 3 Mul>ammad cIzza Darwaza, Al-Tafsir al-Had:Tth, 4 vols., 
Cairo: Dar Ihya' al-Kutub al cArabiyya, 1962, p. 8^
2 4 4 Ibid., p. 7.
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similarity in the style of the two men, inasmuch as Sayyid Qutb's 
work consists almost exclusively of the "sermonising" type of 
tafsir which has become increasingly popular in recent times; it 
has been described as "an enormous collection of sermons".24n
In the work of Muhammad Muhammad al-Madani (d. 1969?), we find 
something much closer to Shaltut's tafsir; we have already 
referred in Chapter One to al-Madani's admiration of Shaltut's 
reform ideas, and the fact that they worked together in Jamar at 
al-TaqrTb bayna al-Madhahib, so in this case we can assume some 
direct influence. Al-Madani has written two books on particular 
suras, concentrating, as the titles show, on the major aspects of 
those suras: "Al-Mujtamac al-IslamT kama tunazzimuhu Surat al~ 
Nisa'", and "Al-Qasas al-Hadif fi-Surat al-Kahf". In the 
Introduction to the former, he puts forward some of his views on 
tafsir and Quranic studies. He believes that each sura has its 
own unique spirit which affects its style and content.248 He 
laments the fact that Quranic studies have generally been 
fragmentary, instead of viewing the Qur'an or the sura as an 
integral whole; he likens this attitude to one who, confronted 
with a magnificent and lofty building, is so preoccupied with its 
stones and individual features that he is unable to appreciate
245Jansen, op. cit., p. 79, fn. 15.
246M.M. al-Madani, Al-Mujtamar al-IslamT..., Cairo: Al-
Majlis al-Ar la li ' 1-Shu' un al-Islamiyya, 1973, p. 5.
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its true magnificence, which can only be brought out by a 
comprehensive, overall view.247
Al-Madar.T extols the virtues of diversity and individuality in 
tafsir, which has in the past been all too homogeneous. He likens 
the sphere of Quranic studies to Sufism, in its richness and 
endless possibilities.240 This seems to imply a spirit of 
tolerance which is akin to Shaltut's, especially when we compare 
this to Amin al-Khuli's desire to minimise as far as possible the 
element of subjectivity in tafsir, which he feels to be a kind of 
undesirable bias (talwin); even Muhammad cAbduh’s emphasis on 
hidaya is seen as a form of talwin.2 4 9
As with Shaltut, al-Madani’s tafsir is arranged not according 
to the order of the text but according to the topics contained ir. 
the sura. In his work on Surat al-Nisa', after an introductory 
section in which he gives a general summary of the sura's 
contents and discusses such things as the position of the sura in 
relation to other suras as regards order of revelation, ar.d the 
Qur'an's concern with women in general, he divides the bock into 
two sections. The first discusses at length the genera! 
principles on which the Islamic community should be founded, such 
as equality, faith in God, social solidarity, justice, then 
discusses al-ayat al-muwajjiha (the verses which contain general
2 4 7 Ibid., p. 6; this is of course reminiscent of Diraz's
view.
2 4 8 Ibid., p. 9.
2 4 9 Amin al-KhulT, op. cit., pp. 296-99.
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directives to the Muslims) and al-ayat al-mubashshira (the verses 
which give encouragement to the Muslim community). In the middle 
of this first section he discusses two of the literary 
characteristics of the Qur’an - that of ending verses with God's 
attributes, and that of constant variation of themes (al-tanaqqul 
wa'l-tawzTr). In the second section he deals with the legislation 
contained in the sura with regard to such things as orphans, 
polygamy, inheritance, family life, financial dealings etc.
Although this boo): does net bear the title of "Tafsir", it 
could easily be regarded as such, its contents being very similar 
in some respects to Shaltut's tafsTr. Apart from dealing with 
many of the same topics, he selects aspects of the sura which he 
deems worthy of study, like the ayat muwajjiha wa-mubashshira, 
just as Shaltut chooses to study, for example, the nida' a~t 
contained in particular suras; commenting on particular 
characteristics of the Qur'an is a further similarity. A brief 
lock at any part of the texts of the two works will show that
they are not dissimilar in their general style.
Another scholar who deserves mention here is rAbd Allah Mahmud 
Shihata, a pupil of al-Madani2R0 and Assistant Professor in h~r
al-cU1 fur at Cairo University- His series entitled; "The Aims and
Objectives cf each Sura in the Glorious Qur'an" draws extensively 
on Shaltut when discussing the first ten suras of the Qur'an, 
quoting him verbatim much of the time. Somewhat surprisingly,
250cAbd Allah Mahmud Shihata, Ahdaf Kulli Sura wa-Maqasfduha 
min al-Qur'an al-Karim, 3 vols., Cairo: Al-Kay'at al-Misriyyat
aI-cAmma li'l-Kitab, 1976-78, p. 6.
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since Shihata mentions Shaltut, along with al-Maraghi, Diraz, al- 
Madani and Sayyid Qutb, as one of those scholars who have been 
influenced by Muhammad cAbduh with regard to the unity of the 
sura,2nt he does not acknowledge this reliance on Shaltut's work. 
However, the form which his work takes is interesting; he devotes 
only about fifteen pages to each of the long suras, picking out 
the more central themes with which Shaltut dealt. The later and 
shorter suras, with which Shaltut did not deal, have 
correspondingly shorter chapters devoted to them; this
continuation, as it were, of Shaltut's work (albeit in far less 
detail), would appear to represent Shihata's original 
contribution.
This work is an interesting illustration of the grey area 
between that which is tafsir and that which is not; it does not 
call itself tafsir, no doubt because the suras are dealt with sc 
briefly. Tt would appear, however, that there is no exact 
definition of tafsTr which suits the modern situation - it is the 
author's choice whether or not to call his work tafsir; perhaps 
this is because the dividing line between tafsir and general 
religious studies has virtually disappeared; since their aim is 
acknowledged to be the same, it is no longer of pressing 
importance to distinguish between the two. The important thing ic 
that the work should provide guidance for the reader and increase 
his understanding of the Qur'an.
251 Ibid., p. 5.
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Conclusion
To sum up briefly, we can say that the general style of 
Shaltut's "Tafsir" is in keeping with the modern tendency towards 
increased simplicity and clarity, and towards a more practical 
approach. Its form and arrangement are innovative, representing 
an increased informality vis-a-vis Tafsir al-Manar, in order to 
accommodate the requirements of topical tafsir. However, the 
actual contents are in no way "extreme"; Shaltut is a moderate 
Islamic reformer, as we would expect of cr.t who attained the 
position of Shaykh al-Anhar, and he was fortunate enough tc write 
his tafsir in an age when the cuiams' of the Anhar and other 
religious institutions were more willing to face the challenge of 
the modern world than in Muhammad cAbduh's day, sc that his 
tafsir won admiration from them as well as from Muslims in 
general.
No moderate Islamic reformer aims at startling originality - 
this would almost certainly entail bldr a (blameworthy innovation) 
of some kind; what he aims at is to preserve a delicate balance 
between the Islamic heritage and the requirements of the modern 
age, giving each its due, and to avoid the two extremes - that of 
the Westernising modernists and that cf the react icnary 
muqallidun,2 *g Shaltut's popularity is no doubt due in no small 
measure to his success in maintaining this delicate balance.
2?2Cf. al-Madani, cp. cit. , pp. 7-3
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CHAPTER THREE 
SHALTUT AS FAQIH
Introduction
The Shari0a is the most vital area of concern for modern-day 
Muslim reformers. In Islam, law is to a large extent identified 
with the religion itself; to be a good Muslim means to adhere to 
the Sharica to the best of one's ability. The adoption by Muslim 
countries of Western style codes of law and the erosion of the
authority of the Shari0a courts, a process which began in the
latter half of the nineteenth century, caused grave concern to 
many serious-minded Muslims including Shaltut.1
Shaltut must have felt that he could combat this most 
effectively from a position of authority within the Azhar, while 
others were attracted to militant opposition groups, most notably 
in Shaltut's time the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the problem 
was not simply one of somehow persuading governments to apply the 
Shari0a instead of Western style laws; many of the opposition 
groups who call for the total application of the Shari°a would no 
doubt be at a loss if they were handed the reins of government 
tomorrow, since they have not so far bridged the gap between the
Shari0a and the complex process of governing a state in the
twentieth century.2
t a fsir, p. 148.
2Cf., eg., Daniel Pipes, Oil Wealth and Islamic Resurgence, 
in Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World, ed. A. Dessouki, New 
York: Praeger, 1982, pp. 37-38 and passim.
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Shaltut works primarily at the theoretical rather than the 
political end of this struggle. It should be stressed that unlike 
many modern Muslim reformers, including Muhammad cAbduh and 
Rashid Rida, Shaltut was a trained faqih; in him we find a 
scholar who is well-versed in the Sharica and its principles 
while at the same time being concerned with its application to 
the contemporary political reality and the problems raised by 
modern civilisation.
The Range of Shaltut's Legal Thought
In the words of an eminent Muslim legal scholar of this 
century:
The Muslim scholars of all madhhabs have agreed 
that all a man's sayings and actions, whether they 
be acts of worship or worldly affairs or crimes or 
personal relations, or any kind of contract or 
disposal (tasarrufat), have their status (hukm) in 
the Sharica..,3
In view of this comprehensive nature of the Sharica, it is 
sometimes difficult to draw a clear line between "legal" and 
"non-legal" material, especially in the work of a writer like 
Shaltut whose legal discussion is rarely dry, but is generally 
incorporated into the hortatory genre. A brief survey of some of 
Shaltut's writings will illustrate the wide range of his activity 
in the legal sphere, and indicate which sections fall most 
appropriately under the heading of fiqh.
3cAbd al-Wahhab Khallaf, cIlm Usui al-Fiqh, 11th ed., 
Kuwait: Dar al-Qalam, 1977, p. 11.
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At the most basic level we find his fatwas , written or 
broadcast in reply to Muslims from all over the world who have 
addressed their problems to Shaltut. These form an essential part 
of his work, for the passing on of knowledge has always been 
perceived as a bounden duty on the culama; Shaltut quotes two 
hadiths which stress the importance of sharing knowledge.4 These 
fatwas, which represent the consummation of the theoretical and 
the practical, will be central to this chapter.
In cAqida wa-Sharica , the bulk of which is in fact devoted to 
"Sharica", we find a slightly more theoretical treatment of the 
law, tending to deal in general concepts rather than specific 
situations. Part Two, entitled "The Sharica", is divided into the 
following areas: cibadat {acts of worship), family law and 
inheritance, financial dealings, penal law, civil and criminal 
liability, and the umma (constitutional and international law).
However, the treatment accorded to these various sections is 
somewhat uneven; in the section on c ibadat he deals not so much 
with the legal details appertaining to the various acts of 
worship, as with their general nature and significance. The 
content is of a similarly general nature in the section on family 
law, where we find headings like "The principles of Islam with 
regard to the formation of the family", and "Islam's view of 
women", and inheritance law receives a cursory treatment in just 
four pages. Even in the area of financial transactions the 
emphasis is on general moral teachings, with headings like "The
4Fatawa, p. 16.
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status of wealth in Islam", "Islam wages war on miserliness, 
extravagance and indulgence in those who are wealthy", "A call to 
spend in the way of God", "The effect of fraud on society", and 
so on.
However, the section on penal law covers over a hundred pages, 
and in addition to a treatise on the nature and various types of 
punishment in Islamic law, includes a detailed discussion of 
homicide and retaliation (qisas), where the sources are examined 
in some detail. The section on civil and criminal liability,
though shorter, deals with several principles of substantive law,
and includes some comparison of the madhahib, and will therefore 
be relevant to our discussion on comparative jurisprudence. The 
section on the umma returns to the more general style, discussing 
broad concepts like "justice" and "shura" (consultation), and
giving very cursory treatment to subjects like "war in Islam". 
The third and final part of cAqida wa-Sharica is entitled "The 
Sources of Law", and its importance for this chapter is self- 
evident .
It remains to mention Shaltut's work on comparative
jurisprudence; his work "Muqaranat al-Madhahib fi'l-Fiqh", 
written in conjunction with Muhammad cAlT Sayis, was intended as 
a text book for students in Kullivvat al-SharTca of the Azhar; 
unlike his other works, it contains much juristic detail and 
technical terminology.
We will begin with a discussion of Shaltut's section on the 
sources of law, as a prelude to his fatawa~, where we will be able
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to see how he actually uses and combines those sources in 
specific situations; this will be followed by a look at his
systematic treatment of the area of penal law, in view of his
detailed treatment of the subject; finally, we will discuss his
more specialised work on comparative law.
1) The Sources of Law
In his section dealing with the sources of law,5 Shaltut 
begins with an introductory passage where he enumerates three 
sources: the Qur'an, the Sunna and ra'y (personal opinion), which 
is based on the first two sources and consists primarily of 
analogy and the application of the general principles of the 
Sharica such as "the removal of harm", "the preservation of the
public interest", and "duress makes forbidden things 
permissible". He follows this introduction with a section on each 
of the three sources.6 Thus there is a departure from the 
traditional classification of the sources of law, the concepts of 
qiyas and iimac being subsumed under the heading of ra'y.
a) The Qur'an
After discussing various questions relating to the definition 
of the Qur'an, its essential features and its "Arabness", Shaltut
5cAqida wa-Sharica, pp. 468-550.
6A section entitled: "The reasons for disagreements about 
the legal content of the Qur'an and Sunna among imams", which is 
inserted between the section on Sunna and that on ra'y, will be 
discussed in the section on comparative jurisprudence.
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puts the Quranic legislation into perspective by listing the many 
elements which the Qur'an contains, such as creed, morals, and 
al-wacd wa'l-wacId (the Promise and the Threat), of which 
legislation (ahkam camalivva) is only one. He then lists the 
approximate number of Quranic verses on particular topics of 
legislation, showing that they form a relatively small portion of 
the Qur'an.7
He points out that the Qur'an did not bring a completely new 
system of legislation, and was not revealed in a vacuum, but 
built upon the social reality in which it appeared, confirming 
what was beneficial, forbidding what was harmful, and modifying 
certain other things.8
Under the subheading, "The Quranic method of propounding legal 
rulings (ahkam)", Shaltut lists various features of the Quranic 
legislation.9 He first draws a distinction between those ahkam 
which are fixed and unchangeable, such as the duty to pray, and 
those areas which are open to discussion, such as exactly how 
much ridac (suckling) gives rise to tahrim (marriage 
prohibition). In these cases, there is no one correct opinion, 
but the mujtahid must bear in mind the public interest 
(maslaha).10
7Ibid., pp. 479-81.
8 Ibid., pp. 481-84.
9Ibid., pp. 484-89.
10Ibid., pp. 484-86.
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Secondly, unlike man-made laws, the Quranic legislation is not 
dry, but interspersed with targhib and tarhib (the inspiration of 
desire and awe), couched in a variety of styles designed to evoke
a positive response. Unlike man-made systems which have to rely
only on temporal sanctions, divine systems provide the added 
dimension of religious sanction.11
Thirdly, the legislative material in the Qur'an is not laid
out as in legal manuals, classified according to subject matter;
on the contrary, there are verses on the same topic scattered in
different places, and the Qur'an has frequent and often abrupt
changes of legal subject matter. Shaltut's comments in this
regard are relevant not just for the ahkam in the Qur'an but for
the Quranic style in general:
...in this regard it (the Qur'an) is very much 
like a garden, whose fruits and flowers are 
scattered all over it, so that wherever a man 
finds himself in it he is able to obtain a 
selection of different flowers and fruits which
will be beneficial and pleasing to him...12
He points out that this characteristic of the Qur'an also means
that it must be taken as a whole - one cannot take a section
which deals with a particular sphere of legislation and study it
in isolation. Moreover it fulfils the didactic aim of avoiding
the reader's preoccupation with one topic to the exclusion of
others.13
1*Ibid., p. 486.
12Ibid., p. 487.
13 Ibid., pp. 487-88.
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Fourthly, the Quranic legislation is usually of a general 
nature; It only goes into details when dealing with matters which 
are too important for any disagreement to be countenanced 
concerning them, such as creed and worship, or when dealing with 
those areas of legislation which are fixed and not subject to 
ijtihad, such as the hudud (fixed penalties for certain crimes), 
the fara1id (fixed shares of inheritance), etc. In other matters, 
it supplies general principles; for example it enjoins justice on 
those who pass judgement, but does not give details of juridical 
procedure. Shaltut points out that "expounding in detail that 
which is unchanging and in general that which is subject to 
change" is an essential characteristic of a religion which claims 
to be eternally valid.14
b) The Sunna
In this section Shaltut first discusses the evolution of the 
word sunna and its various usages in order to clarify that the 
usage with which he is concerned here is that of the scholars of 
usul al-figh (the principles of jurisprudence), i.e. the sayings, 
actions and silent approval of the Prophet which are used as a 
secondary source of law to the Qur'an.15 He points out that since 
the Qur'an does have some ambiguities and lacunae, the Sunna 
fulfils various roles in relation to it, i.e. takhsis al-camm 
(excluding a particular section from a comprehensive category),
14 Ibid., pp. 488-89.
15Ibid., pp. 490-94.
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tagyTd al-mutlaq (qualifying that which is unqualified, thus 
restricting its application), and bavan al-muimal (clarifying 
that which is unclarified, e.g. by supplying details), as well as 
being an independent source of legislation. He quotes several 
instances where the Qur'an itself confirms the importance of the 
Prophet's example.16
Shaltut then discusses the reasons for the difference in 
status between the Qur'an and the Sunna. He points out that the 
Qur'an is superior to the Sunna in the following ways: firstly, 
the Qur'an was written down during the Prophet's lifetime, while 
only a few ahadith were; secondly, the Qur'an has been 
transmitted bi'1-tawatur (i.e. by a sufficiently large number of 
authorities in every generation to guarantee its authenticity), 
both through the medium of writing and in people's memories, 
while most of the Sunna is ahad (i.e. not mutawatir); thirdly, 
stricter criteria were applied with regard to the transmission of 
the Qur'an, whereby it was necessary to observe the exact 
wording, while the Sunna could be transmitted in such a way as to 
convey the sense but not the exact wording; and fourthly, the 
Quranic text was verified and examined in minute detail, in that 
the Companions would consult the Prophet even regarding a single 
letter of it in order to be sure of the correct reading, while 
there was nothing like this with the Sunna. The effect of this 
difference in status is that essential matters of faith and creed 
can only be based on the Qur'an, since it alone provides absolute
16Ibid., p. 497.
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certainty, and that more disagreements arise concerning the Sunna 
than the Qur'an.17
Shaltut then draws an important distinction within the Sunna, 
between that which has legislative relevance and that which has 
not. Into the latter category fall the Prophet's purely human 
actions, such as eating and drinking, things which depend on 
human experience or social usage such as agriculture and 
medicine, and things of an organisational nature such as military 
tactics, which depend on human initiative.18
As for those ahadith which are legally binding, these too must 
be divided into those which are of universal relevance (tashric 
camm) and those which are not (tashric khass). Into the first 
category fall those things he did in his capacity of prophet, 
such as his explanations concerning the Qur'an and acts of 
worship, the halal and the haraiti, and morals. However, his 
actions and decisions in his capacity of Imam and leader of the 
Muslims, such as administering the treasury and appointing
governers, or as a judge, cannot normally be executed by any
individual, but would require the sanction of an appropriate
authority.19
Since much confusion has arisen as to the status of many
ahadith, some people claiming that the Prophet's purely human 
actions were legally binding, Shaltut points out the importance
17Ibid., pp. 498-99.
18Ibid., p. 499.
19Ibid., pp. 500-1.
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of properly classifying ahadith in this way in order to define 
their legislative status. He gives several examples of 
disagreements which have arisen among scholars of usul as to 
whether a particular action of the Prophet was in the nature of a 
general communication, and therefore universally applicable, or 
whether it was in his capacity of imam and leader, and therefore 
dependent on the imam's consent. For example, scholars have 
differed concerning his pronouncement that anyone who cultivates 
barren land thereby becomes its owner, as to whether this means 
that any individual can do this at his own discretion, or whether 
he needs permission from the authorities. Scholars are 
unanimously agreed, however, that there is a distinction to be 
drawn here in order to determine the status of the hadith.20
c) Al-Ra1v
Shaltut begins this section by showing that the use of ra'y 
was a natural and accepted phenomenon right from the earliest 
period of Islam. After the Prophet's death, life for the Muslims 
became more complex in many respects. The first Caliphs often 
consulted the Companions both on the interpretation of the Qur'an 
and the Sunna, and on matters which were not clearly laid down in 
the sources; naturally these scholars would try to apply the 
general spirit or principles of the Qur'an or the Prophet's 
teachings where specific directions could not be found.21
20 Ibid., pp. 501-3.
21 Ibid., p. 542.
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The use of ra'y was in fact validified and confirmed by the 
sources themselves, as where the Qur'an enjoins consultation 
(42:38) and having recourse to "ulu al-amr" (those in authority) 
(4:83), and where the Prophet confirmed to those going to the 
provinces as governors and qadis that they could use their own 
judgement where the Qur'an and Sunna were silent.22
In the early days, however, there was relatively little 
difference of opinion among mujtahids; all exercised caution in 
the use of ahadith, and consulted each other regularly, and 
nearly all were settled in the Caliphal seat of Medina. The 
differences of opinion which did arise were usually due to 
different interpretations of Quranic verses, or differences in 
accepting and applying ahadith. Thus from the beginning there was 
both individual and collective ra'y in an informal sort of way.23 
However, Shaltut believes that it is only in the Caliphates of 
Abu Bakr and cUmar that we have a true illustration of the 
interaction of the sources of law, since after that the Muslims 
were split into factions, and as a result ra'y was misused.24
Shaltut then turns to the subject of ijmac . Taking this 
passage in conjunction with an earlier section in the book, 
entitled "Ijmac in relation to certainty in matters of faith", we 
will see how Shaltut effectively negates the traditional concept
2 2 Ibid., p. 543.
2 3 Ibid., p. 543 .
24 Ibid., p. 544.
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of ijmac by demonstrating its impracticability and inherent 
illogicality.
Shaltut points out that if iimac is to be taken as the 
unanimous agreement of those culama who are suitably qualified to 
exercise ijtihad, then in order to obtain it one must first 
define and identify those people, and then somehow register them 
so that they can all be consulted on a given matter. In order for 
i,jmar to obtain, all these people must be unanimously agreed on 
the matter. However, given the fact that this matter must be one 
which is subject to ijtihad in the first place, i.e. differences 
of opinion concerning it are permissible, the likelihood of their 
all agreeing on one point of view is negligible. Thus iimac in 
this sense is in fact no more than an unrealisable theoretical 
concept.2 5
In fact complete unanimity is only possible on matters about 
which noone has any doubts, such as the fact that there are four 
rakcas in the zuhr prayer, in other words on matters which are 
established in the Qur'an or the Sunna. Therefore the ruling 
would be based not on ijmac but on the Qur'an or the Sunna.26
In any case the concept of iimac has never been satisfactorily 
formulated in its details, and there has been a distinct lack of 
ijmar on the subject of ijmac , in all its aspects from the 
criteria to be applied in deciding whose opinion counts, to 
whether it is in fact practically applicable, and its legal
25 Ibid., pp. 544-45.
26Ibid., pp. 68-69.
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status if in fact it is accepted and applied.27 Moreover it has 
been abused in the past, and used as a weapon to support 
sectarian views or indeed the established schools of law, and to 
intimidate potential dissidents who are frightened to reveal 
their own opinions even on matters where differences of opinion 
are legitimate, for fear of going against "iimac" and 
jeopardising their religious reputations. Thus i jmac was used to 
reinforce sectarianism and to close the gate of ijtihad, stifling 
independent initiative and the spirit of free enquiry.28
Even if one accepts a majority rather than a unanimous ijmac , 
this would necessarily be based on considerations of maslaha, 
which changes according to circumstances, and so any decision 
based on ijmac would be subject to repeal by a later ijmac , and 
it would be an agent for change in the law rather than the 
contrary.29 Indeed, in one place Shaltut equates "ahl al-ijmac" 
with "ulu al-amr".3Q
As far as individual ijtihad is concerned, it may be exercised 
by anyone who feels himself suitably qualified, and binds only 
the one who exercises it; there is no monopoly on ijtihad by any 
particular person or group of people, since all humans are 
subject to error. Even the most eminent mujtahids have warned
27Ibid., pp. 65-66 ,
28Ibid., pp. 67 and 69.
29Ibid., p. 546.
30Ibid., p. 443.
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people against accepting their opinions without understanding the 
reasons behind them.31
The different schools of law have grown up as a result of the 
natural differences in the methods of mujtahids, for there are 
those who rely more on ahadith ahad than, say, qiyas, or those 
who pay particular attention to the opinions of the Companions, 
etc.; but these differences must be regarded as a blessing, since 
they represent the intellectual freedom granted to Muslims of all 
ages who desire to exercise that freedom in the interests of the 
Muslim community, and this is ultimately a means of preserving 
the Sharica.32
d) Summary
The content of the sections on the Qur'an and the Sunna is 
relatively straightforward and uncontroversial;33 Shaltut's main 
contribution here is to have presented information which is 
normally considered specialised, in a way which is understandable 
to the ordinary Muslim. Such information is usually included in 
works on usul al-figh along with a wealth of technical detail 
which would be offputting to the lay Muslim.
31 Ibid., pp. 546-48.
32Ibid., pp. 549-50.
33However, as we observed in Chapter One, some conservative 
scholars, including al-Khidr Husayn, objected to the distinction 
drawn between the Prophet's various actions as regards 
legislative status.
157
In the section on ra'y, however, we see a departure from the 
classical sources of qiyas and i.imac . Iimac is a topic whose
various aspects have been much discussed in all ages; in view of 
the controversial nature of this source, we will pause to see how 
far Shaltut's views are typical here.
Even in the classical age there were scholars who did not 
accept ijmic as a source of law; among them were the Muctazili
scholar al-Nazzam (d. ca. 840}, who believed that it was
impossible to actually ascertain ijmac for various reasons such 
as the difficulty of defining a mu.it ah id and of communications 
over a wide geographical area, etc.34 Ibn Hanbal is said to have 
expressed a similar view,35 and some scholars, including Ibn 
Taymiyya and Ibn Hazm, believed it to be restricted to the
generation of the Companions.36 Some of these scholars also
believed that it must in any case be based on textual evidence, 
in which case Shaltut's objection that the real source would then 
be the Qur'an or the Sunna holds good.37
The questioning of the validity of the classical concept of 
i.jmac has been more widespread in recent times, however.38
34Khallaf, op. cit., p. 48.
35 Ibid., p. 49.
36Ahmad Hasan, The Doctrine of I.jmac in Islam, Islamabad: 
Islamic Research Institute, 1976, p. 226.
37See ibid., p. 226, Khallaf, op. cit., p. 49, and D.M.H.
Hitu, Al-Wajiz fI Usui al-TashrTc al-Islami, Beirut: Mu'assassat 
al-Risala, 1983, p. 333.
38Ahmad Hasan gives a survey of opinions of selected modern
Muslim thinkers in op. cit., pp. 226-56.
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Muhammad cAbduh recognised that it had never been properly 
systemised. He did not see i.imac as a rigid and static 
phenomenon, for this would threaten Islam's adaptability to 
changing circumstances; he pointed out that some classical
authorities like al-Shafici in his "Risala", Ibn Hanbal and 
others conceived it as revocable, i.e. subject to repeal by a 
later ijmac .3 9
cAbduh denied that the authority for ijmac was based upon the 
hadith: "My community shall never agree upon an error" or upon 
the Quranic verse (4:115) which talks about the "way of the
believers",40 but instead identified it as the consensus of "ulu 
al-amr" mentioned in Qur'an 4:59 and 4:83. These were identified 
as those in authority in all areas of life, including the 
political, military, commercial, industrial, agricultural, 
financial etc. - in fact anyone upon whose expertise the
interests of the nation depend.41 While Rashid Rida is in 
sympathy with cAbduh's views on ijmac , he accords a special place 
to the ijmar of the Companions, which he believes is not subject 
to modification or repeal.42
The Pakistani scholar Kemal Faruki arrives at not dissimilar 
conclusions, with perhaps more carefully reasoned arguments; he 
feels that the concept of "protection from error" (cisma) upon
39Tafsir al-Manar, 5:208-9.
40Ibid., 5:209 and 201.
41 Ibid., 5:205 and 187.
42Ibid., 7:198.
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which the justification for ijmac is normally based, if left 
unrestricted, comes dangerously close to shirk by attributing 
infallibility to other than God.43 He therefore suggests that the 
"presence" of the community as regards both time and space should 
be a prerequisite for the authority of ijmac , i.e. it should be 
binding only on the community which agreed upon it.44 However, 
this does not mean denying all the previous findings of ijmac , 
which would in fact be tantamount to destroying the entire 
edifice of fiqh.45 This can be avoided by acknowledging that each 
generation has a special authority as regards its own age, being 
more familiar with its circumstances, and therefore the early 
communities were better able to judge in matters such as the 
authenticity of the Quranic text and ahadith. (He does not 
however preclude the possibility of modern historical research 
bringing to light new evidence and modifying previous
findings.)4 s
In our opinion, the fact that there are so many different 
aspects of ijmac which may be discussed obscures the fact that 
there is more real agreement among scholars on this issue than 
may at first appear to be the case. For those who acknowledge the 
ijmar of the Companions are in fact acknowledging only an
43Kemal A. Faruki, Ijmac and the Gate of Ijtihad, Karachi: 
Gateway Publications, 1954, pp. 14-15.
44Ibid., pp. 16, 30 and passim.
45 Ibid., pp. 21-23.
46Ibid., p. 31.
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informal sort of i jmac , since the Companions had no mechanism to 
obtain absolute unanimity, nor did they ever attempt to do so.
Moreover it is acknowledged by Shaltut and others that the degree
of unanimity that they did achieve was due only to the fact that 
there was as yet no sectarian division. No scholar has ever 
really claimed that there has actually been absolute unanimity on 
any point, unless that point is clearly laid down in the Qur’an 
or the Sunna.47
In fact it appears that there are two distinct incarnations of 
ijmac which are discussed. Firstly, there is the informal 
inarticulate accumulation of conscience which formed the 
effective sanctioning base for the whole structure of figh, and 
which of course cannot be dismissed by any Islamic scholar 
without dire consequences. Secondly, there is the attempt to 
adapt the concept of i jmac to meet the needs of the twentieth 
century; anyone who wishes to interpret it as a forward-looking 
source of legislation for the modern age must necessarily have in 
mind an ijmac that is subject to repeal by a later ijmac , and 
moreover a majority rather than a unanimous ijmac . Thus in the
conception of scholars like cAbduh, Faruki and Shaltut, ijmac has
been transformed from an infallible retrospective authority to a 
collective form of ijtihad, and may properly be subsumed under 
the heading of ra'y, as Shaltut has done.48 Apart from those 
matters upon which the very early generations agreed and which
47Khallaf, op. cit., p. 50.
48See also M. Kerr, Islamic Reform, p. 144.
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nobody would presume to question,49 classical i.imac is no longer 
regarded as an absolute authority in legislation, although in 
practice many of its findings may be endorsed by modern scholars.
2) "Al-Fatawa"
This work, which bears the subtitle: "A study of contemporary 
problems which arise in a Muslim's everyday life", is a 
collection of fatwas given by Shaltut both before and during his 
period of office as Shaykh al-Azhar; they had previously been 
published in newspapers and magazines or broadcast on radio.50 In 
these fatwas Shaltut responds to the questions of Muslims
concerning their religion and their everyday life; the great
demand for this type of guidance may be inferred from the
popularity of the book, which by 1983 had reached its 12th
edition.
In his introduction to this work, Shaltut shows how the
practice of giving fatwas derives from the Qur'an itself, which 
contains many legal rulings, some in response to specific
questions. He points out that those questions which were
addressed to Muhammad by Muslims and answered in the Qur'an
49See cAll Hasab Allah, Usui al-Tashric , 5th ed., Cairo: Dar
al-Macarif bi-Misr, 1976, p. li6 for some examples.
50Fatawa, p. 15.
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concerned useful, practical matters, rather than theoretical or 
trivial matters.51
He points out the usefulness of the fatwas of the classical 
fuqaha1 as a source of reference, but despite his regard for
their work he says:
I have not adhered to any particular madhhab in 
them (i.e. his fatwas), nor have I restricted 
myself to the opinion of any one faqih; (I have 
relied) only upon the beloved Book and the true 
Sunna and the basic and eternal principles of 
Islam..,5 2
He commends the fact that various bodies have now been set up for 
the express purpose of providing fatwas in the modern age, and 
that even radio has seen fit to broadcast such edifying material, 
generally in clear and easily understood language.53
"Al-Fatawa" necessarily covers a very wide range of subject 
matters, since Muslims may ask about any aspect of their lives, 
or about matters of creed or the meaning of specific Quranic 
verses. For ease of reference the fatwas have been subsumed under 
various headings, and a brief look at these will show the range 
of topics dealt with: creed and the unseen; acts of worship;
customs and innovations (mubtada0at); oaths and pledges; family 
law and personal status; financial transactions; food, drink and 
adornment; and two final sections, entitled "iitimaciyyat", which
51 In his fatwas Shaltut often exhorts Muslims to keep to 
practical issues and to avoid too much questioning on unimportant 
details - see e.g. Fatawa pp. 133-34, 137, 143, 201, 391 and 394.
52 Ibid., p. 15.
53 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
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contains miscellaneous items such as the possibility of man going 
to the moon and the theory of evolution, and "mutafarriqat", 
which discusses the interpretation of various Quranic words and 
verses, and may be described as tafsir.
As the subtitle of the work suggests, some of the issues dealt 
with are specific to modern-day living, such as test-tube babies, 
Post Office savings, stocks and shares and communism, while 
others have always formed a part of fiqh, although even in this 
case they may have become more significant in recent times, as is 
the case for example with family planning and suicide. However, 
the emphasis here will be on Shaltut's methods, i.e. his use of 
the sources and the character of his legal thought, rather than 
on the social relevance of his findings, many of which will be 
pertinent to Chapter Four.
a) The Sources
It is an important feature of Shaltut's fatwas that in them we 
can often see the use he has made of the sources; by this means 
he enables us to see the stages by which the ruling is arrived 
at, and in this his fatwas contrast with many other published 
collections of fatwas , which may refer only briefly to the 
sources or simply give a ruling which is to be taken on faith, as 
it were.
i) Qur'an and Sunna
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We have already had occasion to mention the fact that for 
Shaltut, as for other Muslim scholars who were nurtured on the 
Qur'an, the Qur'an is so deeply embedded in his psyche that it 
affects his style and his very way of thinking. The Qur'an for 
him is not just a "source of law" but the basis of everything; 
although the Qur'an does not cover all legal areas, it is very 
rarely that Shaltut cannot produce a Quranic quote which is
pertinent to the subject in hand. It is natural that the Qur'an 
should be quoted and referred to extensively in matters of creed, 
worship and things like marriage and divorce which are dealt with 
at some length in the Qur'an; but even under headings like "Birth 
control" or "Stocks and Shares" the Qur'an is quoted to
illustrate the general principles at stake.
In recent times this centrality of the Qur'an, and to a
slightly lesser extent the Sunna, in the minds of Muslims, has
been supplemented by a specific call for a return to the original
sources and a purification of Islamic law from the later
accretions which were the result of the activities of the 
fuqaha', and which culminated in the so-called "closing of the 
gate of ijtihad".54 In practice, however, the Qur'an and the 
Sunna are supplemented by the opinions of the classical fugaha1,
as can be seen in the work of Muhammad cAbduh and Rashid Ridi and
in that of Shaltut; the work of these fuqaha* is considered a 
wealth of scholarship upon which to draw, and it is in fact rare
54ZakI Badawi, The Reformers of Egypt - A critique of al- 
Afghani, cAbduh and Ridha, Slough: The Open Press (Muslims
Institute Papers No. 2), 1976, p. 37.
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that any of them depart totally from the opinions of the 
madhahib, but the principle remains, that one is not bound by 
them as they are the product of human activity and therefore 
fallible.55
We have seen in Chapter Two how the Qur'an itself was a 
primary source of tafsir for Shaltut, and how for example when 
commenting on the muqattac at or ghaybiyyat he restricted himself 
to what was in the Qur'an. One of the legal issues dealt with in 
his tafsir, that of tayammum, provided an example of how the 
opinions of the madhahib may be passed over in favour of an 
interpretation based on the Quranic text alone.56
In "Al-Fatawa" we find Shaltut using the techniques of tafsir, 
for he often takes into account the Quranic style and language in
his rulings. For example, in order to examine the question of
whether or not touching (lamasa) a woman breaks a man's wudu',57 
he looks firstly at the Qur'an's metaphorical usage of comparable 
verbs such as "massa" and "bashara" to denote sexual relations; 
secondly he looks at the context in which the phrase "aw lamastum 
al-nisa*" occurs within ayat al-tahara (5:6), and concludes that 
the interpretation of lamasa as sexual relations makes the verse 
more comprehensive in its legislation since "aw .ja'a ahdun minkum 
min al-gha'it" would refer to the use of tayammum in place of
wudu', while "aw lamastum al-nisa'" would refer to its use in
B5Ibid., pp. 37 and 52.
56Tafsir, pp. 323-28.
57Fatawa, pp. 84-85.
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place of ghusl. Moreover, the ending of ayat al-tahara with the 
phrase: "Allah does not wish to burden you; He seeks only to 
purify you and to perfect His favour to you, so that you may give 
thanks", provides a further reason why one should choose the 
least arduous of the two possibilities.
He again refers to Quranic context in the question of whether 
or not animals are to be called to reckoning on the Day of 
Judgement, pointing out that the phrase "wa-idha al-wuhush 
hushirat" (81:5) occurs in the context of a description of the 
disturbance of the natural order at the end of the world, and is 
thus simply a physical phenomenon like the others.36
In certain issues, a careful examination of the Quranic text 
is vital, as for example in the question of "the raising up of 
Jesus" (rafc cIsa). Shaltut strongly objects to those who insist 
on making this matter one of essential creed, i.e. accusing of 
kufr those who do not believe that Jesus has been physically 
raised up to God and is still alive and waiting for the end of
a.*;
the world when he will descend, since the Quranic verses in 
question are mutashabih;39 in fact he makes quite a strong case 
for the contrary belief. He looks at the Quranic usage of the 
word rafc in the figurative sense of raising in rank and dignity 
(although ignoring the fact that in other places it is not 
followed by ilayya or ilayhi, meaning to God). He also looks at 
the context in which it occurs in (3:55), preceding the phrase:
58Ibid., p. 41.
59 Ibid., p. 67.
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" and We will purify you from those who disbelieve ", which
Shaltut feels strengthens the case for an increase in rank and 
dignity.60 Again, he looks at the Quranic usage of the verb 
tawaffa, which is generally to denote death in the ordinary sense 
of the word.61
Contextual considerations are important for the interpretation 
of the phrase "innahu la~cilmun li'l~saca" (43:61), where Shaltut 
argues that the following words, "fa-la tamtarunna bi-ha", show 
that these words are being used to persuade a dubious audience, 
and therefore the pronoun in the first phrase cannot refer to the 
appearance of Jesus himself at the end of the world, since this 
in itself is an object of doubt and would not serve to persuade 
the doubters.62
Shaltut again refers closely to the Quranic text in the 
question of polygamy. He is indignant at those who use the 
exhortation to justice among co-wives as a sort of "catch-22" in 
order to ban polygamy outright, for in this they are tampering 
with God’s verses, which give explicit permission to marry two, 
three or four wives(4:3).63 In order to determine the 
relationship between the verse which asks men to confine 
themselves to one wife if they fear they cannot observe justice 
between their wives (4:3), and the verse which states that they
6 0 Ibid., p . 63.
61 Ibid., pp. 60-61.
62 Ibid., pp. 75-76.
63Ibid., p. 182.
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will not be able to deal equally with their wives (4:129), 
Shaltut observes the context of the latter verse, which occurs in 
a passage beginning "They consult you concerning women", 
suggesting that the question of justice between wives was one of 
the issues which was worrying the Companions, and that this verse 
was sent down in response to this worry, as a reassurance that 
complete impartiality is impossible and therefore not to be 
expected.6 4
Arguing against those who believe that polygamy is a kind of 
license conditional upon, for example, a wife's sterility or 
illness, Shaltut points out that the Quranic phrase which permits 
polygamy gives no hint of conditionality, and contrasts its style 
here with its style when it allows things which are generally 
disapproved of or haram, and only permitted under duress. He 
feels that the Qur'an would have specifically stated the 
conditions of sterility and illness if this was meant.63
It is to be expected that in matters relating to creed or to 
ghaybiyyat, the Qur'an should be closely referred to, since 
Shaltut repeatedly affirms the belief that "as regards matters of 
the unseen, (one should) confine oneself to the texts", and this 
should be without any forced interpretations of those texts 
("duna sarf al-lafz can macnaha").66 In this manner, like
64 Ibid., p. 183.
65Ibid., p. 186; the Quranic mode of expression is again 
adduced as evidence in the question of conditional repudiation
(al-talag al-mucallaq), p. 300.
66Ibid., p. 56; see also pp. 39 and 20.
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Muhammad cAbduh and Rashid Rida before him, he desires to keep 
the essential creed to an absolute minimum, thus avoiding as far 
as possible dogmatic or sectarian disputes, and seeking to 
eradicate the plethora of superstitions which have grown up
around some of these ghaybiyyat, laying people open to 
exploitation.67
Discussing the theory of evolution, Shaltut feels that the
Qur'an itself is sufficient to confute this theory, since it 
explicitly refers to the creation of Adam from raw materials. He 
feels that the creation of man is one of the ghaybiyyat about
which only the text can tell us, and in which there is no room
for experiment or research.68
On several occasions when weighing up particular issues 
Shaltut refers to the general style of the Qur'an, for example to 
illustrate the importance of such things as the injunctions 
relating to inheritance, the duty of fasting and the "Night of 
Power", and the gravity of such crimes as murder and drinking 
alchohol.69 Although such stylistic evidence might not constitute 
a ruling on its own, Shaltut uses it to support his case and to 
lend emphasis to his exhortations.
67Ibid., pp. 27 and 30-31.
68Ibid., pp. 402-3. This would appear to be the mainstream
Sunni view on the subject; in fact Shaltut was replying here to
the question of whether "men of religion" refuted the theory of
evolution on the basis of textual evidence or out of narrow­
mindedness .
69See ibid., pp. 33-37, 138-39, 154, 417 and 362-63
respectively.
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As regards the Sunna, the frequency with which Shaltut quotes 
ahadith makes it clear that he sets great store by it. He uses it 
in all three of its functions in relation to the Qur'an: 
mu'akkida (confirming what is in the Qur'an), mubayyina
(clarifying or elaborating on what is in the Qur'an), and
munshi'a (as an independent source, legislating for what is not
mentioned in the Qur'an).70 An example of the first is where he
cites the fact that there are genuine ahadith which show that 
touching women does not break the wudu*, although he has already 
drawn this conclusion from the Qur'an itself.71 Secondly, as a 
sunna mubayyina, he quotes: "That which is forbidden (for
purposes of marriage) as regards blood relationship is also 
forbidden as regards ridac", which explains the Quranic phrase: 
"wa-umiT.ahatukum allatT ardacnakum wa-akhawatukum min al-radaca" 
(4:23) as comprising all the relationships previously mentioned 
in the same verse.72 Thirdly, the hurma (illegality) of tahlil (a 
legal fiction invented to remove the impediment of a triple 
repudiation to remarriage), which is not specifically mentioned 
in the Qur'an, is based on ahadith in which the Prophet condemns 
those who participate in it.73
It is evident that once Shaltut believes in the genuineness of 
a particular hadith, he feels bound by it, even if it is not
70See Khallaf, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
71Fahawa, p. 85.
72Ibid., pp. 282-83.
73Ibid., pp. 316-17.
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wholly concordant with his general emphasis on yusr (lenience). 
For example, the aforementioned hadith concerning radaca obliges 
him to disappoint some of those who send him questions in this 
regard.74 In the case of two hadiths to the effect that the 
omission of prayer entails kufr, Shaltut feels obliged to take 
these into consideration despite his reluctance to brand men as 
kafirs for matters other than those of essential creed (note the 
distinction drawn between he who denies the obligation to pray 
and he who omits the prayer while acknowledging its obligatory 
nature). He gets around this by interpreting the hadiths as 
merely a strong reprimand, intended to act as a deterrent rather 
than being literally true.73 On occasion a liberal interpretation 
of a hadith is made possible by ascertaining the intentions which 
lie behind it, as where Shaltut observes that since the intention 
behind the hadith which prescribes washing a dish which has been 
licked by a dog seven times, one with earth, was simply to ensure 
cleanliness, then one may use any effective cleaning agent, and 
the number seven need not be taken literally.76
Since Shaltut's fatwas are intended to be of use to ordinary 
Muslims and are not addressed to other fugaha', it is very rare 
for him to indulge in the critical evaluation of ahadith in the 
text of his fatwas; he only does this when forced to defend
74For example the questioner in ibid., p. 287 will not be 
allowed to marry her cousin.
73 Ibid., p. 162; he does the same with a hadith which says: 
"Man halafa bi-ghayr Allah, fa-qad kafara", p. 305.
76 Ibid., pp. 86-87.
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himself on a particularly emotive and polemical issue, such as 
that of the raising up of Jesus, where he uses the weapons of 
jarh wa-tacdll (the science which rejects or accepts ahadith 
according to accepted criteria) to reject the ahadith used by his 
opponents in support of their argument.77
In his fatwas Shaltut has constant reference to the Qur'an and 
the Sunna; he is generally consistent with the views put forward 
in his scheme of the sources of law, with perhaps minor 
exceptions, such as where he adduces the hadith mentioning the 
harmfulness of the milk of a pregnant woman as evidence to 
support the couple's right to actively prevent pregnancy during 
the period of suckling.78 This would appear to be in 
contradiction with the distinction which Shaltut draws between 
the legislative and non-legislative functions of the Prophet, for 
he is acknowledged to have had no special expertise in such 
matters as this.
ii) Al-ijmac
Although Shaltut effectively negates the value of classical 
i,jrr.ac as a source of law, he uses the term both in its nominal 
and verbal forms in several places in his fatwas . He even goes so 
far as to describe it as the third source of law.79 However, it 
is noteworthy that he virtually never uses it on its own as an
77Ibid., pp. 61-62.
78 Ibid., p. 297.
79 Ibid., p. 361.
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independent source in the proper sense of the word; in nearly 
every case where he cites i m a c , the principle in question is in 
fact directly based on the Qur'an or the Sunna, so that, as 
Shaltut points out in his treatise on the sources of law, the 
actual source is in reality the Qur'an or the Sunna.80 This is 
the case with the ban on selling wine, the fact that the wine 
drinker should receive worldly punishment, and the fact that 
women are not obliged to attend the Friday prayers, all of which 
are based on the Sunna.01 Similarly, the fact that a secret 
marriage performed without witnesses is null and void, and that a 
Muslim woman is not permitted to marry a non-Muslim man may be 
inferred from the Qur'an.82
Shaltut also uses the term with regard to matters which are in 
any case virtually unquestionable, such as the fact that he who 
denies the obligatory nature of fasting during Ramadan may not be 
considered a Muslim, and that he who omits the obligatory acts of 
worship commits a grave sin.83 (In this last case i,jmac is cited 
as an authority alongside "al-dala'il al-sariha" - explicit 
authoritative evidence).
Even in the instance where he describes i.imac as the third 
source of law, he is only using it to support what is established
80There is an exception to this, however, where Shaltut 
cites c ijma as the sole authority for talion in cases of injury- 
see cAqida wa-Sharica, p. 386.
81 See ibid., pp. 365, 366 and 93 respectively.
82Ibid., pp. 268 and 276-77 respectively.
B3Ibid., pp. 140 and 161 respectively.
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in the Qur'an and the Sunna with regard to the illegality of
drinking wine, so one is inclined to believe that his use of the
term here is primarily for effect; in fact he proceeds to clarify
his position in the same passage:
If the ruling is found in the Qur'an, then that 
alone is its source, and if it is found in the 
Sunna, then that alone is its source, and if it is 
not found in either the Qur'an or the Sunna, then 
the fugahl', who are cognisant of the general 
principles of legislation, and of the public 
interest, must apply their mental faculties (to 
the problem), and whatever they agree upon, then 
that and only that is the ruling...84
Since Shaltut is talking in the present tense, it is evident that
he is not talking of classical ijmac but of ijmac as a changing
phenomenon, and one suspects that he envisages broad agreement
rather than absolute unanimity, this being virtually impossible
by Shaltut's own admission.85 Thus despite Shaltut's referring to
i.jmac as a third source of law here, he does not contradict the
views put forward in his section entitled: "Masadir al-TashrT^".
¥hen Shaltut states that there is i.jmac to the effect that
tahlTl is haram,86 one might be tempted to say that this is
technically untrue, since tahlil as a legal fiction has been
sanctioned by culama1 from the Hanafi, Maliki and ShaficT schools
down the ages.87 One may assume, however, that Shaltut feels so
strongly about the serious nature of the marriage contract and
84 Ibid., p. 361.
85cAqida wa-Sharica, p. 545.
86Fatawa, p. 316.
87Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, p. 82.
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the divorce laws as laid down in the Qur'an, that any facrih who 
would treat such things lightly does not deserve the name, and 
therefore his opinion does not count. While it could be a 
dangerous precedent to claim i jma° on the grounds that anyone who 
disagreed must be misguided, Shaltut has a strong case here 
because the hiyal (legal fictions) contradict the spirit if not 
the letter of the law, and are widely acknowledged to be abuses 
of the Sharica.
iii) Al-ra1y
There have been numerous attempts in the history of usul to 
define the exact sphere of operation of ra1v in Islamic law, the 
most notable being the attempt on the part of the classical 
fugaha' to confine the ij tihad of the fagih to giyas, i.e. 
analogical deduction based directly on the sources. However, 
human value judgements have never been wholly excluded from the 
juristic process; indeed, a f aqxh uses ijtihad at all levels - in 
the very choice of which texts to take into consideration, and 
which ahadith he believes to be genuine, as well as in his 
interpretation of these texts. Moreover situations do arise for 
which there is no strict analogy in the sources, and some of the 
classical jurists felt bound to resort to istislah 
("consideration of the public interest") and istihsan ("juristic 
preference") in order to accommodate the concept of the public 
interest or utility (maslaha). Thus human value judgements were 
guaranteed a place in the scheme of law. However, divergence has
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always been contained to some extent by the existence of texts 
which are considered muhkam (unambiguous), and therefore not 
subject to ijtihad, providing a central core upon which all 
fsqihs are agreed, and by the fact that the fuqaha' consider 
themselves bound by the principles and spirit inherent in the 
Sharir a.
Although ra1y is not subject to strict categorisation, 
Shaltut's activities in this regard fall mainly into the
following areas: the application of analogy and of the general
principles of the Sharica, considerations of maslaha, and the use 
of empirical evidence.
Analogy and the principles of the Sharica
We have avoided using the technical term giyas because Shaltut 
himself does not use it, probably in order to avoid confusion 
between the simple concept of analogy and giyas as one of the 
four classical sources of law. The principle of analogy, however, 
is an important one; Shaltut sometimes refers to its validity 
without naming it, as when he maintains that from the
unlawfulness of wine (khamr) we can assume that any substance 
which intoxicates is also unlawful; since the reason behind the 
forbidding of wine (manat al-tahrim) is its harmful effects, then 
other substances with the same effects are also forbidden. He 
continues:
...this is one of the natural methods of 
legislation, which has been known to man ever 
since he has comprehended the characteristics of
things and compared them to each other; Islam
confirmed this as a method of legislation, and 
thus was able to use the status (hukm) of things
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which were known to establish the status of other 
things which were not (previously) known, by 
virtue of the fact that they possessed the same 
characteristics...8S
Shaltut's method of analogy differs slightly from the 
classical one, where the analogy must be based on the cilia 
(effective cause), which in the case of the prohibition of wine 
is the intoxication rather than the harmful effects thereof, 
which, strictly speaking, constitute the hikma (the underlying 
reason or wisdom behind rulings), although the dividing line 
between the two is a fine one.
In the case of the licence to shorten the prayer or break the
fast when travelling, the dividing line is clearer. Shaltut does 
not take the act of travelling itself, or the length of the 
journey, to be the point at issue. He feels that in the light of 
the availability of modern methods of travel, it is inappropriate 
to decide the matter according to distance. The essential point 
is whether or not the journey involves hardship (mashagga).89 
Thus he is observing the hikma rather than the cilia, which is 
the journey itself.90 This blurring of the distinction between 
the cilia and the hikma arises from the modern emphasis on making
Islamic legal precepts and the reasons behind them clear and
88Fatawa, p. 373.
89Tafsir, pp. 551-52.
90Compare cAbd al-Hamld MutawallT, Mabadi1 al-Hukm fi'l- 
Islam, Cairo: Dar al-Macarif, 1966, p. 239, fn. 2, for an example 
of the formalist view which observes only the cilia.
178
understandable.91 This would appear to be quite in keeping with 
Shaltut's emphasis on the practical rather than the theoretical, 
and his reliance on his own moral instincts or even common sense.
A kind of loose analogy is drawn when Shaltut expresses the 
hope that, since the Prophet permitted someone to perform the 
hajj on behalf of their deceased father without the express 
request of the latter, then perhaps it would be acceptable for a 
man's heirs to pay his outstanding zakaL, kaff'arat (expiation) 
etc., and thereby eliminate any otherworldly punishment he may 
have incurred.92 However, in this case Shaltut is expressing a 
pious hope rather than a firm conviction. Elsewhere he draws a 
kind of analogy between oaths and the engagement agreement (al- 
khitba), i.e. if one may even break an oath, which is normally 
considered binding, for a valid reason, then it is even more 
appropriate that an engagement, which is not a binding contract, 
should be broken for a valid reason.93 Again, he draws an analogy 
between adultery and artificial insemination where the donor is 
not the husband, maintaining that their essence and result are 
the same, but he refrains from making the analogy complete (i.e. 
according them the same status) because of "a deficiency (gusur) 
in the actual form of the (latter) crime".94
91Kerr, op.cit., p. 67.
92Fatawa, p. 342.
93 Ibid., p. 260.
94 Ibid ., p. 328.
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We often find an even broader type of analogy in Shaltut's 
fatwas , where the analogy is based on a hikma which may not be so 
obvious as that of the prohibition of drinking alchohol. For 
example, he maintains that since the reason why Muslim women are 
not allowed to marry non-Muslim men is because the man and 
therefore his culture is usually dominant, this prohibition may 
be extended to Muslim men also in cases where the non-Muslim 
woman's culture is allowed to prevail.95 Again, just as debtors 
are deprived of the right of disposal of their property in order 
to protect the rights of their creditors, so should fathers who 
attempt to abuse the inheritance laws and deprive certain heirs 
of their rightful shares lose the right of disposal of their 
property, in order to protect the rights of those heirs.96
It is only a short step from here to using the general 
principles of the Sharica as a criterion. In fact Shaltut places 
the two criteria together - the effective causes of rulings 
(cilal al-ahkarr.) and the principles of legislation - as the two 
factors which have enabled Islam to adapt to new circumstances 
and evaluate the hill or hurma (lawfulness or unlawfulness) of 
any new things or innovations with which Muslims may be faced. He 
says this when discussing the subject of smoking, which he
95Ibid., pp. 279-80; Shaltut is thinking of European women
in particular.
96 Ibid., p. 340.
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regards as haram on the grounds that Islam forbids anything which 
dissipates wealth or is detrimental to one's health.97
Shaltut's belief that profits from cooperatives. Post Office 
savings and stocks and shares are all lawful98 is necessarily 
based on the general principles of the Sharica in view of the 
fact that such things did not exist in the early ages of Islam; 
in each case the key issue is the fact that there is no 
exploitation of those in need - on the contrary, the agreement in 
question is entered into willingly by both parties, and generally 
benefits all concerned and is therefore in accordance with the 
spirit of the Sharica.
Most of the principles cited revolve around the prevention of 
harm and the promotion of benefit; the single most important 
principle is that of yusr, or ease, which often influences 
Shaltut in his legal decisions, sometimes leading to surprising 
compromises. For example, the burden of guilt or sin is lifted 
from the one who borrows on interest because of his need,99 and 
men whose work entails loading wine off and onto ships do not 
come under the prophetic curse which embraces the carrier of 
wine, because of the fact that they do not intend to abet anyone 
in sin but are simply doing it to earn their living.100 In view 
of the fact that to prohibit praying in mosques with tombs might
97 Ibid., pp. 384-85.
" Ibid. , pp. 348-55.
"Ibid., p. 354.
100 Ibid., pp. 378-79 .
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discourage people from praying, Shaltut simply recommends that 
the tomb should not be in view of those who pray.101
Other principles referred to include the principle of 
safeguarding bodily health,102 and the principles of hifz al- 
masalih (the preservation of interests), dafc al-madarr (averting 
harm), sadd dhara'ic al-fasad (closing the avenues which lead to 
evil) and al-darar madfuc bi-gadr al-imkan (harm is to be averted 
to the greatest extent possible);103 all of these principles have 
essentially the same purpose as the principle of maslaha, which 
we will shortly discuss.
On the subject of the permissibility of taking medicine 
containing muharramat (forbidden substances), Shaltut refers to 
the principle al-darurat tubThu al-mahzurat (duress renders
forbidden things permissible);104 and on the subject of
circumcision he refers to the principle that one may inflict
injury if it brings a greater good, using this as the main
evidence for the sunniyya or possibly wujub of circumcision, 
since there is no text which he recognises, that refers to the 
legal status of circumcision.105
A1-maslaha
101 Ibid., p. 105; for other examples where the principle of 
yusr is referred to, see pp. 85, 355 and 379.
102 Ibid., pp. 166 and 384 and cAqida wa-Sharica, p. 209.
103Fatawa, pp. 372-73 and 297.
104 Ibid., p. 382.
105 Ibid., pp. 332-33 .
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The principle of maslaha has attracted particular attention in 
the modern age, although we should not forget that it was 
recognised by many medieval jurists, some of whom, such as al- 
Ghazali, Ibn Taymiyya and Najm al-Dih al-Tufi, laid particular 
stress on it.106 Shaltut considers it to be an important factor 
in Islamic law, something which any ijmac or ijtihad must take 
into account.107 For him, this is a natural principle arising 
from the need of the law to adapt to changing conditions, but he 
does not use technical terms such as masalih mursala (textually 
unrevealed benefits) or the MalikT term istislah or the Hanafi 
istihsan. The medieval jurists may have felt the need for such 
terms and definitions in order to defend their use of such things 
which may not have been strictly within the order of things as 
laid down by al-ShaficT, but in the modern age, the need for such 
a principle is universally recognised, for without it Islamic law 
would be unable to meet the challenges it faces in the twentieth 
century.
Thus there is now no need for any narrow definition of such a 
concept. In Shaltut's usage, it is rather the general concept of 
benefit, as embodied in the legal principles of the last section, 
and in fact the word "maslaha" occurs in some of the passages we
106Kerr, op. cit., pp. 55-6; while we agree with Kerr that 
this concept has been used to emphasise the dynamism and humanism 
of the Sharica, the statement that modernists have "seized upon" 
it is perhaps unfair; after all it is a perfectly natural 
principle of legislation, and the religion of Islam is
unquestionably intended to promote man's welfare.
107 See Min Tawjihat al-Islam, p. 74, cAqida wa~Sharica, p. 
546, Min Huda al-Qur'an, p. 249, and Fatawa, pp. 44-45.
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referred to there.108 Even where the word is not used it is often 
implied; for example, brokerage is considered licit because it 
provides a useful service, i.e. it is in the public interest.109 
Perhaps the main difference between maslaha and the legal 
principles for the prevention of harm and the promotion of 
benefit is that maslaha usually concerns the umma as a whole,110 
whereas the principles more often involve the interests of 
individuals.
Empirical evidence
Since nature is part of God's creation, and the Qur'an 
repeatedly calls Muslims to contemplate and learn from natural 
phenomena, it is considered that law can be revealed implicitly 
in nature, and no rigid distinction need be drawn between divine 
and natural law. Shaltut is therefore not averse to appealing to 
such things as medical evidence, or the natural order of things, 
or even to human nature, although these things are usually cited 
in a corroborative capacity rather than as sole evidence for a 
ruling.
In the case of medical evidence, this is usually concerning 
matters which are widely accepted, such as the dangers of 
alchoholism, or the fact that the man's sperm possesses the
10BFatawa, pp. 355 and 297.
109 Ibid., p. 356.
,10In addition to the above examples see Min Taw.jihat al­
ls 1 am , pp. 74, 563 and 565.
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attributes of life.111 In such cases it would not be deemed 
necessary to give an authority, but where he claims more 
controversially that the uncircumcised man is more liable to 
cancer and "other fatal diseases", or that it has been "medically 
proven" that carrion, blood and pork are harmful to one's health, 
he would perhaps have done better to give some medical authority 
for this.112
Shaltut recognises natural laws when he maintains that those 
who use the Qur'an as a charm and a cure for ills are ignoring 
the laws of cause and effect, and thereby abusing the Book, which 
was sent down to heal spiritual ailments rather than physical 
ones, and neglecting the true means to bodily health.113
Shaltut feels that since it is God who has ordained the 
natural order of things, this should not be disturbed without 
good reason; since it is in the nature of life to continually 
grow and expand, and we have been given the ability to procreate, 
mass birth control imposed by governments goes against that 
nature and is therefore unacceptable.114 Even on the individual 
level, the natural processes of fertility and procreation should 
not be disturbed without good reason.115
111Fatawa, pp. 371-72 and 291 respectively.
112Ibid., pp. 333 and 386 respectively.
113 Ibid., pp. 207-8.
114 Ibid., p. 295.
115cAgida wa-Sharica , p. 207.
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We will observe in Chapter Four Shaltut's concept of the 
essential dignity and goodness of human nature; in view of the 
complex nature of human relations as opposed to those of animals, 
and the way we are grouped (on the basis of marriage) into 
families, tribes and communities, he considers artificial 
insemination by donor to be derogatory to man's dignity.116
Since man instinctively knows what is right and good, the very 
fact that something is surrounded by secrecy or feelings of 
shame, as in the case of tah111, is enough to indicate that it is 
haram; similarly with secret marriage, which is a source of 
anxiety and fear for the couple rather than of mercy and peace as 
marriage is meant to be.117 The pleasure which man takes in 
listening to music can only be an innocent one, since it is part 
of human nature to be attracted to pleasant things; therefore, 
music cannot be haram in itself.118 Ultimately, it is human 
nature which bears witness to the sacredness of human life and 
the gravity of the crime of homicide.119
116Fatawa, p. 327.
117Ibid., pp. 317 and 269-70 respectively.
118Ibi1d., p. 410; Shaltut it seems would prefer to rely here 
solely on the dictates of instinct and common sense, but 
reluctantly gives some account of the jurists' opinions in order
to satisfy the reader (pp. 412-14). This approach contrasts 
strongly with that of Rashid Rida, who lists at great length the 
ahadith for and against listening to music and the various 
opinions on the subject - see his FatdwS, Beirut: Dar al-Kitab 
al-Jadid, 1970-, 2:470-93.
119Fatawa, p. 416.
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b) The Characteristics of Shaltut's Fatwas
i) Al-war z
Alongside the scholarly content, there is a large sermonising 
element in Shaltut's fatwas, especially when we compare them with 
other collections of fatwas. Some of these simply provide the 
various opinions of the madhahib or leading classical jurists 
without attempting to evaluate those opinions or choose between 
them.120 Even Rashid Rida's fatwas are generally terse in style. 
The closest thing in style to Shaltut's fatwas is not to be found 
in fatwa collections but in less specialised works on Islam, or 
in articles in Majallat al-Azhar, for example. In fact this style
is no doubt partly due to Shaltut's position within the Azhar;
having a prominent public role, he would be expected to take 
every opportunity to exhort people to good and dissuade them from 
evil' In any case it is common in Islam, where scholarship and 
piety go hand in hand, to find a certain amount of wacz even in 
specialist works.121
It is this strong wac z element which accounts for the
similarity in style between Shaltut's fatwas, tafsir and general 
religious writings. It is part of the effort to reach a wider 
audience, not just on general aspects of Islam but in areas which 
are often considered specialised, like figh and tafsir. His legal
120Cf. e.g. the collection of fatwas by H.M. Makhluf, former 
Mufti of "al-Diyar al-Misriyya", entitled Fatawa Sharciyya.
12!See e.g. cAli Hasab Allah, op. cit., p. 39, where,
discussing the Qur'an as a source of legislation the author 
exhorts anyone who wishes to profit from the Qur'an to "make it 
his intimate companion" etc.
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writings are firmly placed in their moral context, and in this 
Shaltut has the Qur'an as a precedent, which as he points out 
does not neglect the element of wac z in its legal rulings.122
Shaltut's sermonising tendencies are most in evidence when he 
is discussing matters about which he feels strongly, such as 
superstitions and bidac . We see this on the subjects of tasha'urn 
(taking things as evil omens), the saints' birthdays, abuses of 
the Qur’an, the belief in corpses that fly with their biers, 
certain funereal traditions, the superstition about marriage in 
the month of Muharram, and so on.123 Another area which provokes 
this tendency is the abuse of the law, as in the questions of 
tahlil and fathers' abuse of the inheritance laws.124
In several of these passages we can clearly see his use of 
emotive language or vivid description, and of rhetorical devices 
to achieve greater effect. In the last-mentioned passage, he 
talks about the importance of the father-son relationship for 
society as a whole,125 and uses strong language to condemn those 
who deprive their sons of their rightful inheritance: "...and by 
this immoral action they corrupt their families and destroy their 
houses, because of a vain desire or an immoral whim..."126 In
122cAgida wa-Sharica, pp. 486 and 196.
123 See Fatawa, pp. 29-32, 193-94, 207-9, 200-1, 214 and
262ff. respectively.
124 Ibid., pp. 301-3 and 336-41 respectively.
125 Ibid., p. 336
]26Ibid., p. 338.
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addition to this, his fourfold repetition of the phrase "tasarruf 
sayyi’ mahzur"127 and his portrayal of the plight of the helpless 
daughter who has been disinherited, or the son who sees his
brother or even a more distant relative receive his own rightful 
inheritance,120 illustrate the ways in which Shaltut lends 
emphasis to his point and expresses the strength of his feelings.
Again, on the subject of the birthdays of the saints (mawalid
al-mashayikh), he gives a vivid description of the undignified
hustle and bustle surrounding the departure for these
occasions,129 and of the characters one might find at such
festive gatherings:
...you may even see parties of gamblers nearby 
parties of alchoholics and drug addicts
(mudminun), and next to these might be those 
performing the dhikr, and various dissolute 
characters, and dancers male and female, and among 
all these will rove beggars and pickpockets.130
It seems that Shaltut occasionally allows himself to be
carried away by the strength of his feelings into the realm of
exaggeration, as where he laments the abuse of the permission to
marry the women from ahl al-kitab:
Often has a Christian or Jewish wife, living in a 
Muslim country and enjoying the benefits of life 
there under the auspices of a naive Muslim 
husband, served her own country or government,
127Ibid., p. 339.
128Ibid., p. 341.
129Ibid., p. 193.
130Ibid., p. 194; in order to fully appreciate his style the 
original Arabic should be consulted, as he names each category in 
the masculine and the feminine gender.
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deceiving her husband and using him as a means to 
inflict disaster on his country and to give her 
own country a foothold in it.131
Sometimes he will enter into a declamatory passage (which
often forms a digression from the subject in hand) quite
consciously and deliberately, under an indicative heading such as 
"NasTha li'l-azwaj" or "Kalimatgn", or preface a passage with a 
phrase such as "ayyuha'1-muslimun";13 2 at other times the 
transition may be more abrupt, as where he breaks off from his 
scholarly discussion on the question of rafc cIsa to lament the 
reliance upon weak ahadith about Jesus on the part of certain 
unscrupulous scholars.133
In the course of his fatwas Shaltut often exhorts not only 
Muslims in general but those in authority to take action on 
certain matters, for example to put an end to the abuse of the 
inheritance laws or the abuses of the saints' birthdays, or to
ban smoking.13,1 This kind of direct exhortation is more
characteristic of sermons and oratory than of fatwas; one should 
not forget that some of these fatwas were originally broadcast on 
radio.
Another respect in which Shaltut*s fatwas sometimes resemble 
sermons is the tendency to dwell on general aspects of the 
Sharica or of Islam; this can be seen from a glance through his
131 Ibid., p. 280.
132See ibid., pp. 298, 243 and 299 respectively.
133 Ibid., pp. 77-78, beginning: "Wa-innahu la-yu*sifuni..."
134Ibid., pp. 340-41, 194 and 385 respectively.
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section on "Blameworthy innovation (al-ibtidac al-madhmum) in 
Islam", where the subheadings include "The essential elements of 
worship", "The word bidca in our society", "The universal human 
identity of Muslims", and "The unique individual identity of
Muslims".133 Elsewhere we find such headings as "Islam's concern 
with cleanliness (tahara) ", "The importance of the _iumc a prayer 
in Islam", and several headings beginning "Al-hikma fi..." or 
"Hikma...", which treat of such things as prostration, the 
prescription of expiation in general or of fasting as an
expiation, and sadagat al-fitr.136 As we indicated in Chapter 
Two, Shaltut considers drawing attention to the reasons behind 
things and the general nature of the Sharica to be an essential 
part of dacwa.
Shaltut's idealism finds ample expression in the mode of wac z , 
for the preacher must always exhort people to aim high; and if at 
times Shaltut seems idealist to the point of being simplistic, 
this is part of his policy of expecting the best of people, so
that they may live up to one's expectations rather than down to
them. Some remarks may sound naive or platitudinous, but we have 
no reason to doubt his sincerity.137
Perhaps the feature of his fatwas which is most of all 
reminiscent of the sermon is the ending, for there, more often
133lM_d., pp. 178-87.
136 Ibid., pp. 86, 96, 110, 249, 151 and 155 respectively.
137See, e.g., cAgida wa-Sharica , p. 214: "wa cala cuqala'
al-umma...", and p. 216: "wa-inni la-arju an nara qariban...",
and Fatawa, p. 355: "Wa-law anna al-umam al-Islamiyya— "
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than not, we find a sort of post-script, often introduced by 
words like "amma bacdu", whether it be a pious hope,138 an 
admonition,139 a simple summary140 or a reminder of the most 
important points in the fatwa,141 or a mixture of two or more of 
these.1 4 2
ii) Observance of the inner reality
Islamic law does not limit itself to external forms, and 
Shaltut does not fail to point out wherever necessary the
importance of intentions. Reformers before him stressed the 
importance of the right spirit and intention in acts of worship, 
for example, where the mere observance of external forms is not 
considered sufficient. Shaltut hints at the legal import of this 
when he states that he who fasts but omits the prayer cannot be 
fasting for the right reason, i.e. in obedience to God's command, 
for if he obeyed God he would perform the prayer.143
It has always been the case that the legal status of a
particular action can vary according to circumstances or the 
intention behind it. Even the acts of worship can be haram under
138E.g. Fatawa, pp. 186-87.
139E.g. ibid., pp. 27, 201 and 434.
140E.g. ibid., p. 65.
141E.g. ibid., pp. 20 and 163.
142E.g. ibid., pp. 35-36.
14 3 Ibid., p. 159.
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certain circumstances, for example where the performance of them
represents a threat to health or life.144
In Shaltut's "Fatawa", we read that a woman's jewellery is 
subject to zakah if it represents an investment, and this is the 
case even if she wears it to avoid losing it, whereas if she 
wears it as an adornment it is not subject to zakah;145 the 
visiting of graves, normally halal, becomes haram if the 
intention is to indulge or increase one's sorrow;146 and the hill 
or hurma of kissing the hands of culama' and others depends on 
the motive behind it.147 In the case of land which has been 
pledged, the creditor may exploit such land only if permission 
was freely given by the debtor, with no kind of pressure 
whatsoever.148 We should point out that none of these opinions 
represents a radical departure from classical fiqh or a 
concession to the modern age.
Such legislation depends to a large extent on the integrity of 
the individual, who alone knows his own intentions, for a divine 
law appeals above all to people's consciences and does not limit
itself to external behaviour, or acknowledge any barrier between
law and morality. For Shaltut, this is part of the Sharica's 
wholeness and perfection, for a law which does not take people's
3 4 4 Ibid., p. 384.
14 5 Ibid., p. 120.
146Ibid., p. 221.
147Ibid., pp. 224-26.
148 Ibid., pp. 345-46.
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consciences into account is a cynical law which provokes a
cynical response.149
iii) Shaltut as scholar and .jurist
ln "Al-Fatawa", alongside the preacher, we find the scholar 
and jurist, for although Shaltut is writing for an audience of 
lay-Muslims and generally avoids the use of technical terms and 
concepts, it is inevitable that his training as a faqTh should be 
apparent in his fatwas.
This training becomes most evident in his more polemical 
writings, as for example in his discussion of rafc cIsa, where he 
has to reply to his opponents' arguments. We have already 
described some of his methods here, such as jarh wa-tacdTl and 
close textual analysis. He also has recourse to the science of 
usul, discussing for example the different kinds of dalil
i
(evidence), in order to clarify those sources upon which creed
depends,150 or when he discusses the probative validity
(hujjiyya) of ijmac in relation to matters of the unseen.151 In 
order to refute the idea that the pronoun in "innahu la~cilmun 
li1l-sar a" (Qur'an 43:61) refers to the descent of Jesus at the
149Min Tawjihat al-Islam, p . 15.
1 5 0 pp. 66-67; he again refers to the necessity of
"qatciyyat al-dalala", with regard to establishing "hurma", on 
p. 388.
151 Ibid., p. 79.
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end of the world, Shaltut resorts to technical linguistic 
concepts.15 2
In this section, too, Shaltut uses all his polemical and 
dialectical skills, for example taking his opponents' arguments 
to their logical conclusions in order to ridicule them, as where 
he says that if the description of Jesus as one of the muqarrabun 
means that he was physically raised up to be near God, then there 
must be many others up there besides Jesus.153 Elsewhere he
points out the circular reasoning of his opponents, who when 
dealing with the Quranic text maintain that the hadith of the 
micraj shows that the rafc in the Qur'an is a physical one, and 
when dealing with the hadith of the micraj, maintain that the 
Quranic text shows that the micra.i was physical, not just
spiritual.15 4
Having shown that ijmac can have no authority in matters of
the unseen, Shaltut takes the argument a step further when he
says that even if ijmac were to be accepted as an appropriate 
authority for the signs of the Sac a (Last Hour), this would not 
alter the fact that there has always been disagreement (i.e. an 
absence of ijmac) on the question of the descent of Jesus.155
152 Ibid., p. 76: "...al-hukm idha usnida fi'l-lafz ila al-
dh£t..." etc.
153Ibid., p. 69; for other examples where he takes matters
to their logical conclusions see pp. 229 ("Wa-nahnu law..."),
302-3 and 173 ("Wa-innana law abahna...").
154Ibid., p. 62.
15 5 Ibid., pp. 79-80.
195
Shaltut again brings his powers of argument to bear on the 
phrase "wa-innahu la cilmun li'l-saca, fa-la tamtarunna bi-h5", 
showing how it would be illogical to use something which was 
itself an object of doubt (i.e. the descent of Jesus at the end 
of the world) in order to remove another doubt (about the reality 
of the resurrection).156
It is in lengthy and detailed discussions like that of rafc 
cIsa that Shaltut often quotes the opinions of various jurists; 
there he quotes the opinions of Ibn Jarir (al-Tabari), Ibn Hazm, 
Al-QadT cIyad, al-Sacd, Muhammad cAbduh, Rashid Rida and al- 
Maraghi, in order to show that there has never been unanimity on 
this subject.157 In his discussion on birth control, he refers to 
various opinions including those of al-Ghazali, the Hanafi 
school, and sometimes simply "al-fuqaha111 or "al-culama’",158 
Other areas where he deems it appropriate to discuss the opinions 
of the jurists or madhahib include holding the Friday prayer 
before noon, the status of one who omits the obligatory acts of 
worship, and the pawning of plots of land (rahn al-atyan).159 In 
more straightforward matters Shaltut will often simply quote an 
authority such as al-Alusi or al-Razi in support of his own 
views.160
15 6 Ibid., p . 75.
157 See ibid., pp. 71ff. and 80-81.
15BcAqida wa-Sharica, pp. 200, 201-2, 210 and 212.
159Fatawa, pp. 92-95, 161-63 and 344-47 respectively.
160See e.g. ibid., pp. 41, 55 and 128-29.
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iv) Conservatism and caution
In spite of the importance attached to intentions and 
underlying reasons, we occasionally find Shaltut somewhat 
formalistic; and in spite of the importance attached to the 
principle of yusr and his general inclination to lenience, we 
sometimes find him surprisingly strict. Thirdly, in spite of the 
avowed right of ijtihad and non-adherence to the schools of law,
we sometimes find him reluctant to depart from the schools, or
indeed from Egyptian law, altogether, even though his own opinion 
differs slightly from them.
For example, in the case of one who breaks his fast too early 
(or begins it too late) in the mistaken belief that the sun has 
set (or has not yet risen), Shaltut maintains that this entails 
gada' (a repetition of the fast on another day), in spite of the 
ruling that he who eats or drinks forgetfully does not break the 
fast. Shaltut maintains that in this case, the faster actually
ate or drank intentionally (camdan) during the time of fasting.
We feel that he is drawing a superficial distinction here, since 
the faster evidently did not intend to break his fast.161
Having thus inclined to a stricter view than usual, he then 
proceeds to take a lenient view of the question of injections 
during fasting; he maintains that no type of injection, anal or 
otherwise, breaks the fast, even if it reaches the intestines, 
since the substance does not enter the body by the normal
161Fatawa, p. 136.
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channels or pass through the stomach.162 Rashid Rida and H.M.
Makhluf, on the other hand, both point out that some types of
injection may have the effect of nourishing and invigorating the
body, thus fulfilling the function of food and drink, and should
therefore be considered to break the fast.163 The latter view
would appear to take account of the inner reality rather than the
outer form, although Shaltut is clearly influenced by a desire to
make things easier for the fasters and to dissuade Muslims from
being preoccupied with such details, for the observance of the
spirit of the fast
..raises the soul above such preoccupations as to 
whether things like this break the fast or do not 
break it, and protects the faster from having 
doubts as to the validity of his fast, for the 
fasting which God desires, and upon which, 
according to the Qur'an, true piety depends, is 
not a subject of doubt and obscurity as one would 
imagine from the behaviour of fasters and 
muftis ...16 ^
Thus the apparently formalistic view of injections is in fact
inspired by the desire that people should pay more attention to
the essentials of their religion rather than the formalities. In 
this passage we can almost see the preacher and the missionary in 
Shaltut overcoming the fagih - something one would not normally 
witness in a book of figh or fatwas.
162Ibid., pp. 136-37.
163 See Rashid Rida, op. cit., 5:2123-24 and Hasanayn 
Muhammad Makhluf, Fatawa Sharciyya, 2nd ed., Cairo: Mustafi al~
Bab! al-Halabi, 1965, 1:311-12.
16<tFatawa. , p. 137.
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There are certain subjects on which Shaltut appears to be 
uncharacteristically strict, and this is most often where he is 
influenced by the abuses he witnesses in his own environment and 
his fervent desire to put an end to them. This is the case where 
he discusses the causes to which zakah and sadaqa should be 
devoted, and maintains that the Quranic category of "gharimin" 
(debtors) is no longer applicable, because in his opinion the 
only debtors which exist nowadays are those who have incurred 
debts as a result of immorality or reprehensible behaviour, such 
as drinking and gambling.165
Similarly in the case of Muslim men who marry European women 
for the wrong reasons, and allow their children to be brought up 
as Christians, Shaltut believes that where such abuse becomes 
widespread a government should if necessary ban such marriages 
altogether, even though this would mean prohibiting (albeit 
temporarily) something which is explicity permitted in the 
Qur'an.1 66
In the case of repudiation and divorce, it is understandable 
that Shaltut should wish to be as strict as possible in view of 
the widespread abuse of the divorce laws, but also because it is 
not actually in the interests of the couples concerned to obtain 
an easy divorce.167 By applying the strictest criteria as to such
165Ibid., p. 118; he does not insist on this point 
elsewhere, however - see cAgida wa-Sharica, p. 100, where he 
appears to accept this category.
166Fatawa, pp. 279-80.
167 Ibid., p. 311.
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things as intention, pronouncement on separate occasions and 
during the tuhr (when the woman is not menstruating) etc.,168 
Shaltut could therefore be said to be observing the public 
interest.
Sometimes when giving fatwas, Shaltut does not feel it 
appropriate to enforce his own personal view where the weight of 
authority seems to support a different opinion, so he resorts to 
takhayyur (the selection of an opinion from among the madhahib) 
rather than suggesting a complete departure from the madhahib. In 
his discussion of the amount of ridac which entails tahrim, 
Shaltut makes it clear that he does not believe it is a question 
of any particular number of occasions, but laying stress on the 
Quranic use of the word "ummahat", maintains that the ridac 
should continue for such a time as is sufficient for the foster- 
mother to have real maternal feelings for the infant.169 In his 
final summing up, however, he compromises by choosing the most 
lenient opinion from among the schools of law, in this case the 
Shafici opinion that five or more radacat entail tahrTm.170 This 
may be partly due to the difficulty of legislating on the basis 
of such an intangible thing as maternal feelings, but probably 
also represents a reluctance to go against widely held opinions 
and thus contribute to the confusion which may be caused by 
contradictory rulings.
J 6 8 Ibid., p. 310.
169Ibid., p. 284.
170 Ibid., pp. 285-86.
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Similarly on the question of conditional repudiation (talaq 
mucallaq), Shaltut evidently feels that it should be invalid 
regardless of the intention behind it,171 but under the heading
"The legal opinion we choose to give as a fatwa", he compromises
by saying that conditional repudiation is invalid "so long as the 
intention is to frighten or threaten, and not to actually
repudiate",172 thus avoiding direct disagreement with the current 
Egyptian law, and with "many scholars of all ages".173
Of course, a certain amount of "conservatism" is essential, 
for no responsible faqih would disregard the accumulated wisdom 
of fourteen centuries of scholarship; indeed any scholarly 
tradition necessarily relies on what has gone before. Those who 
call for ijtihad in the modern age are not usually calling for a 
totally new departure, but are in fact more concerned to refute 
the concept of taglid - the idea that Muslims are bound by the 
opinions of any particular jurist or group of jurists. In
practice, the area in which ijtihad is most needed and applied is 
on those matters which are specific to the modern age and which 
were therefore not dealt with in classical fiqh. Shaltut has a 
great respect for classical Islamic scholarship, and accordingly 
quotes opinions of various jurists and madhahib wherever 
appropriate.
171 Ibid., p. 300.
172Ibid., p. 306.
173 Ibid., p. 300.
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Like Muslim scholars before him, Shaltut believes that the 
practice of the sahaba, the generation closest to the Prophet, 
has a special value, and he sometimes cites it as evidence for or 
against particular practices. The Muslim ruler's right to impose 
zakah by force if necessary is witnessed by the wars of the ridda 
under Abu Bakr;174 the fact that the Companions built a high wall 
around the Prophet's grave, in order to avoid seeing it from the 
mosque and in effect praying to it, demonstrates the hurma of 
praying in or to saints' tombs;173 and since the Companions and 
later generations (and of course the Prophet himself) freely 
practiced polygamy, Muslim modernists should not try to maintain 
that it is prohibited or only permitted on certain conditions.176
The importance attached to the practice of the early Muslims 
("al-salaf al-salih") is considered to be one aspect of the 
modern-day desire to purify Islam from later accretions, but as 
we have seen in Chapter Two, where we found that the Companions 
were often accorded a special authority in tafsir, Muslim 
scholars of all ages have always had reference to the practice 
and opinions of the Companions for obvious reasons.
Summary
1 741_bid. , p. 116.
173Ibid., pp. 104-5.
176r Agida wa-Sharica, pp. 183-84; for other examples see
Fatawa, pp. 200, 204, 216 and 391.
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Thus in Shaltut’s fatwas we see many interweaving threads, as 
he strikes a balance between the faqih and the wac iz, and
maintains a tension between qualities which may appear 
paradoxical. Although he is a mufti he encourages people to look 
to their own consciences instead of relying too much on
fatwas;177 generally inclined to lenience, he is uncompromising 
and strict on certain matters, and while usually having regard 
for the essence and intention, he occasionally appears 
formalistic. His idealist outlook and emphasis on general points 
does not prevent him from occasionally making specific 
suggestions of a practical nature.178 Inconsistencies are rare, 
however, and the whole is tempered by Shaltut's training and 
sobriety so that the element of subjectivity does not appear 
intrusive, but his work may be said to represent an appropriate 
continuation of Islamic scholarship into the modern age.
3) Penal Law
The bulk of ”cAqida wa-Sharica" is taken up by the middle
section on the Sharica, which divides the Sharica into 
categories. Of these, penal law is the longest section and the 
most concentrated as regards scholarly content, containing 
discussion of many specific legal points and of the differing
177Fatawa, p. 143.
178 See ibid., pp. 123-24, where he makes a suggestion about 
the collection and distribution of zakah, and p. 174, where he 
suggests ways of dealing with the problem of the accumulation of 
rotting meat at Mina during the haii season.
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views of the jurists concerning them, and detailed examination of 
the sources.
The chapter on penal law is divided into three parts: "The 
methods and aims of the Sharica in establishing penal law", "The 
crime of homicide in Islam and in other laws", and "The rulings 
on homicide and qisas contained in the Qur'an and the Sunna". In 
the first part Shaltut sets out to give an overview of Islamic 
penal law, describing the different types of punishment and their 
characteristics; the second part is of a general nature, 
consisting of a straightforward comparison between the Islamic 
method of dealing with homicide and that of other societies; the 
third part is the longest and the most detailed, containing an 
analysis of the relevant sources, and accordingly will receive 
more attention. We aim to take into account all parts in order to 
illustrate Shaltut's overall approach, but to treat the more 
complex issues in greater depth.
a) Methods and Aims of the Sharica in its Penal Law
Shaltut begins by referring to the threat of other worldly 
punishment as an important deterrent to the potential 
transgressor, especially regarding those things which often go 
undetected and therefore unpunished in this world, such as the 
moral crimes of lying, slander etc.179 As regards worldly 
punishments, these are divided into nassiyya (those which are
179cAgida wa-Sharica, p. 279.
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laid down in the texts, i.e. the hudud) and tafwidiyya (those 
whose legislation is left to man's discretion).180
i) Hudud
The hudud have been laid down as punishments for the most 
serious crimes which involve violating one of the five 
"essentials": religion, life, reason, honour and property,101 to 
which a sixth is added, law and order.
Shaltut deals with the individual hadd crimes only briefly, 
citing the text upon which the legislation is based and often 
selecting specific aspects which have given rise to difference of 
opinion among jurists, such as, on the subject of zina (illicit 
sexual relations), whether Qur'an 24:2, which prescribes that the 
adulterer should be given a hundred lashes, abrogates 4:15-16, 
which states that women who commit fornication should be confined 
to their houses, and men who do so should be "punished" ("f a- 
adhuhum") or whether the latter verses refer to a different 
category of zina, e.g. homosexuality. Another question dealt with 
is whether or not the statement: "The adulterer shall marry none
save an adulteress or an idolatress "(24:3) has legislative
status.]8 2
In most of these discussions Shaltut simply states the 
different opinions without passing judgement on them or offering
180Ibid., p. 280.
1B1See Khallaf, op. cit., p. 200.
182cAgida wa-Sharica, pp. 281-82 and 283-84 respectively.
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his own opinion. On the question of apostasy, however, Shaltut 
feels bound to support the view that the hadd penalty is 
inappropriate, since it is based on a hadith ahad, which is
• i
considered by many to be insufficient evidence to establish a 
hadd crime; he adds that it is only waging war on the Muslims and 
Islam which justifies bloodshed, not mere kufr, and ends by 
quoting Quranic verses which show that there can be no compulsion 
in religion.183 Again, in the case of wine-drinking, in view of 
the differences of opinion among the classical scholars, Shaltut 
opines that the punishment in this case comes under the heading 
of tac zir (discretionary punishment) rather than hudud.18<1
Sometimes Shaltut merely mentions the existence of certain 
questions with which the scholars have dealt, such as whether the 
penalty for apostasy applies to women or followers of religions 
other than Islam, and whether the apostate should be given a 
chance to repent; or on the subject of theft, the minimum amount 
for which the hadd penalty may be exacted, whether compensation 
is payable in addition to the exaction of the hadd penalty, 
methods of executing the hadd, and whether repentance causes the 
hadd to be waived.185
Shaltut follows this brief and selective survey of the 
individual hudud with some general points concerning them. He 
points out that the hadd penalties are for crimes which
18 3Ibid., p. 281.
184 Ibid., p. 287.
185 Ibid., pp. 281 and 286 .
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principally violate the "rights of God", i.e. crimes against 
society as a whole, while crimes against the individual, which 
principally violate the "rights of man", are punishable under the 
system of gisas.1B6
This leads him to discuss the differences between the hudud 
and gisas. As regards the hudud, procedure is generally stricter 
than in gisas; judgement in the latter case can be on the basis 
of the judge's own knowledge, or on the basis of the testimony of 
a dumb man (i.e. by gestures or by writing) - evidence which is 
inadmissible in the case of the hudud. There is no time limit for 
prosecution in gisas, unlike the hudud (with the exception of 
qadhf). In gisas, punishment can be waived by a pardon from the 
victim or his next of kin, the obligation to pay diya (blood-wit) 
is heritable, and intercession is permitted, while none of these 
are possible in hudud. A further difference is that in gisas 
there must be a plaintiff.187
ii) Tarzir
In his short section on al-cuqubat al-tafwldiyya (punishment 
which is left to man's discretion), Shaltut points out that this 
kind of punishment is for those cases where the hadd punishment 
cannot be applied due to a failure to fulfil all the stringent 
conditions as regards witnesses etc., as well as for non-hadd
186Ibid., p. 288.
187Ibid., pp. 288-89.
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crimes.188 After quoting Ibn Qayyim to show that taczir has 
always been an accepted phenomenon, and was applied by the 
Prophet and the Companions as a necessary complement to the 
hudud. Shaltut selects two specific points for discussion: can 
the tar zir exceed the hadd penalty for a given crime, and are 
fines or confiscation of property (akdh al-mal) a valid form of 
punishment?
In the first question Shaltut quotes various opinions all 
supporting an affirmative answer: the Malikis claim that the
hadith restricting punishment to ten lashes except in the hudud 
was applicable only in the Prophet's time, while the Hanafis 
believe that certain non-hadd crimes deserve the death penalty. 
Some early authorities, including cUmar ibn cAbd al-cAziz, 
maintain that people should be punished according to the gravity 
of their crime, regardless of the hudud penalties, and Shaltut 
recommends this view as being in accordance with the public 
interest.189 In the second question Shaltut again quotes only
opinions in support of the affirmative view, including that of
Ibn Qayyim, who relates that the Prophet sometimes confiscated 
booty as a punishment, and decreed that the withholder of zakah 
should have part of his property expropriated. Summing up,
Shaltut says that there are no limits on the nature or quantity
of discretionary punishments, providing always that justice is 
observed and that the appropriate people are consulted, and that
18B!hi<I., p. 291.
189 Ibid., p. 293.
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therefore there is scope for a sophisticated criminal law in 
Islam.190
iii) The aim of the Sharica in establishing punishment
In this section Shaltut aims to bring out the harmonious 
nature of Islamic penal law and the wisdom that lies behind it.
He does this in various ways. Firstly, he highlights the 
necessity for worldly punishment; despite the existence of the 
religious sanction, many people's faith is weak and they are 
vulnerable to temptation. Society as a whole needs to be 
protected from crime and corruption, which spread like germs if 
left unchecked.195 No society, even an Islamic one, can ever be 
wholly free from evil, so worldly punishment is a perennial 
necessity.192
Having established this, Shaltut points out that Islamic penal 
law must be taken in the context of Islamic society as a whole. 
Islam aims to prevent crime by various methods, encouraging a
sense of social responsibility in the individual and urging him
to undertake profitable work; Muslims are encouraged to exhort 
one another to do good and to avoid evil, and Islam aims to
establish justice, giving help to the poor and needy, so that
noone need be forced to turn to crime. Therefore worldly
190 Ibid., pp. 294-95.
191 Ibid., p. 295.
192 Ibid., p. 298.
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punishment is only a last resort where all else, including the 
threat of divine punishment, has failed.193
Even where punishment is warranted, it may lapse due to cafw 
(pardon) in individual cases or due to repentance in crimes 
against society; in the latter case Shaltut again inclines to the 
more lenient view. Here he quotes with approval Ibn Qayyim, who 
argues against those who maintain that repentance can only 
exclude punishment in cases where a muharib (one who wages war on 
the Muslims or Islam) gives himself up and repents before he is 
overpowered, saying that if repentance can have this effect in 
the most serious of crimes, then it should even more 
appropriately do so in other crimes.194
Shaltut ends this section with a description of the Sharica in 
its penal law, comparing it to a skilful doctor who, having 
attempted a cure by all other means, sees that the life of the 
patient must be saved by amputating a limb, or to a captain who 
realises that some things must be thrown overboard to save the 
ship from sinking. 195
19 3 Ibid., pp. 296-98; modernists have pointed out the 
inappropriateness of enforcing hadd penalties in the absence of 
the total application of the Sharica, which would ensure social 
justice - see M . Cherif Bassiouni, (ed.), The Islamic Criminal 
Justice System, New York: Oceana Publications, 1982, p. 5, and J.
Donohue and J. Esposito, (eds.), Islam in Transition: Muslim 
perspectives, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 239, in 
an article by Najib Mahfuz.
3 9 4 Ibid., pp. 299-301.
19 5 Ibid., p. 302.
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b) The Crime of Homicide in Islam and in Other Laws
In order to show that murder has always been regarded as a 
heinous crime from which human nature recoils, Shaltut refers to 
the first murder ever committed, that of Abel by his brother Cain 
as related in the Qur'an, where there is mention of Cain's 
hesitation before the crime and regret after it.196 Secondly, 
Shaltut describes the Jewish law, where retaliation is prescribed 
and Jews are exhorted to have no pity on the offender, so that 
there is no possibility of pardon.197 Thirdly, in the gospel, 
Christians are exhorted to "turn the other cheek", and this 
represents a lenient attitude towards criminals, which would 
exclude the possibility of imposing the death penalty on 
murderers. However, Shaltut agrees with Muhammad cAbduh that the 
Jewish law was not in fact abrogated by the gospel, Jesus himself 
having said: "I have come not to abrogate the law but to complete 
it".198 Fourthly, in Roman law the punishment differed according 
to the social status of the culprit.199 Finally, the pre-Islamic 
Arabs had a system of gisas, but due to tribal fanaticism the 
system was abused, aggrieved parties often demanding excessive 
retaliation, so that blood feuds ensued.200
19 6 Ibid., p . 304.
197Ibid., p. 305.
198 Ibid., pp. 306-7.
199 Ibid., pp. 307-8.
200 Ibid., pp. 308-9.
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Thus the Islamic law may be favourably compared with all
these, rectifying the undue harshness of Jewish law, the extreme 
lenience (by some Christian interpretations) of the gospel, the 
injustices of Roman law and the excesses of pre-Islamic 
practice.201
Shaltut then proceeds to enumerate the basic principles which 
Islam established in this regard: it established the death
penalty as a punishment for the crime of murder, it gave the
aggrieved party the choice of pardon or gisas, it made everyone 
equal in this regard, any human life being worth any other human 
life regardless of social status, it stipulated that gisas should 
be exacted from the criminal alone, and gave the right of pardon 
to the victim's next of kin (i.e. the wall al-dam, the person(s)
who has the right to prosecute) rather than to the ruler, as in
Roman law and most modern laws.202 Shaltut highlights the wisdom 
of the Sharica in each case, for example the establishment of the 
death penalty and the granting of the right of exacting it or 
waiving it to the wall al-dam are measures which actually help to 
stablise society, for in this way the wall al-dam can feel that 
justice has been done and any desire for revenge can be satisfied 
without leading to illegal actions.203
201 Ibid., p. 309.
202See subheadings in ibid., pp. 311-20.
2 0 3 Ibid., pp. 311 and 316 ff.
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c) Rulings of the Qur'an and the Sunna with regard to Homicide
and Qisas
In this section Shaltut arranges and deals with the texts of 
the Qur'an and the Sunna according to their subject matter and 
legislative function. In view of the length of this section we 
will put aside some of the minor points dealt with in order to 
concentrate on the longer and more detailed discussions.
i) Repentance
After reproducing the Quranic verses which mention the divine 
punishment for the crime of murder (4:93 and 25:68-70),204 
Shaltut discusses the differences of opinion concerning the 
relationship of these two passages to one another. Both passages 
describe a grevious other-worldly punishment, but only the latter 
passage mentions the possible mitigating effect of repentance 
("...except those who repent and believe and do good works..."). 
Some have claimed that (25:68-70) is abrogated by (4:93), and 
that therefore the murderer's repentance is of no avail and 
cannot save him from hellfire. Shaltut, however, feels that 
(25:68-70) applies to polytheists, who may still repent and turn 
to Islam and mend their ways, while (4:93) applies to Muslims; he 
maintains that this view is supported by the particular 
phraseology of (25:68-70) which mentions three crimes, including 
that of shirk (associating partners with God), followed by three 
remedies, including that of belief in God, and by the fact that
2 0 4 Ibid., p. 323 .
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the verse immediately preceding the other verse (i.e. 4:92) 
specifically mentions believers: "It is unlawful for a believer 
to kill another believer except by mistake...".205
With regard to the relationship between repentance and divine 
forgiveness for grave sins there are three opinions: those who 
believe that repentance is of no avail and divine punishment 
inevitable; those who believe that divine punishment is 
definitely excluded by repentance and that God may even forgive 
in the absence of repentance, and those who believe that while 
repentance does entail forgiveness, forgiveness is not possible 
without it. Shaltut quotes al-Zamakhshari approvingly in support 
of the latter view, which is seen as the mean between two 
extremes.2 0 6
ii) The Quranic texts on gisas
Here again there is a need to define the relationship between 
two Quranic passages on the subject, in this case 17:33 and 
2:178-79. In order to highlight the differences between them and 
the way in which they are related to each other, Shaltut brings 
in a general description of the differences between the Meccan 
and Medinan sections of the Qur'an; while the Meccan passages are 
more concerned with general truths and individual salvation, the 
Medinan parts supply detailed legislation which is addressed to 
the Muslims as a community. In the light of these facts, the two
205Ibid., pp. 324-25.
2 06 Ibid., pp. 325-27.
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passages concerned need not be taken in isolation from each 
other, or as one abrogating the other, but can be seen to be 
complementary, the second building on the first. While the Meccan 
verse confirms that the wall al-dam has the right to demand gisas 
but should not exceed this right, the Medinan verse adds certain 
details, including the encouragement to pardon the offender and 
the entrusting of the actual execution of gisas to the whole 
community, i.e. to its representative authorities, rather than 
simply to the wall al-dam. This is implied by the opening address 
of the passage: "Oh you who believe, gisas is prescribed for
you...".207 While the Meccan passage simply aims to inspire a 
spirit of justice in the individual and to pave the way for later 
modifications, the Medinan passage actually provides the 
legislation in its final form.208
In the detailed tafsir of the two passages which follows, 
Shaltut tackles certain controversial legal issues, giving an 
overview of the various opinions.
Justifiable homicide
On the subject of what constitutes lawful killing, he 
discusses whether or not it is lawful for any member of the 
community to kill someone who has incurred the penalty of gisas 
for murder. The four schools of law all reply to this question in 
the negative, maintaining that the killer of the culprit then 
becomes subject to gisas in his turn. Only Qatada and Abu Hashim
2 07 Ibid., pp. 334-35.
2 0 8 Ibid., p. 336 .
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believe that no gisas is due because they consider that the ibaha 
(lawfulness) of the culprit's blood is absolute - i.e. he may be 
lawfully killed by anyone.209
Related tc this is the question of whether the death penalty 
for a hadd crime can be executed by an unauthorised person; in 
the case of an adulterer, for example, the majority view is that 
he is mubah al-dam, since there is no possibility of pardon here. 
Only some Shafici's feel that gisas is due as a result of such a 
killing. Here, however, Shaltut interposes his own view, which is 
that only the representative authority (wall al-amr) has the 
right to demand the execution of the hadd penalty, just as only 
the wall al-dam has the right to demand gisas. He feels it is 
inappropriate to draw an analogy between the adulterer and the 
muharib , who can lawfully be killed by any member of the Muslim 
community.210
In the case of an adulterer being caught in the act, however, 
the case is slightly different. A well-known hadith relates that 
cUmar approved of a man who killed his wife and a man upon 
finding them in bed together. Although many fugaha 'say that four 
witnesses are necessary for such an action to be lawful, 
otherwise it constitutes gadhf (an unsubstantiated accusation of 
unlawful intercourse), Shaltut maintains that the action does not 
constitute the exaction of the hadd penalty but is a kind of 
crime of passion (due to "al-ghayrat allati tushbihu al-junun")
2 09 Ibid., pp. 340-42.
2i °Ibid., pp. 341-42.
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therefore ordinary legal evidence (as opposed to that required to 
establish a hadd penalty) is sufficient in this case to establish 
whether or not the killing was lawful.211 However, this does not 
mean that it is lawful to kill even an unknown person who is 
indulging in illicit sexual relations. Some scholars may justify 
such a killing by describing it as the practical aspect of "al- 
nahy can al-munkar", but others have objected that it is only for 
the imam to go to the lengths of killing someone in this case; 
other people should restrict themselves to less drastic measures 
in order to avoid an escalation of the affair, in accordance with 
the principle of "committing the lesser of two evils".212
On the question of killing in self-defence or in defence of 
one's property, Shaltut does not agree with those who apply the 
hadith: "Whomsoever draws a sword on the Muslims may be killed 
with impunity" to cases of self-defence, since he believes that 
this hadith applies only to bughat - Muslims who collectively 
wage war on the rest of the Muslim community.213 In defence of 
one's property, one should apply only so much force as is 
necessary, killing being only a last resort. Moreoever, most 
scholars agree that the thief must be caught red-handed; if he 
reaches a place of safety with his loot it is too late to attack 
him.2!4
211 Ibid., pp. 344-45.
212Ibid., pp. 345-46.
213Ibid., pp. 342-43.
214 Ibid., pp. 343-44.
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The definition of murder and the implications thereof 
In his discussion of what constitutes murder punishable by 
death, Shaltut begins by showing that the sources stipulate that 
the killing must be both wrongful and intentional. Moreover it is 
only fitting that the ultimate punishment should be for the 
ultimate crime, which must needs be intentional.215 The legal 
definition of murder is given as: "The taking of the life of a
human being (it having been established that the person was 
indeed alive) who was not already dying, by an action which would 
normally kill, committed by a person who is responsible for his 
acts" ,216
Certain questions arise from this definition, for example, in 
the case of someone killing a person who was already dying from a 
previous fatal wound, should the first or the second assailant be 
held responsible? The majority view is that the first assailant 
is subject to gisas, since his action actually destroyed the 
victim's life, even if the process of dying was not subsequently 
allowed to take its natural course, and therefore the life could 
not be taken a second time, as it were. The ZahirTs, on the other 
hand, believe that the second assailant is to be held 
responsible, and this is based on the belief that a dying man can 
still inherit or convert to Islam, therefore he is definitely 
alive and can be killed.217 However, Shaltut points out that
215Ibid., pp. 347-48 .
216 Ibid., p. 348.
217Ibid., p. 349.
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those who hold the first view do not agree on the possibility of 
a dying man inheriting or converting to Islam. He does not in any 
case approve of the analogy between the imposition of gisas and 
the ability to inherit (which requires only life) and convert to 
Islam (which requires the ability to discriminate), nor does he 
see why such reasoning should absolve the first assailant of his 
crime. Shaltut then relates the Maliki view that when both 
assailants inflict fatal wounds, both are subject to gisas,216 
One is tempted to believe that this is Shaltut's own view, 
although he does not explicitly say so, since he relates it last 
of all as the final word, and since it accords with his views on 
the execution of justice both as retribution for the crime and as 
a deterrent to criminals.
As regards the actual method of murder, scholars have 
discussed this from the point of view of the weapon used and 
whether the culprit was the direct or indirect cause of death. 
Most scholars do not define the type of weapon which may 
constitute proof of murderous intent, since even a small stone 
can be lethal if aimed at the right spot; similarly most scholars 
acknowledge murder by "indirect" causation (tasabbub), such as 
throwing someone to wild beasts or depriving them of food and 
drink for a length of time which would normally be fatal.219 Abu 
Hanifa, on the other hand, stipulated that the weapon must be one 
which is capable of cutting or piercing (tufarriqu al-ajza' - the
21“Ibid., p. 350.
219l M d . ( pp. 351-52.
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definition is extended to include fire), otherwise deliberate 
intent could not be definitely established. Shaltut points out 
that although this definition is in accordance with the principle 
of exercising caution in establishing ibahat al-dam (i.e. of the 
defendant), it has the effect of making it easy for criminals to 
act with impunity. Moreover there is no restriction placed on the 
concept of gatl in the sources, where, in Shaltut's view, details 
as to method are omitted due to the fact that means of causing 
death vary according to time and place, and new methods are being 
constantly devised by criminals.220
It is interesting that Shaltut pauses here to deprecate 
certain harsh criticisms of Abu Hanifa on this subject; Ibn Hazm 
is particularly scornful of Abu Hanifa's opinion, which he
describes as a "scandal against Islam". Shaltut is anxious to
defend Abu Hanxfa on the grounds that he was probably only
observing the methods of murder most common in his own 
environment, and could not foresee the ingenious methods which 
were to be later invented. He further adds that it may simply 
have been an opinion of some of his pupils and wrongly attributed 
to him, and that in any case Ibn Hazm should not be so hasty to 
neglect Abu Hanifa's invaluable services to Islamic 
scholarship.221
The opinion of Abu Yusuf and al-ShaybanT is then related, 
which is that the murder may be committed by any weapon which is
2 20 Ibid., pp. 352-53 .
221 Ibid., pp. 353-54.
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intrinsically likely to kill, but tasabbub as previously 
described is not accepted. However, Shaltut prefers the view that 
where causation can be clearly established, i.e. any action which 
would normally be expected to lead to death, such as, to take an 
extreme example, pushing someone off a cliff, the case can be 
treated as murder, for otherwise criminals will take advantage of 
loopholes in the law.222
Related to these issues is the category of shibh al-camd 
(quasi-deliberate intent), a type of homicide which is recognised 
by most but not all of the jurists. Those who do recognise it see 
it as an intermediate category between deliberate intent and 
excusable homicide, i.e. it is an action committed deliberately 
but which would not normally be expected to lead to death. 
Shaltut points out that the scholars' definitions of shibh al- 
camd complement their definitions of murder as regards the weapon 
used; thus Abu Hanifa describes it as homicide involving weapons 
which do not fulfil his strict criteria, Abu Yusuf and al- 
ShaybanT regard it as murder by tasabbub, and the majority define 
it as death caused by any instrument or action which would not 
normally be lethal, such as a blow delivered to one of the less 
vulnerable areas of the body ("fi ghavri aagtal"). Malik and the 
Zahiris do not recognise shibh al-camd since they do not 
recognise the hadT*th which is normally claimed as an authority 
for this.223
2 2 2 Ibid., pp. 354-55. 
2 2 3 Ibid., pp. 355-56 .
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Aspects of gisas
In his tafsir of the Medinan verses (2:178-79), the phrase: "a 
free man for a free man, a slave for a slave and a female for a 
female" leads Shaltut to discuss the concept of equivalence 
(mumathala) in gisas (the root meaning of the word gisas itself 
being "equivalence"). Like most mufassirun, Shaltut takes this 
phrase to be a repudiation of the pre-Islamic practice whereby 
relatives of a murder victim would demand excessive retribution; 
not content to simply take the life of the murderer, they would 
often demand to take the life of a higher ranking member of the 
murderer's tribe instead, even though that person was innocent of 
the crime. Here Shaltut quotes al-Baydawi approvingly, who does 
not agree with those who maintain on the basis of this verse that 
in certain murders, such as the murder of a slave by a free man 
or a female by a male, gisas may not be demanded. Shaltut 
maintains that the only characteristic that is relevant here is 
that of life, for all lives are equally sacred.224 He refutes the 
interpretation of those who believe that the phrase is an 
elaboration of the concept of equivalence, so that gisas only 
obtains where the victim and the offender are of equal status.225
Shaltut then proceeds to deal with three specific cases which 
have aroused controversy in the past: where a father kills his
son, where several assailants kill a single victim, and where a 
Muslim kills a dhimmi. In the first case, Shaltut disagrees with
224 Ibid., pp. 369-70.
225Ibid., p. 371.
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those who reason that since the father is the cause of the son's 
existence, it is inappropriate that the son should then become 
the cause of his father's non-existence, i.e. by the father being 
subject to gisas for the murder of his son. He argues that a man 
can be subject to the penalty of death by stoning for the crime 
of committing zina with his daughter, even though he is the cause 
of her existence. He disagrees therefore with the majority view 
that gisas does not obtain here, and goes even further than the 
Malikis who stipulate that extra caution should be exercised in 
ascertaining deliberate intent, in view of the fact that the 
father may only have intended to punish or discipline his son. 
Shaltut prefers to interpret the gisas laid down by the Qur'an as 
absolute, with no special conditions obtaining in this case, in 
accordance with the cumum of the Quranic verses.226
Similarly in the case where there is more than one assailant, 
the Qur'an places no restriction on number; the crux upon which 
the ruling hangs is the murder itself. Failure to apply gisas 
here would provide a loophole for potential murderers and would 
deprive the wall al-dam of his right. Here Shaltut is in 
accordance with the majority view.227
Again, in the case where a dhimmi is murdered by a Muslim, 
Shaltut remains consistent with his view that there should be no 
exceptions to the rule, disagreeing with the majority view that 
gisSs cannot be exacted in these circumstances. In a discussion
2 2 6 Ibid., p. 372 .
2 27 Ibid., p. 373 .
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between a ^anafi scholar and a Shafici scholar reported by Ibn 
cArabi on the subject, it is obvious that Shaltut's sympathies 
lie with the arguments of the former, who maintains that gisas is 
applicable here because the verse is camm, and the phrase
beginning: "a free man for a free man " stands independently
and not as an elaboration of the concept of gisas. Moreover a 
Muslim and a dhimmi are equal as regards hurmat al-dam, for it is 
not lawful to kill either of them. Shaltut further maintains that 
the brotherhood referred to in the phrase: "He who is pardoned by 
his brother..." is not necessarily the brotherhood of Islam but 
could be the most basic brotherhood of all - that of humanity. 
Even if taken as applying only to Muslims, it could apply only to 
the possibility of pardon and not to gisas.228
iii) Qisas in cases of injury
As regards gisas in cases of injury (al-gisas fi-ma duna al- 
nafs), Shaltut relates the HanafI principles, in view of the fact 
that all the schools are agreed upon the classes of wound that 
the Hanafis acknowledge as giving grounds for gisas, while there 
is no unanimity as regards other types of wound. In fact it 
becomes clear that the area upon which all are agreed is very 
restricted indeed, consisting of only two types of wound: 
firstly, a wound to the head or the face which falls under the 
category of muwaddiha (revealing the bone; one of ten categories 
into which wounds are divided), and secondly, a wound to a joint.
2 2 8 Ibid., pp. 373-75.
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In both cases a year must pass without the wound healing in order 
for gisas to be applicable. Shaltut himself points out drily that 
such a wound could only exist in a hypothetical case where it was 
inflicted with surgical care and precision on an immobile victim, 
in order to fulfil the necessary conditions.229
Shaltut then discusses the legal sources for gisas in cases of 
injury; many scholars rely on Qur'an 5:45 which describes the 
Jewish law ("an eye for an eye..."), in accordance with the 
belief that previous divine laws, if not explicitly abrogated, 
are binding on Muslims. However, Shaltut agrees with those who 
see each divine law as a separate entity, on the basis of the 
context of the verse in question, and in particular the phrase: 
"For each we have ordained a divine law and a path..." (5:48).230 
As for those verses which speak generally of repaying like with 
like as regards aggression and punishment (2:194, 16:126, 42:40), 
Shaltut believes that the context of these passages shows clearly 
that it is conflict between the Muslim community and external 
aggressors which is at stake here, not private conflicts between 
individual Muslims.231 Shaltut dismisses a hadith which relates 
an incident where the Prophet ordered gisas in a case of injury, 
on the grounds that its many conflicting versions make it 
mudtarib, and it is in any case a hadith ahad, which many
229 Ibid., pp. 379-81 .
230Ibid., pp. 382-84.
231 Ibid., p. 385.
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scholars do not accept as sufficient authority for the
establishment of punishments.
The only remaining authority, then, is ijmac , and Shaltut 
maintains that this is the only genuine authority for this type 
cf f°r it was practiced by the Companions and all
subsequent generations, without any dissent to the principle ever 
being expressed.232
d) Summary
From this survey of Shaltut's section on penal law, certain 
characteristics emerge. Perhaps the most salient feature is 
Shaltut's caution. This is apparent in his treatment of the
sources, where he feels it is very important that the authority
given should be of an appropriate status. We saw this in the case 
of the hadd penalty for wine-drinking and apostasy, where he
prefers to depart from the majority opinion and err on the side 
of caution, due to the existence of variant opinions in the first 
case, and in the second case because he does not consider a 
hadith ahad sufficient authority to establish a hadd penalty.
In the application of texts to particular circumstances, 
Shaltut employs discrimination; such is the case with the Quranic 
passages cited as evidence for gisas in cases of injury, or with 
the hadith cited in support of self-defence, where Shaltut shows 
that when taken in context they are more appropriately applicable 
to other circumstances. In his views on the circumstances which
2 3 2 Ibid., p. 386.
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entail ibahat al-dam, Shaltut is similarly cautious, preferring 
in all cases that justice should go through the proper channels 
and that istifa1 (the exaction of the penalty) should be the 
prerogative of the authorities in both gisas and hudud.
In the rare event that the rule of extreme caution in 
establishing ibahat al-dam does not apply, this is in the 
interests of maslaha, for if one is too restrictive in defining 
murder methods, criminals' ingenuity would produce ways of 
evading punishment.
In the case of possible exceptions to the rule in gisas 
(father/son, Huslim/dhimmi etc.), we find Shaltut reluctant to 
place any restrictions on the Quranic injunction without suitable 
authority, even though this means opposing the majority classical 
opinion.
On several occasions we saw Shaltut's use of tafsir in 
determining the legislative status of particular Quranic verses, 
taking into account such factors as their context, whether they 
were mutlag or mugayyad, camm or khass, and perhaps most
importantly the relationship between verses on the same topic,
for example in the cases of zina and repentance.
Shaltut could not be said to have a uniform approach
throughout the section on penal law. The level of scholarship
varies from the relatively superficial discussion of the attitude 
of different laws and civilisations to the crime of murder, to 
detailed legal discussions, sometimes giving a broad outline of a 
particular area of the Sharica, at other times selecting a
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specific question for discussion. These discussions on points of 
fiqh vary in their turn, some receiving perfunctory treatment and 
others touching on fiqh muqarin (comparative jurisprudence), 
discussing the different opinions of the scholars and madhahib, 
and sometimes assuming a certain familiarity on the reader's part 
with the classical fiqh works.233
The subject matter is treated with a certain degree of
spontaneity, in that Shaltut feels free to digress slightly in
order to defend Abu HanTfa's reputation, or to broach what is 
strictly speaking a theological issue - that of divine 
forgiveness and grave sins. Uncharacteristically, in the section 
on gisas in cases of injury, he criticises the impracticality of 
the classical legislation without putting forward any suggestions 
for improvement.
This somewhat uneven treatment illustrates the fact that 
Shaltut set out not to write a fiqh book to be used for reference
purposes, but to give the reader a general picture of a
particular area of law, serving to increase his knowledge and 
perhaps stimulate him to further research, for he sometimes
refers the reader to the fiqh books for further details.234 One 
should also bear in mind that the Muslim scholar is always
mindful of his duty to promote the cause of Islam, which often
233Eg. in references to "sahib tahdhib al-furuq" (p. 293),
"sahib al-durr al-mukhtar" (p. 3i6), and "sahib muntaqa al-ahbar" 
(p. 357), where culama* may be assumed to know the identities of 
the authors in question, but not ordinary Muslims.
234Eg. ibid., pp. 285 and 286.
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involves giving a balanced and harmonious picture of the whole,- 
it is fairly common to find this kind of general material even in 
specialist works on Islamic law,235 Likewise the discussion of 
the opinions of the madhahib is increasingly common, jurists 
feeling free to judge each case on its merits rather than 
confining themselves to a particular madhhab.236
Shaltut's opinions appear to accord with today's socio­
political climate as regards equal rights etc.; his views on 
matters such as the possibility of a Muslim being subject to 
gisas for killing a dhimmi or a father for his son are now 
gaining majority support with the rise of the more egalitarian 
outlook which sees all human life as of equal worth.237
In order to preserve law and order, strict criteria for 
istifa' are also now regarded as the norm, the person who kills 
an adulterer or the wall al-dam who kills his relative's murderer 
being regarded as subject to taczTr,23B This tendency may be due
23riIn the area of criminal law see, eg., M.S. al-cAwwa, FT 
Usui al-Nizam al-Jina'i al-Islami, Cairo: Dar al-Macarif, 1979, 
sections entitled "The religious nature of Islamic criminal 
legislation" and "The preservation of moral values", pp. 40-48.
236See eg. M. S. al-cAwwa, op. cit., and Muhammad Abu Zahra, 
Falsafat al-cUquba fT al-Figh al-Isl5~mT, Cairo: Machad al-dirasat 
al-carabiyyat al-caliya, 1966, and Ahmad Muhammad Ibrahim, Al- 
Qisas, Cairo: Maktabat Nahdat al-Sharq, 1944, for examples of 
comparative studies in the areas of penal and criminal law.
237A modern writer, cAwwa, states in op. cit. p. 232 that 
most modern scholars do not consider difference in religion as a 
bar to talion, and gives references to support this; similarly in
the case of father and son (p. 234) . Abu Zahra, in op. cit., 
p. 437, on the subject of diyat, expresses the opinion that all 
human lives are of equal worth.
23PAbu Zahra, op. cit.. Part 2, pp. 290 and 372.
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to practical considerations, i.e. the complex nature of today's 
societies. Thus Shaltut, although writing some thirty or forty 
years ago, is in many ways in harmony with more recent writers 
and is likely to have influenced many of them.239
4) Comparative Jurisprudence 
a) Al-Ikhtilaf
The science of ikhtilaf (the study of the differences between 
the schools of law) dates back to the beginnings of the madhahib. 
One modern scholar traces three main stages in its historical 
development.240 First came the polemical stage, where the main 
aim was to defend one's own school; writers such as Abu Yusuf, 
al-Shaybani and al-Shafic7 are cited as examples. Later on more 
impartial works emerged, such as Tabari's "Kitab Ikhtilaf al- 
Fugahai1" and Ibn Rushd's "Bidiyat al-Mu.itahid". This type of 
work, which was the most common up until recent times, contained 
a simple juxtaposition of the various opinions, without usually 
giving the reasons for the differences. The third method, which 
is the most common in the modern age although having precedents 
in the classical period, usually bases itself on a particular 
school, and thus avoids much of the cumbersome repetition 
involved in an exhaustive comparison of all four schools on all
239cAwwa, for example, refers to Shaltut's work on several 
occasions, eg. op. cit., Chapter 3, fns. 42, 46, 49, 50 etc.
240Y. Linant de Bellefonds, La Methode Comparative en Droit 
Musulman, in Revue Internationale de Droit Compare (22ieme 
annee), pp. 465-75.
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points; attention is drawn to points of divergence and 
convergence in a style approximating to modern comparative 
methods. An outstanding example in the classical age is the 
Hanbali scholar Ibn Qudama's "AI-Mughn:!?1. While there was a 
scarcity of such works from the sixteenth to the beginning of the 
present century, interest in this area has greatly increased 
during this century.241
One could advance many reaons for this renewed interest; the 
schools became less geographically self-contained due to improved 
communications; it was part of the Arab-Islamic revival which 
pervaded all areas of scholarship; and the idea that one must 
confine oneself to a particular madhhab was losing ground as 
Muhammad cAbduh and others claimed the right to practice 
takhayyur or talfig, and rebelled against all manifestations of 
the spirit of sectarianism.
Shaltut's interest in the study of comparative jurisprudence 
is related to his work in the area of taqrTb, which we desribed 
in Chapter one. In an introductory section of "Muqaranat al- 
Madhahib fi'I-Fiqh", it is stated that one of the aims of 
pointing out the areas of difference is so that one may choose 
between them with complete impartiality, "having stripped oneself 
of the madhhabiyya to which one has become accustomed". If the 
student is unable to do this, Shaltut advises against his 
embarking on comparative jurisprudence, for in that case he would
241 Ibid., p. 470.
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be like a judge who is giving judgement between a friend and an 
enemy.2 42
Shaltut talks of the objections to the study of comparative 
jurisprudence which arise from the slavish adherence to taglTd, 
and the unwillingness to see any classical authority criticised. 
Some have objected, for example, that if one performed the 
different parts of wudu' according to the teachings of different 
schools, one's wudTT' would not in fact be valid (sahTh) according 
to any of them. Thus "comparison" would be a mere theoretical 
exercise of no practical value. As for the gadi, they argue that 
he is in any case bound to give judgement according to his own 
madhhab, therefore comparison would be of no use there either.
Shaltut attributes these opinions to the spirit of 
sectarianism, and feels that this attitude has deprived people of 
"malakat al-figh" (the aptitude for jurisprudence/understanding). 
Those people who advocate strict adherence to a single madhhab 
put themselves in a position where they are forced to defend even 
the weak opinions of their imams, or those which go against the 
Qur'an and the Sunna. It is pointed out that neither God nor the 
Prophet ordered Muslims to follow a particular madhhab. The 
classical scholar al-Kamil allowed tatabbuc al-rukhas (seeking 
out the madhhab with the most lenient opinion on a given point), 
seeing no reason why one should not choose the easier course.243
242Muqaranat al-Madhahib fi'l-Fiqh, p . 2.
2 4 3 Ibid., pp. 2-4.
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In a section of "cAqida wa-Sharica" entitled: "The reasons for 
the differences of opinion among the scholars concerning the 
Qur'an and the Sunna",244 Shaltut gives a detailed description of 
the various causes of ikhtilaf. He states that the purpose of 
identifying these causes of difference is so that they may be a 
source of guidance to those who wish to understand the legal 
content of the Qur'an and the Sunna, both with regard to the 
actual opinions of the fugaha' and the methods used.245
He divides the causes of ikhtilaf into those which can arise 
concerning both the Qur’an and Sunna, and those which are 
peculiar to the Sunna. He points out that many differences have 
their origins in linguistic considerations. For example, a word 
may have two different literal meanings, or a literal and a 
figurative meaning, or even a linguistic and a legal meaning. 
Shaltut gives specific examples to illustrate each possibility, 
indicating the practical consequences of differences of opinion. 
In the first case, for example, the Quranic word "qur'" can be 
understood to mean either the menstruation itself or the period 
of purity between menstruations, and the choice of meaning will 
materially affect the length of the cidda for a divorced or 
widowed woman.246 In the second, the Quranic stipulation that 
those who wage war on God and the Prophet should be "banished 
from the land" (5:33) can be taken to mean literal exile or
244cAgida wa-Sharica, pp. 506-41.
2 4 5 Ibid., p. 506.
2 4 6 Ibid., pp. 507-10.
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understood metaphorically as imprisonment.247 In the third case, 
the description of "daughters" as one of the categories of 
muharramat could be taken to apply only to one's legally 
recognised daughters, or it could apply also to illegitimate 
daughters who are daughters in the literal sense although not in 
the legal sense.248
Less straightforward are the cases which involve compound 
sentences. Certain particles in the Arabic language are 
particularly conducive to ambiguity. Shaltut singles out the 
particles aw, ilia and fa in addition to the relative pronoun. 
The word ilia, for example, can apply only to the clause 
immediately preceding it, or it can apply to any additional 
clauses preceding that one; in the case of those who are guilty 
of qadhf, the phrase "except those who repent" could be taken to 
apply to the immediately preceding description of them as 
fasiqun, or it could additionally apply to the stipulation that 
their testimony should never be accepted. The same kind of 
ambiguity can arise with relative clauses.249
Differences can also arise from the application of different 
jurisprudential principles; this includes the whole area covered 
by the science of usul, such as the relationship between khass 
and ^imm, muqayvad and mutlaq, and the status of, e.g. ahadith
2 4 7 Ibid., pp. 510-11.
24 8 Ibid., pp. 511-12.
2 4 9 Ibid., pp. 515-17 and 518-19.
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ahad or qiyas vis-a-vis other sources.250 These principles often 
define the way in which two separate texts are to be related to 
one another. In the case of the quantity of radac which entails 
tahrim, for example, the radac is mutlaq in the Qur'an, but 
various ahadith give different numbers of radac at. Apart from the 
process of tar iTh, whereby one hadith is preferred to another, a 
jurist's opinion will depend on whether or not he accepts the 
possibility of a hadith ahad "restricting" (vugayyid) the 
Qur'an.251
In the case of the cidda of the pregnant woman who is widowed, 
there are two pertinent Quranic passages; one, which can be taken 
as referring to both pregnant widows and pregnant divorcees, 
states that the c idda is until the birth of the baby (65:4), and 
the other, concerning widows (who may or may not be pregnant), 
specifies the c idda as four months and ten days (2:234). Most 
scholars take the provision in 65:4, which was the later revealed 
of the two verses, as a restriction on 2:234, i.e. that the 
pregnancy of a widowed woman is regarded as a special 
circumstance which makes the waiting period longer or shorter 
according to the stage of pregnancy. Others, however, take the 
two verses in conjunction; 2:234 represents a restriction on 65:4 
in that it lays down a minimum waiting period of four months and 
ten days which will obtain even if the baby is born before that 
time, while 65:4 represents a restriction on 2:234 in that the
250Ibid., pp. 519-20.
251 Ibid., pp. 520-21.
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cidda of four months and ten days is to be extended if the baby 
is not yet born at the end of it.252
In the case of the Quranic permission to marry believing (i.e. 
Muslim) slave girls (4:25), whether or not one acknowledges the 
mafhum (that which is implied)253 of the verse, will determine 
whether or not (a) one allows marriage to a slave girl when a 
free girl is available and (b) one allows marriage to a slave 
girl from ahl al-kitab. The phraseology of the verse: "If any one 
of you cannot afford to marry free believing women, let him marry 
from among the believing women who are slaves", may be taken to 
imply that the permission to marry slave girls is conditional 
upon not being able to afford to marry free women, and 
furthermore that the slave must be a Muslim.254
Differences may also arise from the legal principles which 
were formulated by the classical fuqaha'. For example, there is a 
hadTth which states that he who has been sold an animal which is 
musarrah (i.e. one which has been left unmilked for a period 
preceding the sale in order to make its milk appear more abundant 
than it really is), having milked the animal, has a choice of 
retaining it or returning it with a sac (a measure equal to 2 1/a 
cups) of dates by way of compensation for the milk taken. The 
Hanafis do not take the hadTth at its face value because of the
2 5 2 Ibid., pp. 521-22.
253See Khallaf, op. cit., pp. 153-61 for a description of
the concept of mafhum.
2 5 4 Ibid., pp. 531-32.
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legal principle that fungibles must be indemnified by their exact 
equivalent; one type of fungible cannot be considered 
compensation for another, since it is not possible to ascertain 
that they are of exactly the same value. Adherents to this 
principle will find some way to reject the hadith or its 
significance.2 5 5
In the section dealing with differences which arise from the 
Sunna alone, it becomes clear that there are many more possible 
areas of difference concerning the Sunna than there are 
concerning the Qur'an, largely due to the differences which can 
arise concerning the riwaya.2 5 6 Secondly, differences can arise 
concerning the legislative status of a particular action of the 
Prophet's, e.g. it could apply to him alone or to the Muslims in 
general, and an action performed by him could be wajib, mandub or 
mubTh .257 Thirdly, the Prophet's "silent approval" (taqrir), can 
sometimes be ambiguous. For example, if accompanied by signs of 
pleasure, it is generally taken to indicate permissibility.
However, the expression of pleasure may be in response to
something else. A case in point is that of gifaya (determining 
someone's lineage by their facial characteristics). In a well- 
known hadTth , the Prophet expresses pleasure at the ga'if's
confirmation that Usama ibn Zayd is in fact the son of Zayd ibn 
Haritha. However, while some may take this as confirmation of the
255 Ibid., pp. 532-33.
2 5 6 Ibid., p. 535 .
257 Ibid., pp. 535-37 .
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legal validity of qiyafa in establishing lineage, others argue 
that the Prophet was in fact pleased at the rebuttal of the 
charges of the unbelievers, who alleged on the basis of the 
difference in skin colour of the two men, that they were not 
related; in that case, his reaction could hot be taken as having 
a bearing on the legal status of qiyafa.258
This section on asbab al-ikhtilaf is fairly complex and 
technical by its very nature. In many cases Shaltut gives an 
extremely detailed discussion of the differing opinions of the 
jurists, including their arguments and counterarguments. It may 
seem inappropriate to include such a section in a book which is 
intended for popular consumption. However, the provision of 
specific examples to illustrate each point makes most of the 
material reasonably comprehensible to the layman. Furthermore, 
there is a liberal dose of Shaltut's common sense in several 
places where he expresses his own opinion. In the case of the 
animal which is musarrah, for example, he deplores the way in 
which some scholars interpret the hadith, which is the source 
(asl), on the basis of legal principles which are derived from 
the sources themselves. In any case, the underlying aim of the 
hadith is to protect people from deception; to reject the hadith 
would be to withdraw this protection, which would be patently 
unjust. The specification of the quantity, i.e. a sac , avoids
258 Ibid., pp. 538-40.
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wrangling over the exact quantity of the compensation, and 
provides a reasonable solution for all concerned.259
Elsewhere, in a discussion of the Quranic verse 5:33 in which 
the various punishments for waging war on God and His Prophet and 
spreading corruption are described, using the conjunction am 
between each of them, Shaltut upholds the opinion that they 
represent straightforward alternatives to be applied at the 
discretion of the judge, rather than each punishment appplying to 
a specific crime according to the gravity thereof. He maintains 
that his opinion is in accordance with maslaha, since each crime 
has to be judged according to its particular circumstances; there 
are cases where a crime involving killing, for example, may be 
less heinous and destructive than a crime which does not involve 
killing, such as conspiring to revolt, or kidnapping women and 
children. It is essential in such cases that a suitably harsh 
deterrent should be available.260
Having summarised Shaltut's theoretical exposition of the 
causes of difference among jurists, we will observe the ways in 
which Shaltut reconciles or chooses between these different 
opinions in his own writings.
b) Shaltut's methods of conciliation and tarjih261
259IbM-, pp. 533-34.
260Ibid., pp. 512-15.
26i"Tarjih" is the process of choosing between variant 
opinions, i.e .’"preferring" one to another.
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Although Shaltut wrote a specialist work on comparative 
jurisprudence, he sees the comparison of divergent opinions not 
as the prerogative of the religiously educated elite but as a 
natural process dictated by common sense, which can benefit 
ordinary Muslims. He therefore includes some discussion of 
variant opinions in his "Fatawa", and even in his "Tafsir".262
In the section on penal law, several questions discussed 
involved a comparison of variant opinions. On the subject of 
murder methods, for example, we observed that Shaltut 
rationalised Abu Hanifa's divergent opinion concerning the murder 
weapon on the basis of the environment in which he lived (i.e. he 
could not have foreseen the diversity of murder weapons and 
ingenious methods which were to be later invented). Similarly, on 
the question of birth control, Shaltut attributes certain 
differences of opinion among fuqaha1 to their different 
environments; he argues that the classical scholars like al- 
Ghazali, who were lenient on the subject, did not foresee an age 
when people would be less eager to marry and procreate.263
On the subject of the disagreement concerning the lawfulness 
of abortion before the quickening, Shaltut maintains that those 
who consider it lawful do so only because they restrict their 
interpretation of "life" to that of external manifestations such 
as movement and perceptibility. However, if those jurists were
26ZSee, e.g., Fatawa, pp. 80-81, 92-95, 161-63 and 344-47,
and Tafsir, pp. 305-30 passim.
263cAqida wa~Sharica , pp. 205-6.
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aware of the medical evidence which shows that the sperm itself 
has the intrinsic quality of life, he argues that there would be 
no difference of opinion concerning abortion in the early stages, 
for noone can condone the destroying of life.264
In his section on civil and criminal liablity,265 Shaltut 
treats several delicate legal questions involving divergent 
opinions. In addition to relating the differences between the 
madhahib, he sometimes goes on to give the underlying reasons for 
the apparent disagreement, which may show that the disagreement 
is not really over a point of fiqh but due to different 
prevailing circumstances. Such is the case on the question of the 
liability of the self-employed artisan for indirect damages, 
involving some external factor (bi-ghayri ficlihi), incurred in 
the course of his work. Abu Hanlfa is of the opinion that he is 
not liable for damages, even if they are caused by his 
negligence, since the contract only covers his work, and not al- 
hifz (duty to take care). The other jurists, however, see al-hifz 
as part of the contract and accordingly hold him responsible for 
such damages. Here, however, Shaltut points out that the 
different opinicns are due to the changing times. While Abu 
HanTfa lived in an age when men’s honesty could largely be taken 
for granted, in later ages such a ruling might be a temptation to 
certain dishonest employees, who, in the knowledge that they
264Ibid., pp. 203-4, and Fatawa, pp. 289-92.
z65cAqida wa-Sharica , pp. 392-429.
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could not be held liable, could make false claims of having been
robbed or having lost something, in order to fraudulently take
possession of it. In fact later Hanafi scholars acknowledged the 
unsuitability of Abu HanTfa’s ruling in later times, and
accordingly applied the rulings of other schools.266
On the next point, Shaltut shows how differences between 
fugaha’ can be resolved by judging each case on its own merits. 
Where an employee causes damage by his own direct action, Abu 
Hanxfa holds him liable while the others do not, since Abu Hanxfa 
believes that the contract requires "al-camal al-salxm" (i.e. 
that the work should not be faulty), while the others argue that 
it may be a question of unforeseeable damage caused by faulty 
equipment or goods. Here, Shaltut sees the solution as being to 
consult the appropriate experts who are qualified to judge 
whether it was a case of negligence or of faulty equipment in 
each individual case, and thus distinguish between foreseeable 
and unforeseeable damage. In the light of such an objective 
assessment, there would be no need for disagreement between the 
jurists, for it would be clear where the responsibility lay.267
On some points, such as the case of the man who kills an 
animal in self-defence,268 Shaltut does not attempt to reconcile 
the differing views in this way, but simply relates the various
26 6 Ibid., pp. 399-400; another point upon which ’curf is 
responsible for differences of opinion is given on p. 397, the 
case of whether damages are payable for loss of usufruct.
267Ibid., p. 400.
26 8 Ibid., p. 401.
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opinions, briefly giving reasons for them. However, he makes it 
clear here and elsewhere that these differences of opinion can be 
taken as evidence of the extent of intellectual freedom enjoyed 
by Islamic scholars, and the great potential of the Sharica to 
adapt to changing circumstances. Many of these questions have no 
single correct answer, but one may reach a satisfactory 
conclusion by reviewing the opinions of the jurists in the light 
of the prevailing circumstances or maslaha,26 9 In two cases he 
cites the fact that later Hanafi scholars departed from the 
opinion of their imam and preferred instead opinions of some of 
the other schools, as evidence of a commendable lack of sectarian 
fanaticism.270
Thus his main aim seems to be to illustrate the nature of 
these differences of opinion, and to show that (a) they are not 
serious disagreements on essential matters of principle, and (b) 
opposing viewpoints can be equally valid in different
circumstances. It is for this last reason that Shaltut does not
usually find it necessary to offer his own opinion on the points 
discussed.
The material contained in "Muqaranat al-Madhahib fi'l-Fiqh"
is, as one would expect in a text-book for students at the
Kuliiyyat al-Sharica , dealt with in a more technical and complex 
way. A number of selected issues are discussed, ranging from 
aspects of wudu1 to types of divorce and types of evidence
269See e.g. ibid., pp. 391, 397 and 401.
27 0 Ibid., pp. 398 and 400.
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acceptable in court. Shaltut's method is to relate the opinions 
of the madhahib first, and then list the authorities or evidence 
upon which they base their opinions, usually under a separate 
heading: "Adilla" . Following this section, Shaltut will usually 
produce counterarguments to those opinions with which he does not 
agree. Finally he generally gives his own opinion, although the 
matter is sometimes left open for the student to draw his own 
conclusions.271 Often in the course of his conclusion he will 
mention the current practice of Egyptian law in support of his 
case.2 7 2
The aim of these comparative studies is not so much to 
conciliate the differences of opinion as to select the preferable 
one, or indeed to discard them all in favour of a new opinion. 
Notwithstanding the often complex nature of the arguments and 
counterarguments presented, Shaltut's conclusions often base 
themselves primarily on maslaha or common sense.
In the case of the status of the wife of the missing man,273
for example, he relates the detailed opinions of the madhahib
with regard to the length of time which should be allowed to
elapse before she can be considered a widow, together with the 
ahadith and legal principles relied on in each case. The opinions 
vary between four years, based on a report from cUmar ibn al- 
Khattab, and the natural lifespan of the missing man. Shaltut
271E .g . Huqarana, p . 38.
272 Ibid., pp. 96, 112, 123 and 127.
27 3 Ibid., pp. 117-24.
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himself, however, prefers the opinion that the matter should be 
referred to the qadi in view of the fact that different 
circumstances give rise to different probabilities. He points out 
that it is in accordance with maslaha that a flexible attitude 
should be taken, for if a woman should be asked to wait 
indefinitely she might fall into temptation. Moreover in the 
modern age improved communications should be taken into account. 
cUmar's specification of four years is in any case seen as a 
piece of ijtihad based on the particular circumstances which then 
obtained,274
On the question of "Giving judgement on the basis of 
circumstantial evidence"275 Shaltut relates the various degrees 
to which each madhhab acknowledges circumstantial evidence. In 
his conclusion he argues that many types of circumstantial 
evidence are extremely reliable, and that no type of evidence, 
even those which are universally recognised such as confession or 
testimony, can provide absolute certainty. Ibn Qutayba is quoted 
in support of the view that the judge should seek to establish 
the truth by whatever means are available to him, including 
circumstantial evidence. Shaltut argues that it is a natural 
principle which has been applied thoughout history, and is in 
accordance with the spirit of the Sharica which seeks to 
establish justice by all possible means.276
2 7 4 Ibid., p. 123.
2 7 5 Ibid., pp. 137-41.
2 7 6 Ibid., pp. 140-41.
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In the case of the simultaneous pronouncement of the triple, 
irrevocable divorce, Shaltut states in his concluding passage 
that if one were to cast aside all the evidence and view the 
question solely with regard to its consequences, it would be 
clear that to consider such a pronouncement as one revocable 
divorce is far less harmful in its effects than to consider it as 
an irrevocable triple divorce. Thus one should select "the lesser 
of two evils".277
The issue of the validity of non-Muslims' testimony against 
Muslims278 gives us an example of Shaltut's departure from the 
opinions of the madhahib, none of whom acknowledge such 
testimony, with the sole exception of the Malikis who acknowledge 
the testimony of a non-Muslim doctor in certain circumstances. 
Shaltut refutes the attempts of jurists to restrict the 
significance of Qur'an 5:106 which allows non-Muslims to be 
witnesses to a dying man's testimony when Muslims are on a 
journey. He believes that this verse simply provides evidence of 
the permissibility of accepting the testimony of non-Muslims. He 
agrees with Ibn Qutayba, whom he quotes as saying that the 
testimony of non-Muslims can be accepted where necessary, whether 
or not one is on a journey. Shaltut believes that the only 
stipulation for the acceptance of such testimony is that the 
witness should be of truthful and reliable character; he does not 
acknowledge any dalll which prevents the acceptance of the
2 7 7 Ibid.., p. 89.
278Ibid., pp. 135-37.
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testimony of non-Muslims, and believes the jurists have been 
influenced by considerations arising from their own environments 
rather than from any firm evidence or logical argument.
c) Summary
In the area of comparative law Shaltut demonstrates his 
intellectual flexibility by working both at the level of 
classical scholarship and at the level of practical common sense 
which is in accordance with the more direct approach required in 
the modern age.
We have seen how he mitigates differences of opinion by having 
reference to the environment of particular scholars, and by 
calling for the use of discrimination in individual cases, rather 
than a blanket ruling. In this way he opposes intellectual 
laziness while at the same time highlighting the flexibility of 
the Sharica.
"Muqaranat al-Madhahib fi'l-Fiqh" is not meant to be an 
exhaustive comparative study but an exemplary selection which 
aims to provoke the student to further study, as is evident from 
Shaltut's introduction and some of his concluding comments.279 
His wcrk in this area illustrates a quality which we remarked 
upon in Chapter One, namely his desire to encourage people to 
think for themselves rather than to take things on trust or 
accept them without fully understanding the reasons behind them.
279See e.g. pp. 2, 38 and 80.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ISLAMIC SOCIETY
1) The Ideal Paradigm
For Shaltut there is no question of discussing social issues 
outside the context of religion, for Islam establishes not only 
the relationship between man and God but also that between man 
and his fellow man.1 Shaltut writes: "It is a social religion
above all else"; if a man's devotional acts do not instil in him 
a social conscience, then his worship is useless.2 Shaltut 
believes that the only effective social and legal reform is that 
which builds on peoples' religious belief and so appeals to their 
consciences, not that which is imposed from above, failing to 
command the true support of the people.3
a) The "Identity" of the Islamic Umma
Shaltut expresses his conception of the individuality of the 
Islamic umma by using the word shakhsiyya (personality/identity). 
He believes that societies have a moral identity (shakhsiyya 
macnawiyya) as well as a purely physical one (shakhsiyya 
hissiyya) which is determined by such factors as geography and 
demography. It is the shakhsiyya macnawiyya which gives a society
^ i n  Huda al-Qur'an, p. 233.
2Ibid., p. 234 and Min Taw.iihat al-Islam, p. 105.
3Min Huda al-Qur'an, pp. 234-35.
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its feelings of self-worth and self-respect;4 if it lacks a 
strong sense of its own identity, it becomes vulnerable to attack
from other nations, no matter how favourable its physical
characteristics may be.5
Whenever peoples' sense of identity has rested on such
arbitrary considerations as race or geographical area, this has 
resulted in a spirit of selfishness which has led ultimately to
war.6 When nations rely on man-made ideologies, the emphasis on 
material rather than spiritual considerations results in 
conflicts of interests and the oppression of certain sections of 
humanity by others.7
Thus, for Shaltut, a religious basis, which acknowledges the 
equality of all men before God, is essential for a strong and 
stable society. The very root meaning of the word muslim itself 
shows that faith in God is the cornerstone of the Islamic umma's 
identity; Ibrahim prayed that his progeny should be a community 
which surrenders to God ("ummatan muslimatan laka" - 2:28).B
While certain aspects of the umma's identity which are subject 
to human experience and endeavour, such as its activities in the 
spheres of agriculture, industry and economics, may be common to 
many societies, its uniqueness lies in the divinely inspired
4Min Taw.jihat al-Islam, p. 56.
5 Ibid., p. 57, and Min Huda al-Qur'an, p. 252.
6Min Huda al-Qur'an, p. 252.
7Min Taw.jihat al-Islam, pp. 57-58.
6Ibid., p. 538.
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Islamic dimension of its identity.9 This identity, however, 
embraces many aspects of the society's existence; at the centre 
are creed and worship, but it extends to the attitude towards 
wealth, knowledge, honour, health, legislation, government and 
morals,as well as the everyday manners and customs which go to 
make up one's culture, for the Qur'an contains advice on such 
wide-ranging things as visiting peoples' houses, backbiting, 
behaviour towards the opposite sex, receiving and passing on 
news, etc.10
Shaltut feels that whenever this Islamic dimension is 
neglected, Muslim nations become disunited, weak and vulnerable. 
It is because they forgot their God-given identity that the 
Muslim nations became subservient to other nations and 
effectively lost their own identity, becoming absorbed in that of 
others and following them in all spheres of life - military, 
economic, political, and even in the areas of legislation and 
culture.11
Shaltut urges Muslims to return to their true identity ("cudu 
ila shakhsiyyatikum");12 he laments the fact that the word 
"Muslim" has for some become a mere label to denote a certain 
group of people, instead of a deeply-rooted system of religious
9Fatawa, pp. 182-85.
10Min Tawjihat al-Islam, pp. 66-78.
11 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
12Ibid., pp. 55 and 60.
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belief and worship which unites all those who adhere to it.13 The 
Qur’an itself gives advice on how Muslims can preserve their 
identity and independence; it warns against taking enemies of 
Islam as companions, and it describes those weak or hypocritical 
Muslims who hasten to mix with them, and thus become identified 
with them.14
The concept of Muslim unity is of supreme importance for 
Shaltut, as for all Muslim reformers, both on the level of
international relations, with which we shall be dealing 
presently, and within the individual Muslim nation. The theme of 
social solidarity occurs frequently in Shaltut's writings.
b) Social Solidarity
In an article entitled "Social Solidarity in Islam" ("Al- 
Tadamun al-Ijtim¥cT fi nazar al-Islam") , Shaltut states that the 
formation of human societies is a natural process arising from 
man's need for mutual aid; however, Islam establishes a strong 
emotional bond of religious brotherhood that creates a more
close-knit society. In the Qur'an and the Sunna, this brotherhood 
is elevated over blood ties.115 If people are strong in their 
faith, this sense of brotherhood will inevitably exist.16
13Ibid., pp. 53 and 538-41.
14Ibid., pp. 262-63 .
18Min Huda al-Qur'an, pp. 208-9.
16cAqida wa-Sharica, p. 43.
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Social solidarity is a corollary of that brotherhood, and may 
be expressed materially or morally.17 The material aspect 
consists of helping those in need and contributing towards the 
establishment of necessary public utilities? in the Qur'an this 
kind of help is mentioned often in the form of ihsan, zakah, 
sadaqa, haqq, infaq fi sabTl Allah, etc. The act of giving is 
important not only for the recipient but also for the giver? even 
the poor person should try to give something, "in order to have 
the experience of giving", for this will increase his feelings of 
self-respect and perhaps inspire him to greater efforts to change 
his own situation.18
However, material aid is not sufficient on its own. In order 
for a society to be healthy, there must prevail a sense of 
corporate moral responsibility? each member of the community must 
take it upon himself to "command what is good and forbid what is 
evil". From Muhammad cAbduh's time on, modern reformers have 
stressed the importance of this Quranic precept? it is not enough 
just to do good and abstain from evil oneself - one must take 
responsibility for giving advice to others when necessary.
In an article entitled: "Reprehensible actions (al-munkarat)
and their effect on society",19 Shaltut describes the three 
methods of changing munkarat, based on a well known hadith: with
17Min Huda al-Qurran, p. 210, and Min Taw.iihat al-Islam,
p. 297.
18cAqida wa-Sharica, p. 436, and Fatawa, p. 156.
19Min Taw.iihat al-Islam, pp. 194-201.
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the hand, the voice or the heart. He has practical suggestions in 
each case. In the first two cases he refers specifically to those 
who are in the best position to effect changes, namely those in 
authority whether in be on the national level, in the religious 
sense, in the sphere of education or within the family. In the 
second category (changing things with the voice) he mentions the 
special responsibility of broadcasters, journalists and 
publishers. As for the third category (changing things with the 
heart), Shaltut emphatically rejects the notion that this is a 
purely passive feeling of disapproval, for otherwise it could not 
be described as "changing" at all. At the very least this should 
involve cutting all links with the perpetrator of munkarat, so 
that he will feel isolated and rejected, and perhaps be thus 
encouraged to review his behaviour.
In the context of a society Shaltut names this active sense of 
reponsibility as "irshad" (guidance), and he points out that this 
guidance will only be fruitful if it meets with receptivity 
("istimac"), and members of the society are not too proud to take 
advice or to admit their errors.20 He points to the early Muslim 
community in Medina as an example of a society in which these two 
factors are strong, for then even the heads of state could be 
corrected by ordinary people. He regrets that in later ages this 
sense of responsibility waned, and people became afraid of 
angering others by speaking out, and preferred to acquiesce in 
munkarat rather than risk losing their wealth and influence,
20Min Huda al-Qur'an, pp. 210-11.
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etc.21 This attitude has resulted in the rise of the cult of 
selfish individualism to the point where base actions and ideas 
are defended in the name of "freedom of opinion".22
The Qur'an relates how former communities have perished due to 
an absence of this sense of moral responsibility, and peoples' 
failure to discourage one another from reprehensible actions; for 
those who remain silent are in reality helping the spread of 
these actions, and deserve retribution along with the actual 
perpetrators.23
Shaltut is acutely aware of the fact that a society can only 
be as good as the individuals of which it consists:
Society is, in reality, no more than the 
individuals which are its bricks, for it is of 
these that it is built; and individuals are, in 
reality, no more than the society which they go to 
make up; its happiness is their happiness, its
well-being is their well-being, its suffering is 
their suffering, and when it is corrupt, they are 
corrupt. Thus, in order to study the basis upon 
which society is built, one must study the bricks 
of which it is constructed.24
If society goes astray, it is because individuals have lost their
sense of moral responsibility, and in order to reform society,
one must first reform the individual through education.25
21cAqida wa-Sharica , pp. 437-38.
22Min Tawjihat al-Islam, p. 299.
23Ibid., pp. 196-98; the case is similar^ with those who fail 
to attempt to reconcile estranged parties (islah dhat al-bayn), 
see Tafsir, p. 564.
24Min Huda al-Qur'an, p. 172; see also Min Taw.iihat al- 
Islam, pp. 295, 74 and 555 for similar descriptions.
25Min Huda al-Qur'an, p. 211 and Min Taw.iihat al-Islam, p. 555.
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However, Shaltut also sees the ideal Islamic society as an 
organic entity with "a throbbing heart and a living soul".26
He sees religious faith as a vital factor in determining the 
relationship between the individual and society. The two aspects 
of a Muslim's behaviour - the individual and the social - are 
embodied in Surat al-cAsr; as individuals, men are asked to 
believe and do good works, but they are also asked to exhort one 
another to good actions and to patience. It is not enough just to 
work out one's own salvation; one has a moral duty to help others 
on their way too.27 We will see when we observe Shaltut's views 
on political theory that this moral duty has implications for 
forms of government in terms of popular representation and 
accountability.28
c) The Islamic State
i) Political theory
Shaltut is not concerned with the body of Islamic political 
theory that was formulated in the middle ages by scholars like 
al-Mawardi:
Islamic political principles... can be discerned 
from the Qur'an and the authentic Sunna, and 
guidance can be obtained from their practical 
application by the Prophet (Peace be upon him) and 
the Rightly-guided Caliphs after him.
However, we should not confuse these
principles, which are based on the primary sources
26Min Huda al-Qur'an, p. 289.
27Min Tawjihat al-Islam, p. 296.
28 Ibid., p. 558.
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of Islam, with the political principles which were 
an expression of the actual state of government 
and its institutions after the Muslims had become 
disunited...2 9
He goes on to say that he wishes to speak not of any actual 
Muslim government but of the ideal form of government as embodied 
in the general principles of Islam.
Shaltut states that there is no abstract concept of "state" in 
Islam:
Islam is not concerned with hypothetical or 
illusory studies on the state; it simply lays down 
social, economic and political rulings which are 
based on the Creator's knowledge of men's 
interests and what benefits or harms them.30
The state has a definite moral character. The paramount principle
is the inseparability of din and dawla: "You could only separate
din and dawla in Islam if you were able to separate a soul from a
man's body without killing him."31
However, Shaltut is not just an idealist but a man who is 
apparently willing to recognise and, if possible, endorse the 
status quo, if this appears to be in the Muslims' interests. A 
striking example of this is his attitude towards Egyptian and 
Arab nationalism. Describing the foundations of the Islamic 
state, he maintains that it is not based on considerations of 
race, nationality or geographical accident, for this would be 
placing restrictions on Islam's universal appeal. In the Islamic
29Ibid., p. 551.
30 Ibid., p. 553.
31 Ibid., p . 554.
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state, unity is based on something higher than this, namely 
religious brotherhood.32 This view is of course a corollary of 
the inseparability of din and dawla. However, he acknowledges the 
possibility of the existence of separate Muslim communities
living in different lands, each with its own ruler and each 
having a state "with all the characteristics of the Islamic
state, as is the case today". In this case the strong bonds which
should be established between them would be sufficient to fulfil 
the intention of the Quranic declaration: "This nation of yours 
is indeed one nation" (21 :92).33 Shaltut uses the term "Islamic 
nationalism" to describe nationalism in the Muslim countries 
generally, though perhaps not insignificantly this comes in the 
context of resistance to foreign control and interference.34
He takes a pride in his own country, describing it as "the 
qibla of Arabism and Islam";35 he mentions Arabism and Islam
together in several places,36 and one has the impression that the 
phrase is often used for its emotive value rather than in any 
strict theoretical sense, especially as some of these references 
occur within speeches delivered by Shaltut on various occasions.
32cAgida wa-Sharica , p. 433.
33Min Taw.iihat al-Islam, p. 557.
34Al-Fatawa, pp. 280-81; cf. Albert Hourani's statement: "It 
was the British occupation which fused Islamic modernism with 
Egyptian nationalism", in Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 
1798-1939, London: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 194.
35Min Taw.iihat al-Islam, p. 272.
36Ibid., pp. 523, 539 and 544.
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Elsewhere, however, Shaltut refers to the special relationship 
which exists between Arabism and Islam in view of the importance 
of the Qur'an for the Arabic language; he further erodes the 
distinction between the two by hinting that Arabism is a 
spiritual rather than a national or regional phenomenon, having a 
profound influence on intellectual and emotional development.37
Shaltut welcomed the declaration of the United Arab Republic 
and expressed the hope that it would ultimately embrace all the 
Muslim peoples.38 Similarly, while describing the Qur'an as the 
Muslims' constitution, he welcomes the new Egyptian 
constitution.39 Thus he shows himself to be a pragmatist as well 
as an idealist.
ii) The principles of government
Shaltut affirms that in Islam, sovereignty belongs to God 
alone; as man is God's vicegerent on earth, political authorities 
can only be representatives (nuwwab) of God, and the agents 
(wukala') of the people - "faithful servants" of the umma. Men 
are on an equal footing in their relationship to their Creator, 
and were not meant to have sovereignty over one another; the way 
in which the Qur'an addresses its injunctions to all the Muslims
37Shaltut, Amanat al-Qawmiyyat al-cArabiyya f1 Dhimmat al- 
Azhar, in Majallat al-Azhar, 33 (1961/62), pp. 655-56.
38 Ibid., p. 544.
"See ibid., pp. 553, 556 and 545-49.
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(eq."Ya avvuha alladhTna amanu", "Ya avvuha al~nas"), shows that 
authority is vested in the umma as a whole.40
All this means that any kind of tyranny or despotism is 
absolutely contrary to Islamic principles; on a practical level, 
the principle of shura (consultation) as laid down in the Qur'an 
and Sunna, counteracts the possibility of despotic government.41 
Shaltut attaches much importance to this principle, and lists it 
as one of the four foundations of the Islamic state along with 
religious brotherhood, social solidarity and justice.42 He refers 
to the context of the Quranic phrase: "Wa amruhum shura baynahum" 
("...who conduct their affairs by mutual consent..." - 42:38), 
where this quality is listed among others such as responding to 
the Lord, attending to prayers and spending for the sake of God, 
thus demonstrating its importance as an eternal religious 
principle. Furthermore, the Prophet was asked to consult his 
companions (3:159), and reproached on one occasion when he failed 
to do so (9: 67-68) ,43
These texts, together with various examples of the 
actualisation of the principle of shura in the Prophet's lifetime 
which Shaltut relates, show that even such an eminent person as 
God's messenger does not wield absolute authority.44 This
40Ibid., pp. 560-61 and 567-68 .
41 Ibid., p. 562.
42cAqida wa~Sharica , pp. 438-44.
4 3 Ibid., pp. 439-40.
44Min Taw.iihat al-Islam, pp. 562-63.
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openness to advice on the part of the head of state continued
under the first Caliphs, when men were free to express their
opinions. Although no systematic implementation of the process of
shura was laid down in the Qur'an or the Sunna,
it was a natural process; the Prophet or Caliph 
would assemble his companions, put the issue to 
them, and they would express their views; then 
either the majority opinion or the strongest 
argument would be put into effect.45
Shaltut maintains that this flexibility is in the Muslims' 
interests, since different circumstances may require different 
methods of implementing shura; but although the form and even the 
extent of application of shura are undetermined, the principle 
remains inviolable.46 He rather optimistically opines that so 
long as the aim of shura is the realisation of justice and the 
unity and prosperity of the umma, then the actual means will be 
"a simple affair".47
Shaltut is aware that the principle of shura has been abused 
in the past, and insists that the consultative process must be a 
genuine and effective one, not just a screen for autocrats to 
hide behind, nor a balm to placate others; any form of 
intimidation or bribery will of course invalidate the process. It 
should be no less of a reality than the prayer and spending with 
which it is mentioned in the Qur'an.48
45cAgida wa-Sharica , p. 440.
46Min Tawjihat al-Islam, p. 562.
47cAqida wa-Sharic-a, p. 441.
4 8 Ibid., pp. 441-42.
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While on the subject of shura, Shaltut talks about ulu al- 
amr, whom the Qur'an asks Muslims to obey (4:59). These are the 
acknowledged experts in all areas of life including the military, 
legal, financial and political.49 Religious knowledge, in this 
regard, is just one branch of specialisation among others.50 
Shaltut identifies ulu al-amr with ahl al-i.jmac ; whatever they 
agree upon, whether unanimously or by majority consensus, is to 
be observed by the Muslims until such time as renewed 
circumstances require that the ruling be renewed.51
However, this does not mean that there is a group of people 
who exercise unconditional authority over the populace, for this 
would contravene the principle that authority is vested in the 
umma as a whole. Any authority remains a wakil of the people, who 
have the right not only to choose their head of state (who may be 
an individual or a group), but to supervise his public and 
private actions (inasmuch as he must be morally upright in order 
to be worthy of office), and to dismiss him, if necessary by 
force, if he fails in his duties.52
The head of state is subject to the Sharica like anyone else; 
even the Prophet used to exact retaliation on himself, and the 
Rashidun Caliphs reinforced the principle: "La tacata li-makhlug 
fi macsiyat al-khaliq" (no man is to be obeyed if this involves
49 Ibid., p. 443 and Min Tawjihat al-Islam, p. 563 .
SOcAgida wa-Sharica, p. 444.
51 Ibid., p. 443.
52Min Tawjihat al-Islam, pp. 563-64 and 558.
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disobeying God). There can be no system of patronage to bolster 
personal power in an Islamic state; any authorities appointed by 
the head of state in his capacity of representative of the people 
are working not just for him but for the umma. Therefore his 
dismissal does not entail their dismissal.53
Thus Shaltut is emphatic in his rejection of the patterns of 
authority that were evolved in the Islamic empire, and of their 
subsequent justification in the annals of the classical political 
theorists, for the concept of unconditional obedience robbed the 
Muslims of the principle of shura.54
iii) Forms of government
Shaltut dismisses communism, capitalism and democracy as 
unsatisfactory man-made-systems; the first two can be seen to 
contradict the economic values of Islam, which recognises private 
ownership but does not countenance extreme wealth, while the 
third invests sovereignty in the people.55 For obvious reasons 
it is difficult for a Muslim to wholeheartedly endorse any man- 
made system. However, socialism is conspicuously absent from 
Shaltut's list of failed systems. Indeed, on the subject of riba 
(usurious interest), he states that with the growing 
disillusionment with capitalism,
53 Ibid., p. 564-5.
54cAqida wa Sharica, p. 444.
s5Min Taw.iihat al-Islam, pp. 63 and 566-67, and Fatawa, pp. 
398-99.
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the world is turning to socialism, which does not 
allow a small group of people to control wealth 
and enjoy the privileges of status and influence 
that it brings, while the hard-working majority 
increase the wealth of the former by the sweat of 
their brow, earning for themselves only the barest 
essentials as regards food, housing and clothing. 56
Of course Shaltut has in mind a particular type of socialism, 
namely Arab socialism, rather than Marxist socialism, which is in 
any case hostile towards religion. Even so, at first sight it may 
seem strange that a man of religion should espouse a system which 
does not have religious origins. It should be realised, though, 
that if Arab socialists are electic in their interpretation of 
socialism, then deeply religious Muslims are even more so. In 
fact, Shaltut's usage of the word ishtirakiyya leads us to 
believe that he sometimes envisages it as a kind of ideal 
paradigm, roughly approximating in meaning to "social justice". 
On one occasion he contrasts "socialism" as a political school of 
thought with the true "socialism" of Islam:
However much the advocates of socialism raise 
their heads and proclaim it abroad, you will not
find in what they say or in their actual lives
anything approximating to that socialism which 
emanates from the depths of faith, and which 
Islam has made into a way of life...57
Again, when he states that sadaqa "fulfils the noblest aims of
socialism” ,58 he is certainly using the term in this idealised
56Tafsir, p. 149.
B7cAqida wa~Sharica, p. 95.
B8Fatawa, p. 114.
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sense, for Shaltut would be the last person to judge Islam by the 
criterion of any man-made system.
In a long article entitled "Socialism and Islam",59 it is 
apparent that Shaltut sees Islam and socialism as wholly 
compatible. He concentrates on the theme of social solidarity, 
reiterating many of the ideas we have already outlined on the 
subject, including the concept of moral solidarity which he sees 
as deriving exclusively from Islam. On the subject of material 
solidarity, he stresses the importance of the development of the 
sources of wealth, i.e. agriculture, industry and commerce. He 
sees it as a religious obligation for the nation to be self- 
sufficient with regard to its material needs, thus avoiding the 
necessity for any foreign interference.60 He further states that 
these three realms of activity must be coordinated, so that one 
is not allowed to develop at the expense of the others, "even if 
this means transforming agricultural land into commercial or 
industrial concerns, according to the country's needs". Thus he 
envisages an extensive role for the state in organising the
domestic economy, including if necessary the confiscation or
59Published in Al-Jumhuriyya, December 22nd 1961. This 
article has aroused some interest as it has been reproduced in 
French under the title of Le Socialisme de l'Islam, in Orient, 5 
(1961), No. 20 (4ieme trimestre), pp. 163-74 and the bulk of it 
has been reproduced in English in K.H. Karpat (ed.), Political 
and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, London: Pall 
Mall Press, 1968, pp. 126-32. The English version was republished 
in a slightly abridged form in J. Donohue and J. Esposito (eds.), 
Islam in Transition, pp. 99-102. I was unable to obtain the
original article and have based my comments on the French 
translation which is unabridged.
60Le Socialisme de l'Islam, p. 170.
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limitation of land, for which he cites precedents in Islamic 
history.61 Various Quranic quotes are given to illustrate Islam's 
stress on charity and spending, and to show that all material 
possessions belong to God and are only held in trust by man, who 
is therefore obliged to observe the needs of the community in 
their disposal.62
With its strongly religious tone, this article does not 
represent a departure from any of Shaltut's formerly professed 
views on the subject, apart from being more explicit on the 
subject of land confiscation. Indeed, parts of it are reproduced 
verbatim from some of his other published works.63 Of Shaltut's
support of socialism in general, one could say that it
illustrates his pragmatic side; it is understandable that he 
should support a system which had been adopted by his country and 
others as a means of resisting imperialism and achieving social 
and economic justice, and which could therefore be considered to 
be in the best interests of those countries at that time.
iv) International relations and relations with non-Muslims
Relations with non-Muslims are of obvious significance for
international relations as well as for internal politics and
everyday human relations. In a section entitled "International
61 Ibid., pp. 171-72.
6 2 Ibid., 172-74.
63See, e.g., Min Huda al-Qur'an, p. 210, passage 
corresponding to ibid., pp. 169-70.
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Relations in Islam", Shaltut states that peace is the norm (al- 
halat al-asliyya) in all human relationships in Islam. Islam 
stresses the unity of all mankind; all that is asked of non- 
Muslims is that they refrain from harming Islam or the Muslims. 
In this case, they can be considered "brothers in humanity", and 
all can work together for the general good, each propagating his 
own religion non-aggressively. Shaltut stresses that there can be 
no compulsion in religion, and that Islam sanctions only 
defensive wars, i.e. in response to some provocation, whether it 
be direct aggression, oppression of Muslims, violation of a 
treaty, etc.64
Shaltut confirms the right of the Muslims to conclude treaties 
or alliances with non-Muslims, citing as examples the 
Constitution of Medina (which granted freedom of worship to the 
Jews), the treaty with the Christian tribe of Najran, which was a 
permanent one, and the Treaty of Hudaybiyya, concluded with the 
idolaters of Quraysh, which provides an example of a temporary 
treaty.65 Elsewhere, however, Shaltut points out that all 
treaties with the mushrikun were cancelled by the bara1 a (freedom 
from obligation) announced in the first verse of Surat al-Tawba, 
so that it is now no longer possible to enter into agreements 
with them.66
64cAqida wa~Sharica , pp. 452-53.
65Ibid., p. 456.
66Tafsir, p. 612.
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Shaltut usually stresses the possibility of good relations 
with ahl-al-kitab; the Qur'an enjoins justice and even kindness 
(birr) towards them, and the permission to marry their women and 
eat their food is seen as highly significant, especially in view 
of the closeness and sacredness of the marriage relationship.67
Shaltut disagrees with those who believe that the permission 
to marry the women of ahl al-kitab was restricted to the time of 
the revelation, either due to a temporary shortage of Muslim 
women or because the Christians have become worse since that time 
with regard to worshipping Christ, and this is tantamount to 
shirk so they should be classified as mushrikun. Shaltut refutes 
this last idea, since there is nothing in the Qur'an to suggest 
it was a temporary licence. Furthermore, even Christians who 
believe that God is the third of three, or that Jesus is His son, 
or that Muhammad is not His messenger, are not polytheists since 
all this does not negate their belief in God and in prophethood 
and revelation. Shaltut then goes on to give, in his opinion, the 
reason behind this permission - namely that this should be a 
means of spreading Islam, so that Christians and Jews should have 
a chance to learn about Islam at first hand in an atmosphere of 
love and friendship.68
On the religious level, while abhorring certain beliefs which 
have evolved with regard to Jesus, he nevertheless insists that 
Christians retain their status of ahl al-kitab by virtue of their
67Ibid., p. 530 and 295.
6BTafsir, pp. 295-96.
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basic belief in God and revelation.69 Moreover the basic creed is 
the same in all the divine religions, and the Qur'an warns 
against any religious community considering themselves superior 
by virtue of following a particular prophet, while the true 
criterion is faith and good works.70 Shaltut envisages a society 
in which Muslims and ahl al-kitab have equal rights and duties 
and live in mutual cooperation.71
However, Shaltut does not wholly refrain from polemics with 
regard to ahl al-kitab. It is perhaps inevitable that he should 
refer to the situation in the Prophet's lifetime, when the 
hostility with which his mission met led, among other things, to 
the Quranic order to Muhammad to challenge the Christians to a 
mutual cursing regarding the nature of Jesus. He also describes 
the various ruses and arguments which the Jews and Christians 
employed in their opposition to Muhammad's message.72
While upholding Islam's respect for religious freedom on the 
one hand, Shaltut does on one or two occasions fall into the trap 
of identifying the powers of European colonialism with 
Christianity; he does this is the course of a bitter tirade 
against modern warfare methods and so-called world peace, "whose 
anniversary is celebrated every year by the liars and slanderers 
who claim to follow the messenger of peace (i.e. Jesus)..."-
69Ibid., pp. 94-95 .
70cAqida wa-Sharica, p. 44, and Min Taw.iihat al-Islam, p. 54.
71Min Tawjihat al-Islam, p. 93.
72Tafsir , pp. 96-99.
268
although it is apparent from the use of the word "claim" that he 
does not regard them as true Christians.73 It is clear from a 
similar passage that he is motivated here by a resentment of the 
Christians' claim that theirs is the peace-loving religion par 
excellence, and their assertion that Islam was spread by the 
sword, while in fact wars are being propagated by them.74
Despite the permission to associate with ahl al-kitab, Shaltut 
acknowledges that Muslim unity sometimes requires caution in such 
relations; the Qur'an itself warns of the dangers of following 
certain of them (3:100).75 However, he does not disparage them en 
masse. The Quranic verse which states that whoever takes the Jews 
and Christians as awliya176 is one of them (5:51), is quoted 
among a list of Quranic warnings against "enemies of Islam"; from 
this it would appear likely that Shaltut takes it to apply only 
to those Jews and Christians who are hostile towards Islam, and 
not to Jews and Christians per se.77 There is no hint that any of 
these passages should be taken as applying only in the Prophet's 
lifetime, for that would be contrary to the tenet of al cibra bi- 
cumum al-lafz II bi-khusus al-sabab, applied by Shaltut and the 
Muhammad cAbduh school of tafsir in general.
73Min Taw.iihat al-Islam, p. 238 .
74Min Huda al-Qur'an, p. 325 .
75Min Tawjihat al-Islam, p. 540.
76This word is certainly meant to denote more than just
"friends" as is given in some English translations of the Qur'an; 
perhaps a better rendering would be "close allies".
77Min Taw.iihat al-Islam, p. 262.
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With regard to mushrikun, Shaltut believes that "disbelief
alone does not render the shedding of blood lawful", in the
absence of aggression.78 He points out that the bara'a announced 
in Qur'an 9:1 does not mean that God has completely abandoned 
them and cut off his mercy from them.79 We should also bear in 
mind Shaltut's refusal to brand anyone as a kafir who has not 
heard the message of Islam, or who has heard it but has had it 
poorly presented to them; shirk implies an active turning away 
from guidance.80
d) Conclusions
We will attempt briefly here to put Shaltut's views in some 
kind of context, always bearing in mind that he is essentially a 
religious scholar, and does not claim to be anything else.
On the question of Islam versus Arab nationalism, we can
comment that historically Arab nationalism can be said to be 
based more on cultural and linguistic considerations than on 
strictly racial ones;81 all Arabs can take a pride in their
Islamic heritage just as all Muslims take a pride in the Arabic 
language. Therefore the divide is not as great as might be
thought. In any case, Arab nationalism, particularly in the minds
78Tafsir, pp. 426-27.
79 Ibid., p. 612.
80Ibid., pp. 229 and 230.
81cAbd al~cAziz al-Durr, The Historical Roots of Arab
Nationalism, in Karpat, op. cit., p. 37.
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of religious thinkers, has most often been "a movement for 
guarding a nation's independence and freedom in the face of an 
external aggressor", rather than "an intellectual assertion of a 
nation's separateness and identity".82 It is fundamentalists such 
as the Muslim Brothers who have taken the most uncompromising 
view of nationalism,83 but, significantly, these have never had 
to run a state.
Shaltut does not touch on the procedural questions such as the 
actual scope and authority of shura or the way in which it is to 
be implemented, or the means by which an unjust ruler is to be 
identified as such and subsequently removed. He believes that 
such matters are dependent upon circumstances and should be 
worked out by the appropriate specialists. Although it is now 
generally agreed that ulu al-amr consist of authorities in all 
walks of life, such as industrial, agricultural, commercial, 
economic, political and military,84 the process by which they are 
to be identified and the exact nature of their authority are left 
open by Shaltut.
82Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought, Hong Kong: 
Macmillan, 1986, (repr.), p. 112.
83 Ibid., p., 115.
84This was Rashid Rida's definition of ulu al-amr - Tafsir 
al-Manar, 5:187; Rida has been criticised for his vagueness on 
procedural details (see Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of 
Political Community, London: Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 
80-81, and Badawi, op. cit., p. 63); perhaps this is because he, 
unlike Shaltut, had some claim to be a political theorist, 
witness his work on the Caliphate.
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As in other areas we have covered, such as penal law, it is 
common for modern-day scholars to disregard or disagree with 
certain opinions of the classical fuqaha'. One may cite the 
insistence that Islam does not condone wars of aggression, which 
represents a modification of the classical jurists' concept of 
jihad. In such cases, the need to rely on the Qur'an and the 
Sunna rather than the jurists' rulings is stressed.85 It is 
natural that Muslims should stress the liberal humanitarian 
qualities of Islamic political principles, such as justice, 
freedom, equality, religious tolerance and the desire for peace, 
and find support for these in the Qur’an.86 However, some 
exercise a certain selectiveness in their choice of sources, in
order to reconcile the Islamic polity with certain
internationally recognised principles of the present day, as 
embodied for example in the U.N. Charter. Such is the case where 
a contemporary Muslim scholar states that "Islamic law permits a 
Muslim state to enter into security arrangements with non-Muslim 
states", citing as evidence the Prophet's treaties with Arab 
tribes. However, he chooses to ignore the announcement of the 
bara'a which led to the cancelling of all such agreements.87 This
85 See, e.g., Agha Shahi, The Role of Islam in Contemporary 
International Relations, in L'Islam dans les Relations 
Internationales, Aix-en-Provence: Edisud, 1986, p. 23.
86See, e.g., L'Islam dans les Relations Internationales, pp. 
17-18, 88 and 118ff, and Muhamed S. el-Awa, On the Political
System of the Islamic State, tr. Ahmad NajT al-Imam,
Indianapolis*. American Trust Publications, 1980, pp. 97-113.
87Shahi, op. cit., p. 26.
contrasts with Shaltut, whose mental immersion in the Qur’an and 
the Sunna does not allow him to be selective in this way. In the 
same way, while pointing out the possibility of good relations 
with ahl al-kitab, Shaltut is unable to ignore the Quranic verses 
which warn against certain of their ruses etc.
As regards forms of government, Shaltut is clearly influenced 
by his environment in his endorsement of socialism. Unlike 
Muhammad al-Bahi, whose enthusiastic promotion of socialism 
earned him a government ministry between 1962 and 1964, Shaltut 
was never accused of political opportunism. There is no reason to 
doubt that he was sincere in his belief in Arab socialism as
beneficial to his country and in his admiration of certain
aspects of Nasser's rule.88
Certain earlier Muslim thinkers such as Rashid Rida and cAbbas 
Mahmud al-cAqqad stressed the affinity between Islam and
democracy, laying particular stress on the concept of shura as 
well as the ideals of equality, freedom etc.89 Although Shaltut’s 
generation admired those same qualities, the discrediting of the 
West that had taken place during the interval, and the admiration 
of the anti-imperialist stand of the Soviet Union and China made 
Muslims reluctant to support any ideological trend which
8BFor an able analysis of the reasons behind the culama'1s 
support of Nasser's government see Enayat, op. cit., pp. 117-20. 
Not least of the reasons given is the culama'1s hope of
influencing the leadership by lending their support, and their 
fear that Islam might otherwise get left by the wayside.
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originated in the West.90 Socialism was therefore turned to by 
political leaders and religious scholars alike, although Shaltut 
and others carefully avoided reference to "Islamic socialism" or 
any other phrase which might imply an identification of the 
two.91 A fundamentalist such as Sayyid Qutb may have rejected 
socialism as a system having its origins outside Islam,92 but his 
views on social justice and religion generally do not differ 
radically from those of Shaltut, therefore the difference would
appear to be one of terminology rather than of principle,
especially as Shaltut often uses the word "socialism" in an 
idealised sense, as we have shown. Shaltut was a product of his
age in another way when he expressed hopes for a unified military
force which would defend all the Muslim countries,93 influenced, 
no doubt, by Nasser's attempts to establish a United Arab 
Republic. It is unthinkable that any scholar would express such a 
hope in the eighties.
90The wheel has now turned full circle in that modernists 
can describe Islam as "democratic" without any such 
embarrassment, alluding primarily to the electoral procedure- 
see, e.g., F. Rahman, The Islamic Concept of State, in Donohue 
and Esposito (eds.), Islam in Transition, p. 261.
91Even that ardent supporter of the socialist cause, 
Muhammad al-Bahl, insisted on the distinct identities of 
socialism and Islam, and saw socialism as a necessary transition 
period rather than as an end in itself - see M. Bahi, Al-Fikr al­
ls 1 ami wa'l-Mujtamac al-Mucasir; Mushkilat al-Hukm wa'1-Tawjih, 
2nd ed., Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Lubnani, 1975, pp. 317 and 323.
92Enayat, op. cit., p. 151.
93Min Tawjihat al-Islam, p. 543.
274
On the politically sensitive issue of the rights of non- 
Muslims, apart from the rather vague reference to "equal rights 
and duties", and the granting of religious autonomy, Shaltut 
gives no detailed exposition of the status of ahl al-kitab, or of 
mushrikun, in an Islamic society. He does not say, for example, 
whether or not ahl al-kitab would be excluded from government, 
but simply states that Muslims must be in control of their own 
affairs in order to fulfil God's commands in an Islamic 
society.94 Some contemporary scholars address this dilemma more 
explicitly, pointing out that the fact that the Islamic state is 
based on a specific ideology means that only those who adhere to 
that ideology can be entrusted with the running of the state and 
its defence.95 Maududi defends this distinction of status by 
saying that at least it is clear and explicit, and non-Muslims 
are guaranteed certain basic inviolable rights, while in the 
alternative of the modern nation-state the social, cultural or 
religious minorities suffer various forms of overt or covert 
prejudice, and are ultimately at the mercy of the majority. 
Moreover, non-Muslims have the option to convert to Islam, so 
that any restrictions placed on them are not permanent and 
irremovable.96
94Nin Tawjihat al-Islam, p. 557.
95 Yusuf Qaradawi, Ghayr al-MuslimTn fI al-Mujtamac al­
ls 1 ami, Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1977, p. 33, and Abul Acla
Maududi, Rights of Non-Muslims in an Islamic State, tr. K. Ahmad, 
Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1961, pp. 1-2.
96Maududi, op. cit., pp. 1-4.
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Despite the professed egalitarianism of Islam,97 the very fact 
of a state being "Islamic" and the emphasis on religious 
brotherhood as a foundation of the state necessarily implies that 
non-Muslims must have an inferior status in some respects. The 
payment of jizya, which Shaltut describes as a sign of 
acknowledgement of the ruling power and a means of participating 
in the (financial) burdens of the state,98 while being a natural 
corollary of the non-participation in the defence of the state 
for the reasons given above by Maududi, remains a conspicuous 
symbol of the differentiated status of ahl al-kitab,99 Shaltut 
feels no need to justify or apologise for this, in his firm 
conviction that Islam provides the best possible system for 
mankind as a whole.100
2) The Contemporary Reality
a) The Impact of Imperialism
We have already referred to the immeasurable impact of the 
military and political domination of the West on the minds of the
97Min Tawjihat al-Islam, p. 73.
" Min Huda al-Qur*an, p. 340.
" One contemporary scholar who is generally conservative in 
outlook, maintains that jizya is a kind of non-Muslim counterpart 
of zakah, and that non-Muslims may volunteer for conscription and 
be exempted from the payment of jizya. According to this 
interpretation ahl al-kitab would have a privileged status, 
having more freedom of choice than the Muslims. See cAbdur Rahman 
I. Doi, Non-Muslims under Sharica (sic), 3rd ed., London: Ta Ha, 
1983, p. 57.
100 See, e.g. cAgida wa Shari0a, p. 450, and Min Tawjihat al- 
Islam, p. 552.
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Muslims. Shaltut lived and wrote at a time when not all Muslim 
countries had gained their independence; the factors which led to
the deterioration of the Muslims' situation and enabled
foreigners to subjugate them, and the lessons to be learned 
therefrom, are a frequent subject of discussion with him.
One of the principal factors to which the "downfall" of the 
Muslims is attributed is the loss of their sense of identity and 
lack of pride in their religion and nation(s), and the consequent 
separation of social and religious matters.101 Like other modern 
reformers, Shaltut applies the simple logic that since God 
promised in the Qur'an to make the Muslims victorious in battle 
even over superior numbers (8:66), military failure must be
attributed to a lack of the true religious spirit in the hearts 
of the combatants.102 Failure to observe the true spirit of the 
c ibadat and thus to derive the desired benefit from them has 
prevented Muslims from achieving the strength, success and glory 
for which they were meant.103 Moreover, a superficial
understanding of what it means to be a Muslim has resulted in 
Muslim disunity and the predominance of selfish desires, which 
greatly facilitated the enemies' task.104 The spirit of sacrifice
101 Min Tawjihat al-Islam, pp. 58-59, and Min Huda al-Qur'an, 
p. 234.
102Min Tawjihat al-Islam, pp. 477-78.
103 Ibid., p. 496.
104 Ibid., p. 53.
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which is manifest in the hi.jra of the first Muslims is lacking in 
the modern age.105
Shaltut recognises the importance of education and research in 
the development of a strong and independent nation, for it was an 
inadequacy in this direction, largely due to the predominance of 
taglid over ijtihad, that gave foreigners the opportunity to 
infiltrate all areas of Islamic society and exploit the Muslims 
economically on the pretext of bringing "progress" to them.106 It 
is not enough simply to carry out one's religious duties and then 
relax in the knowledge that God will not allow non-Muslims to be 
victorious over Muslims; Muslims must also pursue the material 
means which will ensure victory. It was neglect of these means 
that enabled their enemies to gain power over them.107 Shaltut 
condemns the fatalistic attitude which has sometimes been 
promoted by enemies of Islam, so that "trust in God" has resulted 
in inactivity and passive acceptance of the status quo, instead 
of vigorous opposition to any form of imperialist control.100
Shaltut brings out the significance of various Islamic texts 
for the current situation of the Muslims. "Holding fast to the 
rope of God" (3:103) involves, among other things, evolving an 
authentic Islamic economic infrastructure, in order to prevent 
the imperialists from siphoning off the wealth of underdeveloped
10BIbid., p. 528.
10 6 Ibid., p. 139 and Min Huda al-Qur'an, p. 281.
107Min Tawjihat al-Islam, p. 286.
10BMin Huda al-Qur'an, p. 251.
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Muslim countries, as well as an effective military power.109 The 
Quranic category of "fT al-riqab" as one of the heads of 
expenditure for zakah (9:60) is deemed by some to be obsolete in 
an age when slavery has died out, but Shaltut maintains that the 
ideological, economical and political slavery of nations is an 
even worse phenomenon than the slavery of individuals, and 
deserves to have much money and effort spent for the sake of its 
removal.110 The occasion when the Prophet ordered the destruction 
of the "opposition mosque", and the hadith which says that 
peepholes giving on to a neighbour's private quarters must be 
blocked, lead Shaltut to talk of the importance of national 
security. Bearing in mind that even a mosque can be used as a 
screen for hostile activities, one should be suspicious of all 
institutions which could be used to serve imperialist ends, be 
they cultural, educational, charitable, financial, etc.; the 
taking of (non-Muslim) "military allies" is particularly
deletorious.111
In view of the importance attached to political independence,
Shaltut takes much pride in his own country's achievement of
independence, and in the achievements of Nasser, whom he
109Min Taw.jihat al-Islam, p. 543.
11°Fatawa., pp. 118-19.
111Min Taw.jihat al-Islam, pp. 279-81; this unequivocal stand 
is greatly admired in a recent newspaper article, where a more 
recent Shaykh al-Azhar, al-Najjar, is unfavourably compared with 
Shaltut, the former having issued fatwas in support of petty 
vested interests, while Shaltut retains his integrity and
impartiality - see FahmT HuwaydT, Lahut al-Taharrur, in Al-Ahram, 
March 8th 1988.
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describes in one speech as "the chosen hand of God", when talking 
of the newly inaugurated United Arab Republic.112 The Suez Canal 
incident is obliquely referred to as an example of how strength 
of faith and a readiness to fight can help the Muslims to 
overcome superior numbers.113
b) The Religious Response: the Defence of Islam
One of the most marked reactions to the Western threat was the 
defensive one; Islam now needed to be defended against a 
dominant, non-Muslim West, and Muslims felt the need to justify 
their faith in the face of charges of backwardness and 
barbarianism. This defence took various forms.
Jamal al-Din al-AfghanT (1839-97) was one of the first in the 
Arab world to rise to this challenge. He was well aware of 
Europe's criticisms of Islam and responded vigorously to them; he 
refuted Renan's claim in his lecture at the Sorbonne in 1883 
entitled "Islam and Science", that Islam was incompatible with 
modern science and in contradiction with it; his longest work, 
"AI-Radd cala al-Dahriyyln" ("The Refutation of the 
Materialists"), attacked the theories of European thinkers such 
as Darwin as well as freethinkers from the Muslim world, such as 
Ahmad Khan, who wished to dispense with the Sharica while 
retaining the Qur'an.
112Ibid., pp. 272 and 544.
113 Ibid., p. 478.
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His erstwhile disciple and companion, Muhammad cAbduh, 
defended Islam in his replies to the articles of Monsieur 
Hanotaux (the French foreign minister) which appeared in a French 
newspaper, and later in reply to the articles of Farah cAntun, an 
Arab Christian, which appeared in "Al-Mu'ayyad". Like al- 
Afghani, he stressed the complementary roles of reason and 
revelation, Islam's flexibility and compatibility with modern 
civilisation, its emphasis on equality, its naturalness 
(fitriyya), and its eternal nature.114 For al-Afghani and cAbduh, 
the gate of i.jtihad was most definitely open, providing Islamic 
law with its dynamic element and safeguarding it against 
stagnation and decay which are the inevitable result of taglid.
Rashid Rida continued Muhammad cAbduh's work in this respect, 
but there is a change of emphasis discernible between the two 
earlier reformers and Rashid Rida, which reflects the changing 
times. While al-Afghani and cAbduh were aware that many Muslims 
needed to be taught their own religion anew and were concerned 
with this area of activity, at the same time they had much 
contact with Europeans and were familiar with European language 
and culture. Rashid Rida, on the other hand, had virtually no 
contact with Europeans,115 and his writings were addressed almost 
exclusively to Muslims; the fact is that by his time it had 
become necessary to defend Islam to the Muslims themselves - in
114See C.C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, pp. 86-90
for a more detailed description of these correspondences.
!15Hourani, op. cit., p. 235.
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particular those who had received a Western education and were 
attracted by European civilisation.
Among Muhammad cAbduh's followers we find a great variety of
schools of thought; while he himself had a background of
traditional Islamic scholarship, many of his pupils were less 
educated in the strictly religious sense, and there were some who 
used his ideas for very different purposes than those for which 
they were originally intended. Some believe that the concept of 
Islam that Muhammad cAbduh propounded was flexible to the point 
of vagueness, with, for example, its emphasis on the principle of 
maslaha (public interest) in Islamic law, in order to leave more 
room for human value judgements, and that it was therefore not 
surprising that his pupils had such vastly differing viewpoints, 
some of them tending towards secularist ideologies.116 These 
include Qasim Amin (1865-1908), who in his book "Al-Mar'a al- 
Jadida" virtually disregarded the Sharica and referred to Europe
for an example of the ideal state of womanhood, and Ahmad Lutfi
al-Sayyid (1872-1963), who rejected religion as a basis for 
nationalism.
Among those of cAbduh's followers who were interested in 
defending Islam, Muhammad FarTd Wagdi (d. 1952) is an interesting 
example. He was a profuse writer and apologist of Islam117;
116See, e.g., Hourani, op. cit., p. 163, and Safran, op. 
cit, p. 76.
117See Sarkis, Mucjamat al-Matbucat al-cArabiyya wa'l- 
Muc arraba, Matbacat TarkTs bi-Misr, 1928, columns 1451-52, and C. 
Brockelmann, Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur, Supp. No. 3, 
Leiden; E. J. Brill, 1942, pp. 324-25, for lists of his works.
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originally a journalist, he did not have the same religious 
training as cAbduh, although he was editor of Majallat al-Azhar 
from 1933 up until the year of his death. Wilfred Cantwell Smith 
uses him as an illustration of the dangers of apologetics;119 
when one's main aim is to defend something, truth can sometimes 
be sacrificed to that defence, and writings which are exclusively 
apologetic are unconstructive - they portray Islam as a kind of 
wonderful object to be admired, instead of calling for action. 
Moreover the constant reference to external criteria - in this 
case Western civilisation and all that it entails - to the 
detriment of one’s own indigenous heritage, amounts to a kind of 
neurosis. The desire to defend one’s religion against attack is 
natural enough, but can be a double-edged sword when this is not 
supplemented by positive teachings.
We find some Muslims who are willing to abandon some of the 
most fundamental legislation of Islam, concerning sensitive areas 
like polygamy, divorce and the hudud (prescribed punishments), in 
order that it may conform more closely to the Western ideal. 
These Westernising modernists had no little influence with many 
of the Muslim governments; for the greater part of this century 
the sphere of authority of the Sharica has steadily diminished in 
nearly all the Muslim countries, even in the area of family 
law.119 Tunisia, a pioneer in this respect, while paying lip-
118W .C . Smith, Islam in Modern History, pp. 132-50.
119This statement may need to be modified in the light of 
developments over the last two decades, in which many pressure 
groups have been calling for a return to the Sharica, but here we
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service to Islamic law, passed legislation in 1956 which 
abolished the Qadi's tribunals and made polygamy a criminal 
offense.12 0
Even among those who are determined to preserve the unchanging 
elements of the Sharica, i.e. those based on the Qur'an and the 
true Sunna, we find some of the adverse symptoms of apologetics, 
such as gross generalisation and a cavalier attitude towards 
history. Defending polygamy, Rashid Rida writes, among other 
things, that in Europe there is not one man in 100,000 who is not 
adulterous,121 and defending the position of women in Islam, he 
claims that before Islam all nations treated women as animals and 
denied them any rights.122
At the opposite end of the scale to the Westerning Muslims we 
find the Muslim fundamentalists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
and other similar groups which grew up largely in reaction to and 
protest against Western influence. Muhammad Qutb's "Shubahat 
hawla al-Islam", translated into English as "Islam, the 
Misunderstood Religion", gives us an example of the 
fundamentalist/conservative viewpoint. In the chapter on Islam 
and women, for example, reasons are given for man's authority 
over women with stress laid on women's emotional disposition;
are primarily concerned with Shaltut's lifetime.
120See J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Chapter 
15 passim.
121Tafsir al-Manar, 4:355.
122 Ibid., 4: 306.
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the author takes a pride in the Islamic system, which he sees as 
the ideal, whereby the women's primary role is the upbringing of 
the children and the care of the home.123 Similarly he sees the 
Islamic divorce laws as the best possible system.124 While 
admitting that the position of women in the Muslim world leaves 
much to be desired, he attributes this to various factors such as 
poverty, social injustice and political repression, despite the 
fact that the economic and political teachings of Islam are 
designed to abolish all these.125 Thus the author maintains that 
Islam is the ideal source of legislation, and that there is no 
need to have recourse to Western socio-cultural or legal norms.
Having briefly described the range of Muslim reactions to the 
West and the ways in which they defended their religion, we will 
proceed without further delay to Shaltut.
i) Shaltut's position: a positive approach
In Shaltut's writings we find little apologetic content as 
such. His "defence" is usually of a more positive nature; he 
likes to dwell on the qualities of Islam which make it the ideal 
religion: its moderation (tawassut), naturalness (fitriyya),
tolerance and lenience (samaha wa-yusr), rationality (cagliyya), 
its eternal nature (khulud), and its comprehensiveness and
1 "Muhammad Qutb, Islam: The Misunderstood Religion, 7th
ed., Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1984, pp. 121-23.
124 Ibid., pp. 116-18.
125 Ibid., pp. 124-30.
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completeness (kamal). He is firmly in the idealist camp, with a 
passionate belief in the validity of his religion on its own 
terms, without feeling the need to measure it against external 
criteria.
We will describe Shaltut's exposition of these positive 
qualities of Islam before going on to discuss his defence of 
religion in general vis-a-vis secularism and materialism, and of 
Islam in particular on certain issues.
The middle way
Moderation (tawassut) is a well-known principle of Islam. In 
his tafsir of Surat al-Fatiha, under the heading, "Islam is the 
Straight Path",126 Shaltut lists some of the areas of life in 
which Islam recommends the middle way. Firstly, with regard to 
faith, it represents the mean between atheism and polytheism; 
secondly, with regard to morality, it represents the mean between 
those who have no concept of virtue whatsoever, and those who are 
over-strict and go to extremes in their rigid interpretation of 
morality, as well as being a middle way in individual moral 
qualities, falling between cowardice and recklessness, 
miserliness and profligacy, arrogance and subservience; thirdly, 
it represents the mean between pure materialism, and the constant 
pursuit of gain, and pure spirituality, which entails asceticism, 
celibacy, and denying the good things of life;127 fourthly, as
126Tafsir, pp. 31-36.
127He expands on this topic in Min Tawjihat al-Islam, pp.
96f f.
286
regards legislation, it neither leaves everything to man nor does 
it arrogate everything to itself, but lays down some things while 
delegating others to man; fifthly, regarding the individual's 
relation to society, it neither leaves man completely free so 
that the strong can oppress the weak, nor does it negate his 
individuality, making him a mere tool of society - instead it 
lays down a balanced system of rights and duties for the 
individual and for society; sixthly, regarding international 
relations, it neither neglects the defence of the Muslim nations, 
nor does it require the Muslims to oppress other nations, 
attacking them unjustly, but requires that the Muslims be always 
on their guard, and defines the legitimate reasons for war.
In his general religious writings Shaltut makes fairly 
frequent mention of the moderation of Islam, and he quotes many 
passages from the Qur'an demonstrating this quality.128 In 
addition to the aforementioned areas, he mentions the political 
sphere, where Islam endorses neither tyranny nor anarchy,129 and 
the economic sphere, where it endorses neither a capitalist-type 
economy nor a communist-type one.130
Part of Islam's tawassut is that it is based upon reality and 
practical needs; it caters for man's physical and spiritual
128See, e.g., ibid., p. 131.
129Ibid., pp. 107-8.
130cAgida wa-Sharica , p. 95, and Tafsir, p. 497.
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requirements,131 and regulates for matters which, though in 
themselves undesirable, are an inevitable part of life, such as 
war.13 2
Shaltut raises tawassut to the level of a "major principle" 
(asI cazim)133 of Islam, and it is one which influences him in 
his fatwas , as where he discusses the confusion which has arisen 
between those who say singing and music is absolutely haram and 
those who say it is absolutely halal. Citing this principle, 
Shaltut falls between the two camps, believing it to be lawful 
with certain provisos.134
Al-fitriyya
Shaltut often mentions this characteristic in conjunction with 
tawassut, since man's natural instincts should be regulated, and 
not allowed to go to extremes.135 He repeatedly affirms that 
Islam does not deny man's natural inclinations, but rather 
moderates them. Commenting that the injunction to be good to 
one's parents, and particularly the mother, in view of all that 
she has borne for the sake of her child, is in accordance with 
nature, Shaltut goes on to say:
131Nin Tawjihat al-Islam, pp. 65 and 176, under the heading 
"Din al-Waqir".
1 " Ibid., pp. 236-7.
133Fatawa, p. 411.
134Ibid., pp. 409-14.
1 "E.g. Min Tawjihat al-Islam, pp. 131, 155 and 497, and
Fatawa, p. 411.
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The injunctions of Islam are in accordance with 
the requirements of human nature not just as 
regards the treatment of parents; indeed, if we 
look further afield, bearing in mind the
requirements of nature in all areas of life, then
compare these with the Islamic legislation in 
those areas, we will find that the Islamic 
legislation is invariably nothing more than the 
regulation of that which human nature requires; 
its regulation of family life is in accordance 
with nature, for the mother is the one most 
closely involved in bringing up the children, she 
suckles them and wakes for them at night, while 
the man helps her in the care of the children, 
works hard, spends, and acts as the guardian of 
the family; its regulation of financial matters, 
namely that money should be obtained by legal 
means and spent in a reasonable manner, and 
neither held back nor squandered, is in accordance 
with nature; its regulation of human relations, on 
a basis of love and cooperation, without 
exploiting those who are in need or subjugating 
those who are weak, is in accordance with nature.196
In this passage it is evident that Shaltut takes nature and 
human nature to be essentially good - indeed, there is no concept 
of original sin in Islam. He asserts that mankind is naturally 
disposed to believe in God,197 and he refers to the way in which 
the Qur'an itself appeals to man's natural instincts as a witness
to tawhid.198 Human nature, in its uncorrupted state, is able to
recognise the truth and knows instinctively that which is 
wrong,139 and if it weren't for "external pressures", human
136cAqida wa-Sharica, p. 222; he also talks about Islam's 
regulation of man's natural inclinations in Fatawa, pp. 410-11 
and in Min Tawjihat al-Islam, pp. 497, 155 and 106.
137Min Tawjihat al-Islam, pp. 5 and 35.
19eIla al-Qur'an al-Karim, pp. 63-64.
199Min Tawjihat al-Islam, pp. 29 and 194.
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nature would hasten to obey God’s commands.140 Thus Muhammad's 
mission was, in a sense, to awaken this natural spirit in man.141
The lawfulness of polygamy in Islam is seen as an instance of 
the regulation of human nature, since it caters for those 
circumstances where for some reason monogamy is unable to fulfil 
man's natural requirements, and avoids the need for adultery, 
while at the same time limiting the number of wives and giving 
instructions for their equitable treatment.142
Al-samaha wa'l-yusr
Again, we find this characteristic related to the previous 
one, since the fact that the precepts of Islam are in accordance 
with human nature makes it necessarily easier for man to comply 
with them.
The main example which Shaltut cites of Islam's leniency is 
those areas, particularly in acts of worship, where alternatives 
are allowed in case of difficulty (tashrTc al-badal), such as the 
shortening of the prayer or the permission not to fast during a 
journey,*143 he also mentions those occasions where necessity 
removes tahrim (prohibition), such as where one is starving to
140 Ibid., pp. 151-52.
141 Ibid., pp. 453-54.
142cAgida wa-Sharica, pp. 181-82.
143See, e.g., cAqida wa-Sharica , pp. 110-11, under the
heading, "Mazahir al-yusr fi al-siyam", and pp. 89-91, under the 
headings, "TaysTr Allah cala cibadihi fT al-salah", and "al-yusr 
dakhil al-salat min jamTc nawahlha", and Fatawa, pp. 141-43, 
under the headings, "Yusr al-Islam wa-rahmatuhu" and "Al-yusr fT 
sawm Ramadan".
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death and the only available food would normally be haram, or 
where prohibited substances are contained in medicine which is 
essential for one's health.144
Under the heading, "Yusr al-Islam wa-Samahatuh", Shaltut 
writes:
They {i.e. those who consider religion to be 
unduly harsh and restrictive) ought to acquaint 
themselves with the general foundation upon which 
the religious legislation is based, and read the 
words of God Almighty: "God does not charge a soul 
with more than it can bear" (2:286), and "God 
desires your well-being, not your discomfort"
(2:185), and "He has not made the observance of 
your faith difficult for you" (22:78), and they 
should listen to the words of the noble Prophet:
"Religion is easy; whomsoever overburdens himself 
in his religion will be defeated, so do your best 
and do not complicate matters", and: "Make things, 
easy, not hard, give good news and do not alienate 
people".
They should look at the details of the 
legislation, then they will see how He has made it 
easy for people, even as regards the basic 
creed...He has imposed on them no more than that 
which their own nature may bear witness to, with 
no complexity or perverseness.145
Shaltut maintains that the qualities of yusr and samaha are
present even in those areas where people have accused Islam of
harshness, such as the laws governing divorce, which some people
say have resulted in an unduly large proportion of divorces in
Islamic countries. Shaltut retorts:
There is nothing in the ample laws of Islam which 
threatens the family except ignorance of those 
laws, and neglect of the prescribed conduct and
144 See his f atwa on medicine containing an element of
swineflesh, in Fatawa, pp. 380-82.
145Min Tawjihat al-Islam, pp. 21-22.
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morals attached to them, and the narrow-minded and 
rigid adherence to particular schools of law which 
are taken as a religion which must be followed...146
Shaltut himself is a good advertisement for the tolerance of 
Islam; his tolerant attitude is demonstrated in his practical 
life, where he worked hard to effect a conciliation between the 
legal schools and to improve SunnI-ShTcT relations, in many of 
his fatwas , and in his desire to keep the essential articles of 
faith, deviation from which entails charges of kufr, down to an 
absolute minimum.147
A1 cagliyya wa1I-taqaddum
Under this heading come those passages where Shaltut shows how 
Islam encourages people to seek knowledge and to use their
intelligence, and not to rely on the authority of others.
Under the rubric: "Islam is the religion of intellect and 
knowledge" ("Al-Islam din al caql wa1l-cilm"),148 he begins by 
drawing attention to the Qur'an's emphasis on the intellect,
quoting passages which show the eminence of those who have
knowledge, as well as passages which show the importance of 
rational proof and evidence in the Islamic religion. He mentions 
the fact that Muhammad's mission did not have recourse to
146Fatawa, p. 311; cf. Hammudah cAbd al-cAti, The Family 
Structure in Islam, Indianapolis: American Trust Publications,
1977, p. 224, where the author points out the impossibility of 
separating the legal issues from the moral ones: "The whole 
question of divorce is enveloped in emphatic moral teachings and 
would thus seem to be regarded primarily as a moral act."
147Cf., e.g., cAqida wa-Sharica, pp. 56-57, and Tafsir,
p. 272.
148Min Taw.jihat al-Islam, pp. 140ff.
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sensuous miracles in order to convince people, but appealed 
instead to their minds, with arguments which are contained in the 
Qur'an. He then shows how the Qur’an condemns taqlid, and links 
the concept of knowledge and the intellect with the concept of 
progress and growth, under the sub-heading, "Stagnation is in 
conflict with the law of growth", where he says:
Intellectual evolution is like the evolution of 
plants and animals and people, for they are all an 
essential part of life. If intellectual evolution 
ceased, man would get tangled up in the great 
multitude of natural phenomena which nature 
produces, and of which he is one, and would be 
unable to cope with life's neverending expansion, 
which is there only to serve man, for his own 
well-being and benefit, and he would fail in his 
task of being God’s vicegerent on earth, a task 
for which he was chosen and which was entrusted to 
him in the beginning of Creation.149
Thus he again shows how the precepts of Islam are in 
accordance with the laws of nature. He reaffirms this under the 
heading which follows: "Slavish adherence to that which is old 
robs man of his humanity", where he describes intellectual 
stagnation as "a crime against human nature".150 After this he 
enlarges on certain aspects of knowledge, such as its relation to 
health and medicine,151 the importance attached to literacy, and 
the fact that education should comprise not just religious 
matters but all areas of knowledge.152 He points to the example
149Ibid., pp. 142-3.
150 Ibid., p. 143.
151 Ibid., p. 146; cf. also pp. 176ff.
152Ibid., pp. 147-49.
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of the early Muslims and their recognition of the importance of 
literacy and knowledge, and how a largely illiterate nation gave 
birth to a highly developed civilisation.153
This section is followed by a section entitled, "The spiritual 
element in education", where Shaltut makes it clear that in his 
opinion intellectual refinement is not the only, nor even the 
most important, aspect of education, but that spiritual and 
religious instruction must be the basis of education.154 On the 
other hand, among the means of spiritual refinement, al-tafakkur 
(thought and meditation) is given as the first - but this
tafakkur must be accompanied by remembrance of God, for
materialistic ways of thinking are even worse than stagnation.155
Shaltut contemplates no dividing line between reason and 
revelation, no instance in which either of them is dispensable. 
There is no attempt to adapt Islam to scientific theories; 
Muhammad cAbduh and Rashid Rida may have toyed with the
possibility of Islam's accommodating Darwin's theory of
evolution, but Shaltut does not. In his fatwa in answer to the 
question: "Do men of religion oppose the theory of evolution on 
the basis of a valid religious authority, or out of narrow­
mindedness?", he is of the belief that the Qur'an's description
153 Ibid., pp. 149-50.
154 Ibid., pp. 151ff.
155See sub-headings in ibid., pp. 125-29.
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of the creation of man is totally irreconcilable with the theory 
of evolution.156
However, he is not averse to the idea that some of the 
precepts of Islam are based on scientific knowledge which man has 
only acquired in the modern age, as where he claims that modern 
medicine confirms the fact that menstruation can be harmful (cf. 
Qur'an 2:222), in that the female reproductive organs are more 
susceptible to infection at this time because of the alkalinity 
and the general inflammation of the vagina.157 This is in keeping
with his belief that Islam is in accordance with natural laws.
Contrary to the Ashcarite theory of "occasionalism", which 
entails a refusal to recognise any inherent order in the universe 
which may be seen as implying a kind of obligation on God,150 
Shaltut and most other modern Muslim scholars recognise the laws 
of cause and effect, and see no contradiction between natural and 
divine law, since nature is part of God's creation and therefore 
His implicit revelation.159
Apart from the importance of reason within Islam, we should 
also mention Shaltut's view of the "reasonableness" of Islam;
156Fatawa, pp. 401-4; one may contrast with this cAbbas
Mahmud al-cAqqad's view that we cannot refute the theory of
evolution on the basis of the Quranic text, which he does not 
believe to be muhkam on this subject - see Al-Falsafat al- 
Qur'aniyya, Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, n.d., pp. 208-9.
157Min Tawjihat al-Islam, p. 177.
158Kerr, Islamic Reform, p. 59.
159Cf., e.g., Fatawa, pp. 207-8, Tafsir al-Manar, 9:593, and 
cAbbas Mahmud al-cAqqad, op. cit., pp. 18ff.
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it s tawassut and yusr and fitriyya form part of this. In 
Shaltut's opinion, the main evidence for it is the fact that one 
can see the reasons behind nearly all the dictates of religion, 
and the way in which they benefit mankind, and it is a 
fundamental principle of religion to reinforce anything which is 
beneficial and to wage war on anything which causes harm.160
In an article entitled, "Islam encourages progess",161 Shaltut
seeks to demonstrate the adaptability of Islam to changing
conditions. He first of all mentions the evolution of religions,
and the fact that Islam came as the final perfected version of
religion when man was at the appropriate stage of development. He
summarises the four main areas of human life which Islam
regulates: creed, morals, dealings between men (mucamalat),
including government, and man's relationship with the natural
phenomena which surround him. Under the third heading, he states
that justice, maslaha and shura are the three bases of government
in Islam; it is noteworthy that the last two in particular
provide devices which contribute a dynamic element to Islamic
government. He maintains that in the light of the way in which
Islam regulates these four areas,
...it becomes clear without any shadow of a doubt 
that Islam is not only a religion which keeps pace 
with modern progess, but it is a divine plan which 
purges modern civilisations of their tyranny and 
recklessness, and urges mankind...to progress
160See headings in Fatawa, p. 406, "Al-din yuqirru al-salih
wa-yuharib al-fasid, and Tafsir, p. 416, "Al-fahsh wa'1-darar 
cillat al-tahrlm".
161 Min Huda al-Qur'an, pp. 247-51.
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along the path of virtue and civilisation, and to 
put an end to evil and corruption, until God's 
command comes to pass.162
In the interests of scholarship, it must be said that there is no
detailed exposition of the four areas which could be taken as
firm evidence of this thesis; however this may be explained by
the fact that this article was originally a speech delivered on
the occasion of the Prophet's birthday, hence its hortatory
rather than scholarly nature.
In the Introduction to cAqida wa-Sharica, Shaltut points out 
the vital role of iitihad in the Sharica, which has resulted in a 
wide spectrum of opinion on those matters which are not basic 
articles of faith or legislation laid down in the Qur'an and 
Sunna, and goes on to say:
If this aspect of Islam indicates anything, it 
is that it is a religion which is sufficiently 
broad to accommodate man's freedom of thought 
(within the limits of reason) and that, with the 
exception of certain basic articles of faith and 
legal principles, it is not restricted to one type 
of thinking or one method of legislation; and 
because of that freedom it has been able to adapt 
itself to all healthy types of culture and all 
civilisations which man’s intellect has produced 
for the benefit and the advancement of mankind, no 
matter how far that intellect progresses, and no 
matter to what degree life evolves.169
The universal qualities of Islam: al-kamal wa'1-khulud 
Shaltut's view of Islam is not luke-warm; for him it is not just 
moderate, reasonable and congenial to human nature - for him and 
for all committed Muslims it is not just a religion but the
162Ibid., pp. 250-51.
163cAgida wa-Sharica, p. 9.
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primordial religion - complete and valid for all times. In an 
article entitled "The eternal element in Islam", Shaltut affirms 
this archetypal nature of Islam - the fact that all religions 
came from the same source and hore essentially the same message, 
and that Muhammad came to complete the building, as it were, by 
laying the last brick in it. Thus Islam is not just one religion 
among many, but it is the religion; "Christianity" and "Judaism" 
are, in their pure forms, Islam.164
Shaltut maintains that Islam is as eternal as its source:
Islam, by virtue of its source and the One Who 
established it, and Who sent the prophets with it 
from the beginning until the end, is as eternal as 
God's mercy to those who worship Him; if God's 
mercy to His servants is eternal and unceasing,
Islam, which is the manifestation of that mercy, 
cannot be other than eternal and unceasing.16B
In order to be eternally valid, the teachings of Islam must
contain, in essence, all that is necessary for man's well-being:
If we examine its (Islam's) teachings as a whole 
and in its details, we will find that it is an 
ideal system, catering for the happiness of the 
. individual and society in this world and the next; 
it has not neglected to enjoin and encourage 
anything which is for man's well-being and
success, and which makes for a good life and
eternal happiness; nor has it neglected to forbid 
and discourage anything which is harmful and 
corrupting, and which makes for a life of 
humiliation and lasting wretchedness.166
The essential core of the Islamic teachings is unchanging
because man's nature remains the same throughout the ages, no
164Kin Tavyjihat al-Islam, pp. 81-85.
16 5 Ibid., p. 85.
166Ibid., p. 86.
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matter how far civilisation appears to have advanced. Man's
thought-patterns remain the same, man's evil and tyranny does not
change, and God's sunna is the same in all ages and with all
peoples.167 However, in order to be eternally valid, there must
also be a changing, flexible element; when giving a fatwa on the
subject of smoking, basing his judgement on the principle that
that which is harmful to one's health is haram,168 Shaltut says:
...for a thing to be haram or makruh in Islam, 
there does not have to be a text on that 
particular subject, for the underlying reasons for 
legal rulings (cilal al-ahkam) and the general 
principles of legislation are both of value in 
deciding the legal status (ahkam) of things; and 
by virtue of these reasons and those principles,
Islam is fully able to evaluate anything which men 
may invent, as regards its legality or 
illegality.169
This passage gives us a clue to what he means when he says that 
Islam has regulated for all man's needs, for it is clear that the 
Islamic sources do not cover every area of life; the underlying 
principles and reasons which may be gleaned from those sources, 
however, can be applied to all areas of life.
Summary
We have outlined the aspects of Islam of which Shaltut makes 
most frequent mention. He does not conceive these qualities as
16TIbicL, p. 46, Ila al-Qur'an al-Karim, p. 124, and Min 
Tawjihat al-Islam, p. 479.
168It would be uncharacteristic of Shaltut to condemn all 
smokers of tobacco; he puts the onus on governments to rid their
countries of tobacco - Fatawa, p. 385.
169Fatawa, pp. 384-85.
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separate and distinct from one another;170 it would seem rather 
that he has a vision of Islam as a harmonious whole, these 
qualities being like points on an unbroken circle, each related 
to the others in some way and all bearing the same relation to 
the centre.
It is not unusual for Muslim writers to bring out these
qualities of Islam; on the contrary, since cAbduh's time it has 
become commonplace, and there are numerous works which 
concentrate on one or more of these qualities.171 In Shaltut's 
case, he does not usually set out systematically to establish
Islam's "tolerance" or "naturalness" or "rationality"; rather, he 
consistently brings out these qualities in the context of the
subject matter in hand. This approach, whereby concrete examples 
are provided to illustrate the particular quality in question, 
means that these claims do not seem forced or artificial, but are 
the natural consequence of his train of thought.
In view of the fact that he is addressing Muslims, he
occasionally assumes in his audience an admiration for Islam
which obviates the necessity for intellectual justification of
170We have mentioned some of the areas of overlap under the 
individual headings. He also relates the qualities of khulud, 
kamal and fitriyya to each other - Min Huda al-Qur'an, p. 247, 
and, in the’context of the khulud of Islam, he brings together
the qualities of tawassut and waqiciyya - Min Tawjihat al-Islam,
pp. 86-87.
171 To name but a few, one could mention "Al-Islam, Din al- 
Fitra wa'l-Hurriyya" by cAbd al-cAzTz Jawish (d. 1929), "Samahat 
al-Islam" by Ahmad Muhammad al-Hufi, "Nazariyyat al-Tawassut fi
al-Islam" by Mahdi cAliam, "Yusr al-Islam" by Rashid Rida,‘and 
"Bikmat al-Islam" by al-Sayyid Mahmud Abu al-Fa'id al-Mutawaffa.
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his postulate, as in the passage quoted below from Min Huda al- 
Qur’an (pp. 250-51). This probably arises partly from the fact 
that this article ("Islam encourages Progress") is one of the 
relatively few where Shaltut deliberately sets out to demonstrate 
a particular quality of Islam. However, it is not in Shaltut's 
nature to make excessive or unfounded claims; perhaps because of 
his legal training, he is consistently sober and cautious, 
keeping to practical examples and backing up his opinions more 
often than not with copious quotes from the Qur'an.172
ii) The threat of secularism
While believing that religion should hold sway over all areas 
of life and all spheres of legislation, Shaltut is well aware 
that this is very far from the actual state of things, even in 
the Muslim countries. In an article entitled, "Man's need for 
religion",173 he begins by describing how man is constantly
pulled between the two opposing forces of good and evil; in some
respects it is easier for him to incline to the latter, to be 
seduced by the glitter of this world and its temptations and to 
give into his own selfish desires.
It is Shaltut's belief that man's intellect alone is not
sufficient to overcome evil and to make good prevail, and he
lists the reasons for this; firstly, no two minds are alike, even 
in their conception of good and evil - men's intellects have
172Cf., e.g., Min Tawjihat al-Islam, pp. 82-84 and 86, and
Fatawa, pp. 402-3.
173Min Taw.jihat al-Islam, pp. 12-28.
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created many different systems which conflict with each other, 
such as communism and capitalism, democracy and despotism; 
secondly, true objectivity is unattainable by men - their 
thinking is always influenced in some degree by their own desires 
and various other elements such as their race, country, the 
people around them, etc.; thirdly, men's intellects are limited 
in nature - unlike God, they are not able to foresee all possible 
eventualities; fourthly, a man-made system does not influence 
people in such a profound way as a religious system, or command 
such deep-seated loyalty - people almost invariably feel man-made 
laws to be something imposed on them by other men, and, if they 
feel they can get away with it, are quite happy to break the law, 
since the only thing which stops them is not their own conscience 
but the fear of discovery and punishment. For these reasons, 
reliance on man-made systems can only lead the world to ruin and 
destruction.174
According to Shaltut, without religion man is liable to be 
overcome by the trials and tribulations of life; religion 
provides him with two things in particular which help him in 
this: sabr and salah.175 The scientific and material progress 
which has enabled mankind to conquer space has not been able to 
provide him with happiness and security; the only answer is for 
man to return to religion, and the only religion which is free 
from complexity and distortion is Islam, "the religion of the
17 A Ibid., pp. 14-16.
17 5 Ibid., pp. 23-27.
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spiritual and the material, the heart and the mind, the
individual and society, of this world and the next".176
Shaltut warns of the dangers of secularism:
This idea (of the separation between religion 
and society) has become prominent and the men who 
have actually undertaken social reform have not 
based their ideas upon religion; as for the men of 
religion, they have shrunk before them, and have 
confined themselves to instructing people in the 
performance of the acts of worship and their
outward particulars, and those things which render 
them valid or invalid.
Thus, many people have come to imagine that
religion, with its rulings and directives, is one 
thing, and society, and all that it entails and 
requires, is another.177
Materialism is seen as being responsible for many of the 
world's problems,178 and materialistic ways of thinking more 
dangerous than intellectual stagnation.179 The threat of 
materialism comes not just from unbelievers but from Muslims 
themselves, for example those who observe only the external forms 
of their religion without the right spirit,100 or those who 
propose materialistic reasons for the acts of worship, dwelling 
on the salubrious aspects of wudu' and sawm, and maintaining for 
example that prayer provides beneficial physical exercise, or 
that the most important function of the hajj is to provide an
176Ibid., p. 28.
177Min Huda al-Qur’an, p. 235.
17BMin Tawjihat al-Islam, p. 454.
179Ibid., pp. 125-29.
18°Tafsir, p. 497.
303
opportunity for Muslims from different countries to get to know 
each other and hold meetings, etc.181
Shaltut is certainly justified in his concern as regards 
secularism and materialism as a threat to religion, but this 
concern does sometimes lead him into generalisations - after all, 
man-made ideologies have been known to command widespread respect 
and support. Theologically speaking, however, it is the only 
possible stand for him to take - that even if man-made systems 
achieve a limited degree of success, they will inevitably falter 
at some point; and if the Islamic system has not always prevailed 
or succeeded, this is only due to man's imperfect interpretation 
or application of that system.
iii) Response to attack
Shaltut was not familiar with the works of Orientalists; 
indeed he devoted all his energies to studying and spreading the 
teachings of Islam, and firmly believed that Muslims should get 
their own house in order before studying the laws, philosophy, 
literature and customs of the West, which at this stage will only 
serve to drain their own confidence and weaken their sense of 
identity.182 However, he was naturally aware of the grave threat 
that foreign occupation and foreign influence had posed and
181 Min Tawjihat al-Islam, pp. 370-71; Rashid Rida was less 
reticent in this regard and did not hesitate to point out the 
implications of wudu' for general hygiene - Tafslr al-Manar,
6:262.
182cAgida wa-Sharica, p. 136.
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continued to pose to the Muslims' beliefs and values, for in 
addition to occupying the lands of the Muslims, Shaltut maintains 
that Europeans had systematically attacked their beliefs and 
traditions and put pressure on them to reject their own civil and 
criminal law in favour of European-style laws, as well as 
seducing Muslim woman with their European ideals while affecting 
to defend her.183 He points out that the mere fact of a nation's 
being powerful and materially superior lends it credibility, so 
that people tend to be attracted to that nation's ideas and 
views, even if those ideas are inherently repugnant.184 It is 
principally those Muslims who are attracted to European culture 
who are rejecting the Islamic legislation,185 and he cites Turkey 
as the prime example of a Muslim country which has been so 
influenced by the West that it has turned away from Islam 
altogether.18 6
Shaltut was also aware of some of the criticisms which had 
been levelled against Islam, both by Europeans and by Muslims who 
were influenced by them, particularly in areas such as the status 
of Muslim women, divorce laws, polygamy, the hudud, and the 
legislation appertaining to war, and when writing on these 
subjects he responded to some of those criticisms.
The position of women: marriage and divorce
183 Ibid., p. 219.
184 Ibid., p. 218 and Tafsir, p. 148.
1B5Tafsir, pp. 210-11.
186cAgida wa-Sharica , p. 193.
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Shaltut describes two extreme views with regard to the Muslim 
woman: on the one hand there are those who believe that she is 
oppressed and humiliated and seen as an inferior being with no 
rights, completely at the mercy of her husband's whims, while on 
the other hand there are those who, in their eagerness to defend 
Islam, put woman on a pedestal and glorify her position in every 
way.187
When defending the position of Muslim women, Shaltut 
concentrates on the following areas: the attention which the
Qur’an devotes to women in general and to certain women in 
history of outstanding qualities, as well as the position of 
women during the Prophet's lifetime,188 women's rights in 
Islam,189 the essential equality of man and woman as regards 
their worth as human beings, their spiritual life and religious 
responsibilities,190 and the position of women in the Jahiliyya 
period, which highlights the improvements in their status brought 
by Islam.191
As regards the relationship between husband and wife, he lays 
stress on the human and moral aspects of marriage. Instead of
187Min Huda al-Qur'an, p. 291.
18BSee, e.g., Min Huda al-Qur'an, pp. 291-97, Tafsir, pp. 
162-67, Min Taw.iihat al-Islam, pp. 204-34, and cAqida wa-Sharica , 
pp. 217-18.
189Min Huda al-Qur'an, pp. 299-302, and cAqida wa-Sharica ,
pp. 231-34 and 237-41.
190cAqida wa-Sharica, pp. 12 and 234-37.
191 Ibid., pp. 230-31.
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concentrating exclusively on the dry legislation, as do those who 
criticise Islam, he points out that the Qur'an enjoins kindness 
and affection between them:
Good companionship (ihsan al-cishra) does not 
just mean the wife responding to the husband when 
he calls her, or him providing for her when she is 
hungry; rather, it is something which is known to 
everyone, and which is possible for all to attain
- it is to do with the manner of looking and
speaking, it is a spirit of love and affection 
which emanates from the man's heart and fills the 
woman's heart with pleasure and joy, and likewise 
comes from the woman's heart and holds sway over 
the man's heart, so that he enjoys an atmosphere 
of peace and security, as do the children.192
While the husband and wife have certain carefully balanced 
rights and duties, and this distribution of work is conducive to 
domestic harmony, it is desirable that they should help each 
other in their respective duties in a spirit of cooperation, 
rather than each demanding their rights.199 The Qur'an enjoins 
them to consult together and cooperate;199 in the ideal marriage, 
the extent to which the wishes and feelings of the husband and 
wife merge is embodied in the Quranic description of them as a
garment for each other.195
Characteristically, though, Shaltut does not evade the issue 
of man's authority or "degree" (daraja, from Qur'an 2:228) over 
woman. He states that this does not give him any power of
192 Ibid., p. 156.
193 Ibid., pp. 154-56.
194Ibid., pp. 158-59.
195Ibid., p. 147.
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coercion over his wife, but constitutes a kind of "domestic 
leadership", which gives the man added responsibilities and a 
duty of protection towards his wife as well as the degree of 
authority. The reason given for this is man's superior bodily 
strength and resolve (cazm), and his earning power. Shaltut sees 
the Quranic phraseology: "bi-ma faddala Allah bacdahum cala bacd" 
(4:34), rather than, for example, "bi-ma faddalahum calayhinna" 
as an indication that it is not a question of inherent 
superiority but rather a differentiation of functions, "like the 
superiority (tafdll) of one part of the body over another", as 
Shaltut puts it. Moreover in any community, great or small, 
leadership is essential for the preservation of unity.196
As regards man's chastisement (ta1dib) of his wife, Shaltut 
believes this to be a natural and necessary step in certain 
cases; he points out that the Quranic directives form a 
comprehensive system, of which physical chastisement is only the 
last resort, verbal admonishment (wac z) and isolation (ha.ir) 
having failed, the desired effect of which is to hold the 
marriage together. An important advantage of this system is that 
it keeps the dispute within the confines of the marriage. Shaltut 
expresses confidence that any reasonable woman would prefer this
196Ibid., pp. 156-57. One modern scholar deals with the 
phrase "bacdahum cala bacd" more explicitly, denying that it 
necessarily refers to an excellence or superiority granted to men 
over women, on both grammatical and contextual grounds. He sees 
it rather as a general reference to the way in which God has 
conferred different types of excellence on different people, 
whether they be male or female - see cAbd al-cAti, op. cit., 
pp. 178-81.
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system to one where she was allowed to persevere in behaviour 
which displeased her husband (a course which would put her 
marriage at risk), or one where disputes had to be settled by 
recourse to law, so that any trivial domestic upset could assume 
ridiculous proportions and endanger her family life.197 Shaltut 
makes no apology for advising the wife, in cases where it is the 
husband who is at fault, to favour him with a kind word or a 
smile, etc., in order to bring him round, basing this on Qur'an 
4:128: "If a woman fears perverseness (nushuz) or aversion on the 
part of her husband, it is no sin for them if they make peace 
between themselves...".196 His use of the subheading "TalbXs wa- 
tamallug" ("Deception and servile flattery") when describing 
those Muslims who consider the system of ta'dib unduly harsh or 
derogatory to women, makes it clear that he considers them to be 
influenced by Western ideals.199
"Divorce" or "repudiation" is not always an appropriate 
translation of the word talag as Shaltut uses it; for him it 
means the whole procedure which should be followed in the event 
of the husband or wife contemplating a divorce, and which 
contains so many checks and safeguards that a reconciliation will 
take place if at all possible. Furthermore, the procedures for 
talag and khulc (where the woman seeks a divorce from her 
husband), are only to be embarked upon as a final resort, after
197 Ibid., p. 164-65.
198 Ibid., p. 166.
199Ibid., p. 165.
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the husband and wife have tried to come to an agreement and 
appointed two arbiters in this cause.200
Thus talag is in fact a positive remedy for marital problems, 
except in those cases where it is made irrevocable. While 
recognising the importance of putting a stop to the abuses of the 
divorce laws which have taken place throughout Muslim history, 
including such things as pronouncing three divorces 
simultaneously, Shaltut denies the claim that the man's 
unilateral right of divorce in Islam is responsible for a high 
divorce rate. On the contrary, he attributes it to a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the Islamic divorce laws.201
We have remarked upon the dangers of apologetics and the 
temptation to resort to generalisations or obscure authorities, 
and Shaltut is not entirely irreproachable here. For example, he 
brings in a fairly long quote by Muhammad cAbduh on the subject 
of women, and we can safely assume it is quoted with approval, 
that includes the remark that fifty years ago (i.e. ca. 1850) 
European women were like slaves in every respect, just as they 
were with the Arabs in the Jahiliyya or possibly even worse;202 
and elsewhere he maintains that if Western woman were left to her 
own conscience, she would weep tears of blood over the loss of 
her dignity and happiness.203
200Ibid-, pp. 166-77.
201 Ibid., p. 176, and Fatawa, p. 311.
202rAgida wa-Sharica , p. 155.
2 0 3 Ibid., p. 219.
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Polygamy
Opening a chapter on the subject of polygamy, Shaltut vrrites:
Polygamy is one of the areas where the 
fanatical voice of the Vest and its poisonous 
propaganda have been instrumental in making people 
critical of it, to the point where some of the 
Muslims themselves try continuously to make laws
which place restrictions on it, while God did not
place any such restrictions.204
He does not contemplate any compromise in this area; he believes
that those who try to turn the Quranic exhortation to men to
restrict themselves to one wife if they fear they cannot be just
to their wives (4:3), into an effective ban on polygamy, due to
the impossibility of absolute justice in this regard (4:129), are
in fact making a mockery of the Quranic text, since polygamy is
explicitly permitted in Qur'an 4:3.205 Similarly, with regard to
those who allow polygamy but only under certain conditions, such
as the sterility or illness of the wife, Shaltut maintains that
if this was the case the Qur'an would have made those conditions
clear.206
He is impatient with all the energy that has been directed 
towards restricting or banning polygamy, and he himself is much 
more concerned that young men are turning away from marriage 
altogether rather than marrying too many women. He is at least
2 0 4 Ibid., p. 178.
205Ibid., p. 182. For examples of this opinion see, e.g.,
Qasim Amin, Tahrir al-Mar'a, Cairo, n.p., 1899, p. 128, and cAbd
al-cAzTz Fahmi, Hadhihi HayatT, Cairo, Kitab al-Hilal, n.d., pp. 
16 6 f f .
2Q6Ibid., p. 186.
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half-serious when he says that instead of banning or restricting 
polygamy, those in authority should on the contrary be putting an 
upper age-limit on celibacy and making laws to help rather than 
hinder those who choose to marry more than one wife.207 However, 
he does not pretend that polygamy is suitable for everyone, but 
believes that its possible good outweighs the potential problems, 
and the exceptional cases where grave problems do arise do not 
justify the total prohibition of polygamy.208
In this contentious area Shaltut is again tempted to include 
some material of doubtful authority. A list of the reasons Muslim 
scholars have put forward for polygamy - a list to which Shaltut 
gives the seal of approval for being based on reality - includes, 
alongside the more usual reasons such as the possibility of a 
shortage of men due to war etc., and the fact that the woman is 
sexually indisposed at times due to menstruation and child­
bearing, the assertion that the fact that the woman reaches the 
menopause at around fifty means that there may be forty or fifty 
years at the end of a marriage where the husband suffers sexual
207Ibid., pp. 193-94; cf. also Tafsir, p. 296.
20 8 Ibid., p. 189.
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frustration.209 This statement is medically inaccurate,210 or at 
least is only true in exceptional cases.
Under the heading, "A lesson from the West",211 Shaltut states 
that the prohibition of polygamy has the effect of raising the 
proportion of foundlings and children killed at birth, "as the 
French writers themselves know and acknowledge"; this may be a 
fair enough assumption given the social conditions prevailing in 
Europe earlier this century, i.e. the stigma attached to 
illegitimacy, so the vagueness of the authority is excusable; 
however, the authority which he then gives for the improprieties 
which sometimes take place between foundlings and those in charge 
of them is a conference held by the French government in 1901- 
somewhat outdated for a subject which is so susceptible to 
changing social conditions.
209 Ibid., p. 181.
210To quote W.H. Masters and V.E. Johnson, in Human Sexual 
Inadequacy, London: J. & A. Churchill Ltd., 1970, p. 335,
"Nothing could be further from the truth than the often-expressed 
concept that ageing women do not maintain a high level of sexual 
orientation." Shaltut's view may have been prompted by a
confusion or identification of sexual with reproductive ability, 
although in Islam there is no puritanical view that reproduction 
is the sole aim of sexual relations.
RashTd Rida presents the same argument slightly differently,
in that the emphasis is on reproduction rather than sexual
fulfilment; assuming that the woman becomes infertile at fifty, 
while the man remains fertile all his life, which Rida assumes 
for the purposes of argument to be a hundred years, by marrying 
only a woman of his own age he loses fifty years of his 
reproductive life - see Tafsir al~Manar, 4:352. (One wonders how 
many hundred year-old fathers of new-born children Rida was
acquainted with.)
211cAqida wa-Sharica , pp. 191-93.
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He then quotes from an "English authoress", who laments the 
increasing numbers of vagrant girls and women, and sees an answer 
to this problem in polygamy.212 Being anonymous, the quote is of 
little value; in any case it is probably from an obscure source. 
However, it is unusual for Shaltut to quote from such sources, 
and these are the only instances we have come across; in general 
he is far less inclined to such things than many other writers of 
his time.
War
In his tafsir of Surat al-Anfal, Shaltut discusses some of the 
Islamic teachings concerning war. In one passage he describes two 
allegations which are commonly directed against Islam by these 
who oppose it - firstly, the accusation that in Islam war is a 
legitimate means of forcibly converting people to the faith, and 
Islam was in fact spread by the sword, and secondly, the 
accusation that the Muslims went out to fight at Badr solely for 
the sake of plunder and booty, and not to defend their 
religion.213
He refutes the first charge by saying that faith comes from 
the heart and cannot be forced, and the whole of the Islamic 
teachings are against a false, superficial faith, consisting 
merely of external actions, and by quoting the Qur’an: "There is 
no compulsion in religion" (2:256), and "Would you (0 Muhammad) 
force men to be believers" (10:99), and other passages which show
212Ibid., p. 192.
213Tafsir, p. 522.
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that superficial or forced faith is not acceptable to God and 
that the Prophet is not responsible for those who disbelieve.21A 
He points out that in many cases Islam was spread by trade and 
peaceful travel.215
He then seeks to clarify the legitimate causes of war, by 
relating the stages of Muhammad's mission and showing how much 
the Muslims endured before being permitted to fight, and by 
showing how the verses which first permitted fighting (22:39-41) 
explicitly state oppression as a cause, and describe war as an 
essential part of life whereby holy places are defended.216 He 
then quotes other verses which mention the causes of war, such as 
repelling attack, defending those who are weak and oppressed, 
fighting those who violate their agreements or who attack the 
Muslim religion in some way, and he points out that none of them 
give any hint of compelling people to accept Islam, or of 
fighting simply due to difference of religion. On the contrary, 
Muslims are allowed to have good relations with ahl al-kitab, to 
enter into agreements with them and to marry their womenfolk.217
Shaltut then deals with two specific texts which the opponents 
of Islam have singled out in their accusations. The first of 
these is Qur'an 9:123: "0 you who believe! Fight those of the
disbelievers who are near to you...". He disagrees with those who
214 Ibid., pp. 523-25.
215Ibid., p. 526.
216 Ibid., pp. 528-29.
217 Ibid., pp. 529-31.
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believe that this verse constitutes an order to fight the 
polytheists until they accept Islam, whether or not they are 
aggressors, maintaining that it is in fact an instruction in war- 
strategy, i.e. that the Muslims should first of all fight those 
(aggressing) polytheists who are nearby, in order to clear the 
way to deal with those who are farther away. Secondly, regarding 
the: hadith which says: "I have been ordered to fight people until 
they say: "There is no God but God" , he simply says that the 
"people" ("al-nas") here referred to are those aggressors etc. 
who are mentioned in the Quranic verses permitting fighting. This 
is fair enough as far as it goes, but he fails to explain the 
latter half of the phrase: "until they say..."; it is
uncharacteristic of Shaltut to evade issues, and this leads us to 
believe that he does not see this part of the phrase as 
problematic. He is silent on it, perhaps in the assumption that 
it is in the nature of a negative conditional clause, i.e. unless 
they say "There is no God but God", that is, this circumstance 
would be one of the circumstances which necessitate an end to the 
fighting.218
Refuting the second charge, concerning the Battle of Badr, 
Shaltut states that confiscating the enemy's wealth is a means of 
weakening him and is a natural part of warfare; in many cases the 
Muslims had lost their homes and belongings to the Quraysh, so it
2)8The context of the phrase backs up this idea, for the 
Prophet goes on to say: "fa-idha facalu dhalik, casamu minni 
dima'ahum wa-amwalahum"; see Wensinck for a list of references 
for this hadith.
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was appropriate that they should recover some of what they had 
lost. In any case, if the Muslims had wanted only plunder they 
could have attacked easier targets than the Quraysh. Thus the aim 
of the Battle of Badr was clearly for the Muslims to secure 
themselves against their enemy, and to work towards establishing 
their right to worship freely in their holy shrine of Mecca.219
In his conclusion to this passage, Shaltut writes: "This is 
what every believer should know, so that he may be secure against 
false claims and allegations", showing that he has gone to the 
trouble of refuting these charges for the benefit of the Muslims, 
rather than for the sake of indulging in polemics with non- 
Muslims .
We have described this passage in some detail because it is 
the only long passage where Shaltut defends Islam against
specific accusations. We can observe that the tone of the passage
is in keeping with the rest of his tafsir and his writings in
general; he is sober, for example warning against hasty
judgements based upon what may be a fortuitous link between two
circumstances rather than a causative one, instead of an
examination of the facts and sources.220 He bases his arguments 
on the Qur'an and the life of the Prophet, and on uncontroversial 
factual information.
As regards the charge that Islam may be spread by the
219Tafsir, pp. 532-33.
220Ibid., pp. 522-23.
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sword,221 Shaltut is successful in refuting this as a principle 
of Islam and is justified in confining himself to the Islamic 
sources rather than the opinions of the fuqaha', most of whom 
believed that polytheism was in theory not to be tolerated at 
all. Although he could perhaps have dealt more fully with the 
aforementioned hadith: "I have been ordered to fight...", he
refrains from far-fetched and unsubstantiated explanations. Taken 
as a whole the passage is straightforward and unaffected, and 
avoids the pitfalls of polemical or apologetic writings.
iv) Conclusions
While there is comparatively little direct response to the 
West in Shaltut's writings, and no obvious conciliation of 
Western values, the desire to show Islam's rationality,
tolerance, flexibility etc. received its initial impetus from the 
Western challenge. However, this does not mean that these 
qualities were artificially grafted onto Islam - on the contrary, 
there is clear evidence for all of them in the Islamic sources. 
The fact is that these qualities had been somewhat neglected in 
past centuries, while Muslim countries were prey to tyrannical 
rulers or Sufi-type superstitions, or the control of culama1 who 
adhered rigidly to the established schools of law, practicing 
taqlid and denying the right of ijtihad.
221 Among Orientalists the theory that Islam was spread by 
the sword is more or less outdated; however, the somewhat
bloodthirsty image of Islam remains, and is rarely contradicted
by current events, so Shaltut's defence of Islam in this respect
remains necessary.
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Nineteenth century Europe may have arrived independently at a 
recognition and appreciation of these values - a fact which only 
reaffirms their inherent validity - and this may have acted as a 
catalyst on Muslims, who realised with a shock that in some areas 
Europe appeared to be more enlightened than the Muslim countries; 
but this does not mean that these qualities are not an authentic 
part of Islam. It is only when Muslim writers go to extremes in 
their attempts to defend Islam, falling into the pitfalls we 
described earlier, that these claims seem clumsy and artificial.
As far as Shaltut is concerned, there is no doubt that he 
perceives these qualities in Islam independently of any external 
or foreign criteria. When he does occasionally respond to 
external criticisms, it is only on very general matters where 
everyone is aware of the controversy, such as the status of 
Muslim women. He is not concerned with the finer points of 
Muslim-Orientalist polemics, but prefers to concentrate his 
energies on Islam and the Muslims; in his own firm conviction of 
the beauty and self-sufficiency of Islam, he only wishes to 
demonstrate this to others, so that they may be equally convinced 
of the viability of Islam as a way of life in the twentieth 
century.
c) Social Evolution and Religious Conservatism: Selected Social
Issues
We aim to concentrate here on areas which are most sensitive 
to social change, and in which therefore opinions tend to be
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diversified. These will provide the best illustrations of the way 
in which Shaltut has adapted religious precepts to modern 
conditions. We have selected the areas of the status of women, 
birth control and financial institutions, in order to identify 
the extent to which he is typical of his milieu, and the scope of 
his real i_itihad.
i) The status of women222
We discovered in the section on the impact of imperialism that 
Shaltut was not particularly apologetic when it came to issues 
such as polygamy and the husband/wife relationship. In these 
matters the Quranic pronouncements were regarded as sacrosanct 
and Shaltut condemned the attempt to twist the explicit Quranic 
permission for polygamy into an effective ban thereof.
The issue of polygamy has become a highly sensitive one in
modern times, and the attention paid to it has been
disproportionate to its actual social relevance. Even Shaltut,
who is relatively isolated from Western influence, devotes twenty
pages to the subject, no doubt in view of the legal changes with 
regard to polygamy, of which he did not approve.
Muhammad cAbduh saw polygamy as an unmitigated social evil, 
arousing jealousy which could result in any of a long list of 
vices and crimes, including murder. The reason given for its 
permissibility in the Prophet's age was that people were more
222This area was discussed in section 2b of this chapter in 
the context of the defensive reaction to Western influence; here 
we will concentrate on the range of opinions among Muslims themselves.
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pious in those days, and this helped to contain the undesirable 
effects of jealousy.223 Rashid Rida, while describing certain 
circumstances which might justify polygamy, maintains that 
monogamy is the norm and the ideal, and polygamy is permitted 
only in cases of necessity.224 The opinion of some of the more 
extreme modernists such as Qasim Amin, that polygamy was in fact 
prohibited, has lost some ground perhaps because of its 
association with undue Western influence, and the debate has 
subsequently revolved around whether polygamy is in the nature of 
a "licence" for specific circumstances such as the sterility of 
the wife or a shortage of men, which appears to be the prevalent 
modernist opinion, or whether it is in fact wholly unconditional, 
which is the opinion of Shaltut.225
It may be informative here to look at the opinion of a more 
recent Muslim modernist who, while not apologetic or defensive in 
tone, has an unusual intellectual flexibility by virtue of being 
conversant with both Islamic and Western culture, and appears to 
be attempting to tackle contemporary Islamic issues in an open- 
minded fashion. This scholar, Fazlur Rahman, does not resort to 
the hermeneutic contortions of some of the earlier apologists who 
tried to show that polygamy was effectively prohibited, but sees 
the Quranic injunctions on polygamy (i.e. to be just to wives and
223Tafsir al-Manar, 4:349.
2 2 4 Ibid., pp. 350ff.
2 25 See Jansen, op. cit., p. 93, and cAgida wa-Shari('a, pp. 
185-86, under "A1 asl ibahat al-tacaddud".
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keep to only one if this is not possible) as a sanction which 
constitutes "a moral ideal towards which the society was expected 
to move, since it was not possible to remove polygamy legally at 
one stroke". In this respect, the case of polygamy is seen as 
comparable to that of slavery.226
The whole issue of male/female equality is one which
modernists feel bound to tackle. The moral context of man's
authority over woman is stressed by Shaltut and others:
The husband's authority is not the absolute or 
despostic type. It is restrained by the ethical 
principles of the Qur'an and...is based on equity, 
guarded by compassion, and guided by 
conscientiousness, principles which underlie the 
husband-wife relationship in the Islamic scheme of 
society.227
However, while Rahman's statement that man's superiority over 
woman is functional rather than inherent may accord with 
Shaltut's view, the logical conclusion which he draws from this, 
namely "if a woman becomes economically sufficient...the male's 
superiority would be to that extent reduced", is something that 
one cannot imagine Shaltut saying.226 Similarly the suggestion
226Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur'an, Chicago: 
Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980, p. 48.
227cAbd al~cAti, op. cit., pp. 181-821; Shaltut (cAgida wa- 
Shari0 a, pp. 146ff.) is given as one of the references for this 
passage.
228Rahman, op. cit., p. 49; John Esposito espouses a similar 
argument by means of a "hierarchisation" of Quranic values, 
whereby the moral and religious equality of the sexes is an 
ethico-religious value which is therefore not subject to change, 
whereas the "superiority" or "degree" granted to men in the 
Qur'an depends on socio-economic factors, and is therefore 
subject to change - see J. Esposito, Muslim Family Law in Egypt 
and Pakistan: A critical analysis of legal reform, its sources
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that the laws of inheritance could be studied further in the 
light of today's realities229, (i.e. women's greater economic 
independence) would, one feels, be abhorrent to Shaltut.
However, there is one point on which the opinions of Rahman 
and Shaltut converge, namely that the Quranic verse on the 
subject of credit transactions which regards two female witnesses 
as equivalent to one male witness (2:282), was due to the fact 
that in the Prophet's age women were not conversant with such 
matters, and therefore would be less reliable as witnesses 
concerning them. While a "traditionalist" would, in Rahman's 
opinion, consider it socially undesirable that a women should 
become conversant with financial transactions, a modernist would 
have no such reservations, and would assert that the testimony of 
a woman who was familiar with such matters would be equal to that 
of a man.230 According to this criterion, Shaltut is a modernist. 
Like Muhammad cAbduh, whom he quotes, he rejects the jurists' 
application of this verse to legal testimony in general, and sees 
such an interpretation as an assertion that woman has a weaker 
mind, which in turn would imply that she is inferior as a human 
being.2 31
and methodological problems, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University 
Microfilms International (facs.), 1980, pp. 268-69.
22 9Rahman, op. cit., p. 51.
23 0 Ibid., p. 49. For a conservative viewpoint, see Muhammad 
Qutb, op. cit., p. 105, where the author opines that "The woman 
is by her very nature vehemently emotional, impressionable and 
liable to digress from the real facts of the case in hand."
231cAqida wa~Sharica, p. 240.
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In controversial social issues it becomes clear that even a 
scholar of the status and integrity of Shaltut finds it hard to 
take a wholly consistent attitude with regard to the Quranic 
text. For example, he resents any attempt to tamper with the 
Quranic permission for polygamy, but as we mentioned in Chapter 
Three, on the subject of marrying the women of ahl al-kitab, he 
suggests that in certain social conditions it might be 
justifiable to suspend the Quranic permission to marry them.232 
Again, on the subject of female witnesses, as we have just seen, 
he considers the Quranic provisions to be subject to modification 
in the light of changed social conditions.
However, one can easily detect reasons for Shaltut's attitude 
in each individual case, and these reasons lie in his socio­
cultural environment rather than in the Qur'an itself. On the 
subject of polygamy it is clear that he is objecting to the 
mental servitude to the West on the part of certain Muslim 
reformers and legislators, and the strength of his feeling leads 
him on occasion to over-corr.pensate in his counter-arguments, as 
where he suggests imposing an upper age limit on celibacy and 
offering financial help to those who practice polygamy, instead 
of banning or restricting it.233 Again, on the subject of
2 3 2 Supra, p .
2 3 3 Ibid., p. 194; he also rejects the idea that men who wish 
to practice polygamy should undergo a means test, arguing that it 
is in fact preferable for poor people to practice polygamy than 
for rich people to do so, since the poor are used to living in 
mutual cooperation and making the best of things, and the poor 
man cannot afford to buy luxuries which could arouse jealousy 
among co-wives - see ibid., p. 195.
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marrying the women of ahl al-kitab, we have already had occasion 
to mention the fact that he was reacting to abuses which he 
witnessed in his own environment, arising from the cultural 
infatuation with the West.
In the case of female witnesses, it would be difficult to 
maintain on the one hand that women’s humanity and spirituality 
is in every way equal to that of men,234 and on the other that 
she is less intelligent or has a weaker memory than her male 
counterpart. The line taken by Shaltut, Rahman and others 
regarding the provisions of Qur'an 2:282, namely that they are 
subject to changing social conditions, is the only one which 
avoids this conclusion.235
ii) Birth control
On this issue, Shaltut relates the opinions of the classical 
scholars in some detail. Their opinions depend in some measure on 
their views concerning the extent to which the child is "the 
right of the parents" (haqq al-walidayn) or "the right of 
society" (haqq al-umma). Those who stressed the parents' right 
were on the whole lenient concerning justifications for 
contraception; al-GhazalT, for instance, sees the preservation of 
the woman's beauty as a valid reason.236
2 3 4 Ibid., pp. 234-37.
235Rashid Rida, however, writing over half a century ago,
attributed man's daraia over women to "the strengh of his body 
and his mind" - see Tafsir al-Manar, 4:354.
236cAqida wa-Sharica , pp. 199-200.
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Shaltut responds to this by arguing that the classical 
scholars neglected hagq al-umma because on the one hand marriage 
was virtually universally practiced in those days and people too); 
pleasure in having many children, and on the other hand the 
Islamic umma was then so vigorous and powerful that no danger was 
anticipated to it from this quarter. If they could have seen the 
present weakened and diminished state of the Muslim umma, and the 
way in which people are abstaining from marriage and procreation 
for frivolous and selfish reasons, Shaltut maintains that they 
would have declared contraception to be haram except in cases of 
extreme necessity.237
However, having established the right of the umma to an 
abundant population, Shaltut goes on to stress the importance of 
the health and strength of that population, and he relates the 
implications of this for birth control in Islam. For example, in 
the case where a man or his wife have a hereditary disease, it 
may be obligatory for them to use contraception on pain of being 
forcibly separated. Even given a healthy mother and father, it is 
desirable to plan the family in a way that is conducive to good 
health and upbringing. In effect, this means spacing the births 
in such a way that the mother can complete the suckling of one 
child (ideally two years) before falling pregnant with the next, 
in view of the hadiths which warn of the harm which may otherwise
237Ibid., pp. 205-6.
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befall the suckling infant. This also gives the mother some 
respite in between births.238
Shaltut then discusses the case of those who anticipate 
difficulty or hardship in raising their children, due for example 
to straitened circumstances or "weakness of nerves".239 Here, he 
feels that just as the society has certain rights with regard to 
the birth of children, so it has a responsibility to give 
material help to those whose poverty prevents them from bringing 
up children in a healthy and desirable manner.240 If such help is 
not forthcoming, then contraception is fully justified, even 
positively recommended, according to the principle: al-darar 
madfu(~ bi-gadr al-imkan.241
For Shaltut, the Quranic verses and ahadlth which generally 
encourage marriage and procreation are sufficient to show that 
any birth-control movement on a major scale, or any national 
programmes for the control of population, are un-Islamic.242 Once
2 3 8 Ibid., pp. 211-12.
239Shaltut uses the phrase ducf al-acsab; he seems to be 
referring generally to those who are of irritable or nervous 
dispostion rather than to a particular medical complaint, i.e. 
nervous debility, otherwise one would have expected him to refer 
to health reasons generally rather than singling out a specific 
health problem.
2 4 0 rAgida wa-Sharica, p. 213.
241Fatawa, pp. 296-97.
2 4 2 Ibid., p. 296; it should be borne in mind that at the 
time when Shaltut was writing birth control on a national scale 
was a highly sensitive issue, being seen by some as an 
imperialist ruse to weaken Muslim countries - see, e.g., Muhammad 
cAbd al-Salam al-QubbanT, Tahdfd al-Nasl, in Majallat al-Azhar, 
29 (1957/58), pp. 550-52.
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one has drawn the distinction between societal measures to limit 
population and individual measures to plan it, however (in Arabic 
the former is referred to as tahdid al-nasl and the latter as 
tanzim al-nasl), the issue becomes a moral rather than a legal 
one. Since the fear of hardship due to a lack of means or a 
delicate temperament could no doubt be made to apply to a 
considerable proportion of the population, especially in the 
third world, it is effectively a matter of conscience. However, 
Shaltut does express the opinion that the need for contraception 
would apply only to a small minority of the population.243
A f atwa obtained by the Jordanian government in 1964 from the 
Grand Mufti of Jordan, Shaykh cAbdullah al-Qalqill, provides an 
interesting contrast to Shaltut's approach.244 The aim of the 
fatwa is to show that there is nothing in Islam against 
contraception, whatever the circumstances, and the Qur'an, the 
Sunna and the classical jurists are all quoted in support of this 
view. The Shaykh reasons that the hadith which advises celibacy 
until a man is financially in a position to marry constitutes 
permission to abstain from procreation altogether, and that any 
restriction of procreation must therefore be legal. The ahadith 
which mention the Prophet's approval of cazl (coitus interruptus) 
are referred to, but there is no mention of those which mention
2 4 3 Ibid., p. 297.
2 4 4 Reproduced in English translation in Donahue and 
Esposito, op. cit., pp. 194-96.
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his disapproval of it.245 It is argued that if cazl is permitted, 
then so is abortion before the animation of the foetus. Isolated 
authorities are given in support of this; the statement: "The 
jurists think that during this period (i.e. the first 120 days) 
the embryo or the foetus is not yet a human being" totally 
ignores the opposite school of thought, contrasting with 
Shaltut's exposition of both opinions.246
This fatwa, with its highly selective use of sources and 
specious reasoning, provides an example of the manipulation of 
the sources in order to support vested interests - presumably in 
this case the government's belief in the economic desirability of 
population control. Both al-Qalqili and Shaltut cite modern 
social conditions as an important factor, but for very different 
reasons, the former stressing the dangers of unchecked population 
growth while disregarding the moral aspect, while Shaltut refers 
to the morally reprehensible abstention from marriage and 
procreation which may be witnessed today. The difference in 
emphasis must be due in some measure to different data available 
to the two men, for Shaltut sees a large population as conducive 
to national strength, and it could therefore be said that 
utilitarian considerations are important for both men. The 
methods of al-Qalqili, however, are somewhat less scrupulous.
245Eg. those which compare cazl to infanticide, two of which
are related in cAgida wa-Sharica , p. 201.
246See ibid., pp. 203-4.
329
iii) Financial transactions
The most important debate in this area revolves around the 
issue of riba - its definition, and whether or not it is 
permissible in cases of necessity. This question is of vital 
concern to Muslims in view of the fact that no Muslim economy has 
been able to wholly avoid resorting to interest in its financial 
dealings, despite the prohibition of riba in the Qur'an and the 
Sunna.
In his interpretation of Qur'an 3:130: "0 you who believe! 
Devour not usury, doubling and quadrupling..." (adc af an 
rnuda0 afat an), Shaltut disagrees with those who use this phrase to 
argue that it is only exorbitant interest (al-riba al-fahisha) 
that is prohibited. He maintains that the phrase adc afan 
mudac afatan is descriptive and emphatic rather than
qualificative, and points out that the prohibition of riba 
elsewhere in the Qur’an and Sunna has no such qualifications.247 
Nor does he agree with those who see interest as an inescapable 
feature of modern life, and who blame the prohibition of riba for 
the economic backwardness of the Muslims. Such beliefs are seen 
as a symptom of disillusionment with the Sharica as a whole, and 
of infatuation with Western civilisation.248
Shaltut boldly asserts that if Egypt were to implement the 
Shari0a and prohibit all its citizens from transactions involving 
riba, substituting an interest-free financial system, then it
24 7Tafsir, pp. 150-51.
2 4 8 Ibid., pp. 147-48.
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would not suffer as a result. He claims that this belief is not 
unrealistic, for if transactions involving interest are 
prohibited, people will seek other ways and grow accustomed to 
them. He states simply that the economy could be organised in 
accordance with Islamic principles "if people sincerely desired
i t "  .24 9
He argues against those who use the principle al-darurat 
tubihu al-mahzurat to justify riba; he sees such methods as a 
sign of weakness, or even worse, religious effrontery ("iar'at 
cala Allah"), motivated by the desire to keep up with modern or 
Western civilisation and disown one’s Islamic identity. He feels 
that such reasoning is insidious and leads to the undermining of 
the Sharica as a whole.250
It emerges from the foregoing that Shaltut sees any kind of 
interest as haram; in his objection to the use of the phrase 
adcafan mudacafatan to justify certain types of transaction 
involving interest he specifically mentions banks, Post Office 
savings and government bonds.251 While he concedes that the 
Quranic prohibition in 3:130 applies to the iahiliyya practice of 
riba al-nasT'a, and he mentions the jurists' disagreement as to 
whether riba al-fadl is in fact covered by the Quranic
249 Ibid., pp. 149-50.
250Ibid., pp. 151-52.
251 Ibid., p. 150.
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prohibition, he himself believes that the prohibitions in the 
Qur'an and Sunna cover all types of riba.252
Thus far, then, Shaltut would appear to be in accordance with 
the uncompromising "fundamentalist" viewpoint such as, for 
example, that of Maududi.253 However, in his fatwas on the 
subject of cooperatives, Post Office savings and bank loans we 
see the pragmatic side of Shaltut emerging.
In the case of cooperatives and Post Office savings,254 
Shaltut concentrates on the benefits for all concerned which 
accrue therefrom, and the fact that both parties enter into the 
agreement willingly, so that there is no hint of exploitation or 
injustice.255 The man who takes his savings to the Post Office is 
on the one hand displaying a laudable frugality and on the other
252Ibid., pp. 140 and 151; the traditional view is that 
"riba al-fadl" is prohibited on the principle of "sadd dhara'ic 
al-fasad," i.e. if sanctioned it could lead in an insidious way 
to the practice of "riba al-nasT’a" - see TafsTr al-Manar, 4:125, 
and cAbd al-Karim al-Khatib, Al-Siyasat al-Malivva fi al-Islam 
wa-Silatuhu bi'1-Mucamalat al-Mucasira, 2nd ed,, Cairo: Dar al- 
Fikr al-cArabi, 1976, pp. 151-52.
253Malise Ruthwen, Islam in the World, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1984, p. 329.
254Fatawa, pp. 348-52.
25 5 A former pupil of Shaltut, however, whose opinions 
usually accord with Shaltut's own, when on the subject of life 
insurance, rejects this argument with impeccable logic on the 
grounds that even two gamblers could be described as willing 
participants, but this does not render gambling licit; see Yusuf 
QaradawT, Al-Halal wa'l-Haram f i~ al-Islam, 2nd ed., Beirut: Al- 
Maktabat al-islami, 1978, p. 264. Muhammad al-MadanT, however, 
goes even further than Shaltut in considering the willingness of 
the participants to be the sole criterion for evaluating the 
permissibility of a transaction, see Al-Mujtamac al-Islami karr.a 
tunazzimuhu Surat al-Nisa', p. 232.
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hand contributing to the overall national prosperity by providing 
employment for Post Office workers and bolstering the 
government’s investments.
In each case Shaltut has no particular objection to the fact 
that the rate of return is fixed. He simply states that in the
Post Office, financial loss is virtually unheard of, and in the
case of cooperatives there must exist certain provisions for
financial loss in the company statutes, of which the participants 
would be aware. The risk element, then, is presumably so small as 
to be acceptable.256 Shaltut sidesteps the objection that fixed 
rates cannot reflect profit and loss by arguing that since these 
institutions are entirely new and do not come under any of the 
classical categories of financial transactions such as mudaraba, 
the stipulations laid down concerning those transactions do not 
apply here.257 Another contemporary scholar, cAbd al-Karim al- 
KhatTb, argues even more ingeniously that although one has to 
concede that any transaction involving interest constitutes riba, 
in certain cases the harmful effects of riba have been removed. 
This means that the riba is no longer haram, just as if a new
256 cAbd al-Karim al-Khatib in op. cit., p. 197, uses a
similar empirical argument, maintaining that financial 
transactions have now reached such a level of sophistication that 
experts can predict overall profit levels with a fair degree of 
accuracy.
257Inconsistently, he objects to government bonds (sanadat) 
on the grounds that the interest bears no relation to profit and 
loss. He mentions without specifying them "the evils of bonds, 
which are well-known to people and confirmed by economists", and 
the motivation behind his argument no doubt lies in this 
overwhelmingly practical consideration - see Fatawa, p. 355.
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type of wine were to be manufactured with all the attributes of 
wine except that of iskar (causing intoxication), it would be 
halal.256
Bank loans with interest are less easy to defend, but more 
vital on a national scale to the economies of developing 
countries like Egypt. Contemporary religious scholars are acutely 
aware of this dilemma, and usually concede that if Egypt is faced 
with a choice between economic isolation and regression, and 
borrowing on interest in order to develop her economy, then the 
latter is the lesser of the two evils, at least in the short 
term. It is made clear, however, that this is a concession to 
specific circumstances, and not an acceptance of interest as an 
unavoidable feature of the world economy.259
Despite his dismissal of this view in his "Tafsir", in a fatwa 
concerning bank loans Shaltut states that the one who borrows on 
interest out of necessity does not share in the guilt of the 
usurious transaction, since he is in effect constrained (mudtarr) 
to do so, and is thus covered by Qur'an 6:119: "God has made
plain to you what is forbidden, except when you are 
constrained".260 The way in which he goes on to reason that this 
can apply to nations as well as individuals, enumerating the 
various essential heads of expenditure such as agriculture, 
defence, trade and industry, indicates that it is principally the
258al-Khatib, op. cit., p. 198.
2 5 9 Ibid., pp. 167-68, and Tafsir al-Manar, 4:128-30.
2 6 0 Fatawa, pp. 353-56.
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interests of the national economy that Shaltut has in mind here. 
Although he stipulates that the need should be real, he appears 
to all intents and purposes to have sanctioned borrowing on 
interest for the sake of maslaha rather than absolute and dire 
necessity; admittedly it would be exceedingly difficult to draw a 
clear distinction between the two. Shaltut thus departs from his 
former stand oo the use of the principle al-darurat tubTh al- 
mahzurat to justify usurious transactions.
Conclusions
The use of terms such as "conservative" or "progressive" in 
the context of social issues can be confusing; on the subject of 
polygamy, for example, the extreme modernist "restrictive" 
interpretation, such as that of Qasim Amin, would no doubt be 
regarded by some as a retrograde step, an abandoning of Islamic 
principles in order to draw closer to Western-inspired values. 
While Shaltut's views on polygamy may appear by contrast 
conservative, he is after all only arguing that the matter should 
be left up to the conscience of the individual rather than being 
restricted by legislation. The same could be said of his opinions 
regarding family planning.
Shaltut often tackles contemporary problems with a commendable 
open-mindedness; his advice that fiances should be given the 
opportunity to become acquainted (in the presence of chaperons) 
is seen as positively utopian by an eminent Orientalist, in view 
of the prevailing socio-cultural conditions in Egypt of the
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'fifties and 'sixties.261 A former colleague of Shaltut's at al- 
Azhar, Dr. Zaki BadaWi, related an incident that illustrates 
Shaltut's openness to new possibilities. When Mr. Badawi
suggested in 1961 to the Malaysian culama' that an investment 
fund should be set up so that people could make regular 
contributions towards the costs of performing the haj.i instead of 
selling all their land and thus rendering themselves destitute, 
he encountered considerable resistance from the culama' who 
feared that such an institution would contravene Islamic 
financial principles. Shaltut, however, who happened to be
visiting Malaysia at the time, supported the suggestion 
immediately and unreservedly.262
As regards Shaltut's contradictory writings on the subject of 
financial transactions involving interest, one can only 
conjecture that in the interval263 Shaltut acquired new
information or became more directly concerned about the practical 
problems of governing the country. Most probably the fatwa was 
issued in a spirit of sympathy with the general aims of Nasser's 
socialist government, while the passage in his "Tafsir" was
261 See cAgida wa~Sharica, pp. 148-49, and Y. Linant de 
Beliefonds, A propos d'un livre recent du recteur d'al Azhar, in 
Orient, 5 (1961), No. 19 (3idme trimestre), p. 34.
262In a conversation with this author on 23rd May 1988.
263It has not proved possible to identify the precise dates 
when individual fatwas were issued, but the tone of this one, 
with its emphasis on aspects of the national economy, accords 
with Shaltut's writings of the late 'fifties/early 'sixties, 
making it probably a decade later than the views put forward in 
his tafsir.
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written with the primary aim of urging Muslims not to be cynical 
or defeatist about the viability of an Islamic, interest-free 
economy. Both passages taken together give a clear illustration 
of Shaltut's two, sometimes conflicting, sides: the idealist and
the empiricist.
As Shaykh al-Azhar with a traditional religious education, and 
without a knowledge of any European language or culture, it would 
seem appropriate to describe Shaltut as "conservative", even if 
certain of his views coincide with those of certain modernists. 
On the other hand, one could not say of him that which Gibb said 
in 1945 of the class of c ulama' in general: "They are losing
touch with the thought of the age."264
If anything Shaltut could perhaps be described as moderate, on 
the one hand desiring to accommodate the Islamic teachings as far 
as possible to modern conditions, as we have seen in his fatwas 
on financial transactions and his opinion on female witnesses, 
for example, and on the other, ever-mindful of the precepts of
the Qur'an and Sunna. Generally speaking his religious training
and conviction prevents him from manipulating the sources in a 
way that less religiously minded reformers have done.265
One theme which has occurred in all chapters of this work is 
that of ij tihad, and in view of its centrality to the thesis it 
seems appropriate to end with a few comments on that subject.
2 6 4 H .A .R . Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, p. 122.
265See, e.g., the description of some of Bourguiba's
rationalisations for reform in Norman Anderson, Law Reform in the 
Muslim World, London: Athlone Press, 1976, p. 63.
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While in theory i jtihad is restricted to matters not laid down in 
the sources, it seems that even Shaltut feels compelled to 
encroach on the Quranic legislation in certain cases (e.g. the 
case of female witnesses and marriage to the women of ahl al- 
kitab). While this can no doubt be rationalised by drawing a 
distinction between those rulings which represent "solutions" 
specific to the age of revelation, and those which represent 
eternally valid "commandments",266 or between "legal enactments" 
and "moral injunctions",267 such distinctions can never be wholly 
objective and there will inevitably be disagreement on individual 
cases.
As regards the role of ijtihad in evolving social patterns in 
the modern world, the development of religious thought does not 
of course take place in a socio-cultural vacuum; however, one 
could reply to a contemporary Orientalist who maintains that it 
is outside forces and not ijtihad which constitutes the "real 
motor of change", 2 6 0 that ij tihad was never meant to be more than 
the instrument of change, the professed aim being the benefit of 
Muslims and of mankind.
266K. S. El-Awa, op. cit., p. 86.
267Rahman, op. cit., p. 47. 
260Jansen, op. cit., p. 91.
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